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I. INTRODUCTION
Confusion among consumers is the grave iniquity against which
trademark laws and jurisprudence are intended to guard. In the guise of
preventing confusion, however, trademark holders can interfere with
competitors’ ability to market competing products, and everyone’s
ability to mock or criticize trademarked goods or services. Expansive
constructions of trademark rights discourage third parties from using
trademarks of their own that are even mildly similar to preexisting
marks, impede legitimate competition, and dissuade and chill legally
permissible free speech uses of trademarks.
In the context of trademark litigation, trademark holders aggressively
assert that consumers are extremely easy to confuse because judicial
acceptance of this assumption facilitates victory in trademark infringement
suits. Convincing courts that consumers will be confused is sometimes
required, and always useful, for succeeding in trademark dilution actions
as well. Trademark law is doctrinally structured to motivate trademark
holders to negatively appraise the intelligence, powers of observation,
and discernment of consumers.
Those defending against charges of trademark infringement or dilution
will typically and understandably respond to such claims with narrowly
tailored arguments that consumers are unlikely to be confused by their
specific marks or particularized usages. Usually, for defendants in
trademark suits, it is neither tactically effective nor efficient to offer
expansive counter-assertions about the relative intelligence and acumen
of consumers at large. As a result, it is fact finders who are best situated
to defend consumers against the broad negative generalizations and
empirically unsupported disparagement aimed by mark holders at buyers
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of goods and services. However, familiarizing oneself with a broad
range of federal court opinions in trademark cases raises a series of
disturbing questions: Why, in trademark litigation decisions, do judges
so often write about representative members of the public as if we are
astoundingly naïve, stunningly gullible, and frankly stupid? Do jurists
truly believe that consumers are complete idiots? What is it about
trademark law that seems to elicit from courts such offensive and
humiliating views of the citizenry?
Admittedly, one can never decipher with any certainty what views,
assumptions, notions, or biases lead a jurist to adopt a particular analytic
approach or ground a given court’s legal conclusions. Also, one can
certainly pick and choose cases out of the fairly robust trademark
jurisprudence to support or refute any number of conflicting theories.
Judges’ assumptions about the ignorance and base confusability of
consumers may, in fact, be merely pretextual, a populace-debasing and
intellectually dishonest, but analytically efficient, normative platform
from which to reach trademark-strengthening outcomes that appear
doctrinally compliant. This Article rejects that possibility,1 and assumes
arguendo that the judicial rulings in the trademark cases discussed (and
frequently criticized) throughout this work were rendered with good
faith beliefs that these holdings were countenanced, and indeed required,
by trademark law. However, nothing in the Lanham Act directs courts
to assume that the American public is comprised of unsophisticated,
easily confused rubes; if indeed this is trademark law, it has been
manufactured by judges at the behest of trademark holders.
The primary objective of this Article is to illustrate the tendency of
judges to inappropriately rely on personal intuition and subjective,
internalized stereotypes when ruling on trademark disputes. Where
jurists perceive consumers as ludicrously easily confused, trademark
holders can exploit these views to secure broad trademark “rights,” often
without offering a shred of evidentiary corroboration concerning such
confusion. As a consequence, the proof required to support allegations
1. As a general matter, this Author certainly does not dismiss the possibility, but
wishes to focus this particular scholarly work elsewhere. Interested readers should
review the excellent article by Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY
L.J. 367 (1999) (arguing that the recent doctrinal shift from regarding trademarks as a
source of product information to regarding trademark holders as possessing property-like
rights in the mark has created market incentives for trademark holders to seek
“trademark monopolies” which are fundamentally at odds with social welfare
justifications for trademark protection).
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that a trademark usage creates a likelihood of confusion is potentially
lessened in all cases, making trademarks normatively stronger, broader,
and ever easier to “protect” for mark holders. Whether consumers
realistically benefit from this, in terms of avoiding future confusion,
seems highly questionable, especially if they were never actually
bewildered or fooled in the first place.
Where judges find defendants’ unauthorized uses of a trademark
repugnant, such as in the context of ribald parodic sexual allusions, they
are especially willing to find likelihood of confusion, often in circumstances
where actual confusion, as most lay people understand the term, is
improbable enough to render such decisions facially absurd. However,
when judges find a plaintiff’s marked product deserving of derision or
ridicule, they are more likely to endorse the concept that free speech
rights can supersede the interests of trademark owners. Judicial biases
result in inconsistent approaches to balancing speech rights against
trademark interests, which in turn foment uncertainty and unfairness.
Trademark rights should not be strengthened and expanded by reliance
on unproven and demonstrably incorrect allegations about the ignorance,
poor reasoning, and deficient observational powers of the public, nor
should trademark rights be calibrated by how appalling or appealing a
judge finds a product or service. If trademark holders are to be broadly
privileged by the courts without explicit direction by Congress, then an
alternative doctrinal justification to protecting consumers is required,2
and the resulting protections should adhere fairly consistently to all
similarly situated trademarks.
Part II of this Article discusses the foundation and development of
pertinent aspects of trademark law and policy, and asserts that the true
intended and actual beneficiaries of the Lanham Act are trademark
holders, rather than consumers. Part III explains the importance of
context in trademark law, especially with regard to assessments of the
likelihood of consumer confusion in trademark infringement actions.
The use of consumer confusion analysis in trademark dilution cases is
also critiqued. In Part IV, the extreme and problematic subjectivity of
2. See generally Robert Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1664
(1999). The article asserts that Ralph Brown’s principal achievement
was to win acceptance for a mode of analysis that tied the protection of
trademarks to their economic role in the marketplace. He had demonstrated
that any extension of trademark protection beyond the limits of the confusion
rationale was at least debatable, and after the publication of his article any case
for expanded protection required more than unadorned allusions to property
rights and unjust enrichment. In the decades that followed, as the debate over
the scope of trademark protection played out on several fronts, Ralph fought to
retain consumer confusion as the touchstone for excluding copiers.
Id.
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the likelihood of confusion inquiry is explained and illustrated, as is the
tendency of judges to assume that consumers are naïve and stupid.
Special emphasis is given to the consequences of gender and class
stereotyping by judges, with respect to trademark infringement analyses
and case outcomes. Part V charts the impact that the substantive defects
in trademark jurisprudence identified by the previous portions of the
Article have upon freedom of speech when trademark holders object to
unauthorized communicative uses of their marks. Finally, Part VI concludes
that all consumers should be presumed reasonably prudent, and all
trademarks should be treated in a gender and class neutral manner.
II. U.S. TRADEMARK LAW: THE LANHAM ACT AND THE
FEDERAL COURTS
To fully understand the problematic manner in which the “likelihood
of confusion” test is often applied, it is necessary to consider what
trademarks are, why they are protected, the statutory and doctrinal limits
of trademark rights, and the reasons that judges sometimes expand or
ignore these limits. A trademark is a word, short phrase, symbol,
picture, design, or other feature that is used in trade, in conjunction with
specific goods or services, to indicate the source of the goods or services
and distinguish them from the commercial offerings of competitors.3
Trademarks are intended to perform a source-identifying function with
respect to goods or services in commerce,4 but trademark rights are not
doctrinally intended to provide any right of exclusivity with respect to
the underlying products and services that are identified by the marks.5
Though popularly referred to as a form of intellectual property, there is
very little that is “intellectual” about trademarks in the sense that
protectable marks, unlike copyrighted works or patented inventions, are
not required to reflect any innovation or creativity whatsoever.6
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Marks that identify the source of services (such as
the name of a travel agency or dry cleaner) are correctly denominated as “service
marks,” but are treated virtually identically to trademarks as a matter of law. Id. § 1053.
Trademarks usually appear on a product or on product packaging, while service marks
appear in promotional material for services. However, service marks are commonly
incorporated within the general “trademark” rubric, and therefore “trademark” or “mark”
will be used to denote both trademarks and service marks here, in conformity with
common practice.
4. See id. § 1052.
5. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212–14 (2000).
6. The Lanham Act accords trademark protection based on use in commerce
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Trademarks are creatures of commerce. Patent owners receive a finite
term of limited monopolistic control over their inventions to reward
them for inventing (or investing in the invention of)7 new, useful, and
nonobvious products and processes, and making the innovative
knowledge underlying the inventions available to the public.8 Copyright
owners also receive finite terms of monopolistic control over copyrighted
works, though a copyright is enforceable far longer than a patent, and the
nature of a copyright monopoly is somewhat different and narrower than
the exclusivity conferred by a patent.9 Copyright owners are given their
bundle of exclusive rights to reward them for creating original works of
authorship.10 By contrast, trademark owners can assert and retain
ownership of their marks in perpetuity (as long as they remain in
commercial use)11 and are not even theoretically obliged to provide a
marked product or service that is creative, unique, or of value to the

rather than on the content of the mark. Content based prohibitions are unrelated to
creativity. Section 1052, for example, states that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of
the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration
on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—” and sets categories of marks
that may not be registered, such a mark which “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); see also Lunney, supra note 1, at
373 (“Unlike patent and copyright, trademark law neither ties its prerequisites for
protection to a need for additional incentive, nor defines its protection to ensure an
appropriate incentive level.”); Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 32–36 (1999) (describing how public perception and use creates the
“secondary meaning” accociated with a trademark).
7. Patent owners are often the corporate entities that employ human inventors.
See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite! A Call for Collective Action by
Employee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 674–75 (1997).
8. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000).
9. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the
Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 154–55 (1998).
The Copyright Act does not bestow absolute exclusive rights upon a
copyright owner, but rather confers a limited monopoly with respect to use of
the copyrighted work. A copyright is intangible (or “intellectual”) property
that is vested with a public interest, intended to achieve an “important public
purpose.” There is a societal bargain implicit in the copyright law. Copyright
owners are given tools in the form of exclusive rights with which to exploit
creative endeavors financially, but this gift is conditioned upon an
understanding that the ultimate goal of copyrights is to maximize the number
of creative works available to the public, and not to benefit individual
copyright owners. Alternatively expressed, “copyright is a bargain between
the public and publishers, in which the public consents to restrict its rights as a
kind of bribe to publishers.” To effectuate this bargain, copyrights should be
no more restrictive than is necessary to create incentives for the promotion of
knowledge and learning. Where public interests conflict with those of
copyright owners, the public interests should prevail.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–59 (2000).
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public.12 Trademark laws do not materialize from the so-called Intellectual
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the
following enumerated power: “To promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”13 Rather,
congressional power to federally regulate trademarks comes from the
Commerce Clause.14
Statutory U.S. trademark law has been expansively altered in recent
years.15 When amendments to the Lanham Act made it possible for
12. Trademark rights are obtained by either using the mark in commerce (and
perhaps subsequently registering the mark with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
or by filing an application to register the mark with the PTO and asserting (in the
application) a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. See id. § 1051. Federal
registration is not required to begin use of a mark, nor necessary to acquire rights in a
mark, but it provides trademark owners with a host of significant advantages. Holders of
federally registered marks are the presumptive owners of the marks on a nationwide
basis and can use the machinery of the federal court system to defend their trademark
rights. The term of a federal trademark registration is ten years, with the ability to renew
for a potentially unlimited number of subsequent ten-year terms. Id.
13. Patents and copyrights are alluded to in Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution, which is known as the Enumerated Powers Clause. See U.S. CONST. art I, §
8. This constitutional power authorizes Congress to enact laws for certain purposes,
such as the creation of money and to “promote the progress of science and the useful
arts.” Id.; see Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–95 (1879); Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139
F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1998).
“[C]ommerce,” for purposes of delimiting “use in commerce” under the
Lanham Act, is expressly defined by Section 45 to be “all commerce which
may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” We recently affirmed that the “history
and text of the Lanham Act show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress’s
intent to legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause.”
Id. (citations omitted); United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc.,
128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:117 & n.2 (4th ed. 2003) (citing TradeMark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), for the proposition that “the power of Congress to
register marks stems only from the ‘Commerce Clause’ of the U.S. Constitution”). The
Supreme Court, moreover, has made clear that Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause extends to activity that “substantially affects” interstate commerce.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
14. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 5.3.
15. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American
Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 829–
30 (2000).
Three major developments have happened in roughly the last decade. First,
in 1988, section 1051 of the Lanham Act was amended to provide for the
reservation of marks which claimants intend to use in commerce. In 1996,
Congress passed the Federal Dilution statute, which was expanded in 1999 to
include dilution as grounds for cancellation or opposition proceedings before
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”). Also, but certainly not
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entities to obtain trademark rights by simply asserting that they
“intended to use” a trademark in commerce,16 the United States moved
closer, in some respects, to harmonization with the laws of countries in
which trademarks belong to the first entity to register them, rather than
vesting trademark rights through commercial use.17 However, nations
with strong trademark protections generally make trademark registrations
far more difficult to obtain than in the United States.18
The original justification for recognizing enforceable rights in trademarks
was premised on the idea that trademarks could simultaneously benefit
both consumers and producers of goods and services. The classic
description of the dual advantages of the trademark system describes
finally, in 1999 Congress further amended the Lanham Act to add a new
section 43(d), which provides for statutory damages and in rem jurisdiction
when a cybersquatter registers another’s trademark as its domain name with
the intent to traffic in the domain name. This trend drastically expands the
boundaries of what the common law had long settled as the scope of American
trademark right. None of the existing social, economic, or legal justifications
supporting American trademark law encourage, let alone tolerate, such expansion.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also International Trademark Association, The Lanham Act,
at http://www.inta.org/about/lanham.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. The intent-to-use application allows federal clearance and
approval for registration of a trademark (the entire examination and clearance procedure
of federal registration) without a showing of actual use of the mark in commerce. After
an intent-to-use application has successfully made its way through the PTO, a Notice of
Allowance, rather than a certificate of registration, issues: Actual use of the mark in
commerce must be made before the mark can be registered. The Notice of Allowance
operates to assure registration once actual use in commerce has begun and the additional
filing requirements have been met. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, What
Happens After I File My Application?, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac
/doc/basic/afterapp.htm#cert (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
If the mark is published based upon the applicant’s bona fide intention to use
the mark in commerce, the USPTO will issue a NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE
about twelve (12) weeks after the date the mark was published, if no party files
either an opposition or request to extend the time to oppose. The applicant then
has six (6) months from the date of the NOTICE OF ALLOWANCE to either:

use the mark in commerce and submit a STATEMENT OF USE; or

request a six-month EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A STATEMENT
OF USE.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (requiring trademark applicant to file a verified
statement that the trademark is used in commerce with the PTO).
17. Port, supra note 15, at 831–32; see also Jenkins, Community Trade Marks, at
http://www.jenkins-ip.com/serv/t_trad05.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004) (noting that
unlike U.S. law, French trademark law generally provides protection based upon
registration, regardless of prior use); Ladas & Parry, United Kingdom—New Trademark
Law, Nov. 1994, at http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/1994/1194Bulletin/UK_New
TMAct.html.
[T]he United Kingdom has to a large extent moved to a first-to-file system,
thus making it highly advisable for trademark owners to try and avoid a
difficult and costly opposition based on prior use against a similar mark, by
registering their marks before they are anticipated by others.
Id.
18. Port, supra note 15, at 831–32.
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how trademarks serve the interests of consumers by reducing search
costs and allowing buyers to “make rational purchasing and repurchasing
decisions with speed and assurance,” while simultaneously “creat[ing]
incentives for firms to create and market products of desirable qualities,
particularly when these qualities are not observable before purchase.”19
That is a succinct articulation of the views contained in an influential
and oft-cited20 law review article written by William Landes and Richard
Posner in 1987, which purports to explain the economics of trademarks
and endorses an expansive view of trademark strength and protectability.21
However, when balanced against the unfettered ability of producers of
goods and services to acquire new trademarks, jettison old trademarks,
use multiple trademarks simultaneously, and communicate through
advertisements, the Landes and Posner analysis can be seen to exaggerate
the positive utility that shoppers derive from trademarks.
A. Problems with Broad Trademark Protection: Overstatement of
Consumer Benefits
Intended to both justify and reinforce court effectuated trademark
protection of broad scope, the legal analysis of Landes and Posner
conceptualizes trademarks as devices that reduce information gathering
19. Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1998); see also S. REP. NO. 79–133, at 3 (1946), reprinted
in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (detailing the legislative history of the Lanham Act.)
20. See, e.g., Sport Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335 F.3d 453, 460
n.7 (5th Cir. 2003); Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 722, 734 (7th Cir. 1998); TMT N. Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876,
882 (7th Cir. 1997); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d 169, 171 (7th
Cir. 1996); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1992); Q Div. Records, LLC v. Q Records, No. Civ.A. 99-10828-GAO, 2000 WL
294875, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 11, 2000); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum
Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
2007, 2081 n.237 (2003); Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic
Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 699 n.15 (1998); Lawrence B. Ebert, The Supreme
Court Decision in Qualitex v. Jacobson—A Comment, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 100, 101
(1995); Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of
Integrity Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 307 n.47 (2003); Kenneth L. Port, The
Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the
Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 888 (2000); Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion Is the
Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
543, 547 n.21 (2002); Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, Functional Design
Features, and the Trouble with Traffix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 29 n.119 (2001).
21. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987).
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and transaction costs by allowing consumers to approximate the nature
and quality of goods and services emanating from recognized sources.22
According to Landes and Posner,
[A] trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself,
“I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase
because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the
same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.”23

One commentator provided this illustration:
Take laundry detergent for example. Hypothetically, let us presume that Tidy
brand detergent is desirable because it gets Emily’s clothes clean while Aller
brand detergent is not because although it gets Emily’s clothes clean, it also
makes her break out in a rash if she wears clothes washed in Aller brand
detergent. The economic function of trademarks in this setting is realized because
Emily can make a quick and inexpensive choice between Tidy and Aller in the
grocery store. Although she knows they each share the quality function of
getting her clothes clean, they also do not share the quality function because one
makes her break out in a rash and the other does not. As such, Emily can rely
on the trademarks to identify one consistent product emanating from one
consistent source, even if that source is not specifically known by Emily.
On the other hand, if Emily cannot rely on the source and quality functions of
trademarks, she will be forced to research the chemical compositions of Tidy
and Aller and determine precisely which chemical or combination of chemicals
irritate her skin. She will then be required to read each package of detergent
and study the ingredients to determine which box of detergent contains the
undesirable characteristics. Consequently, Emily will incur a significantly
higher total cost in purchasing the box of detergent if she cannot rely on
trademarks to identify the information she desires about laundry detergent.24

Trademarks can certainly convey information. The obvious flaw in
the above analysis, however, is the implicit (and stunningly incorrect)
assumption that trademarks play a role in either restricting Tidy’s ability
to alter its chemical composition to include the ingredient that irritates
Emily’s skin, or in imposing a duty on Tidy to at least inform consumers
22. See, e.g., Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why
the General Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3340–41 (1999).
The first major principle of trademark protection is predicated on preventing
consumer confusion that occurs when a junior user adopts a mark confusingly
similar to that used by a senior user. The importance of protecting the public
from confusion is obvious. Absent protection for the exclusive use of
trademarks, consumers would be unable to distinguish between related goods
sold under similar marks. Similarly, consumers may falsely associate goods
bearing similar marks as being derived from the same source. Consumers,
therefore, “would be forced to re-educate themselves with each purchase or
possible purchase of a branded product.” This outcome belies an important
economic benefit attributed to trademarks by increasing consumer search costs.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 268–70.
24. Port, supra note 15, at 889.
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like Emily when it changes its constitutive formulation. The manufacturer
may tout a “new and improved formula” when it modifies a product’s
components, or it may choose not to draw attention to such adjustments.
Unless Emily continually monitors the small print on the Tidy label for
changes, she may find her dermis red and itchy, lured by the Tidy
trademark into a false sense of freedom from the risk of rashes.
Theoretically, because a particular company is the only entity allowed
to use trademarked words and logos on particular goods or services in
the stream of commerce, consumers can be confident that when they buy
a product bearing the company’s marks, it will comport with the
company’s standards (whatever they are perceived to be). In addition,
there may be a belief that consumers can locate and contact the
responsible party if they have questions about, or experience problems
with, a product or service associated with that company’s mark. The
reality, however, is that trademarks do not impose any actual obligation
upon a mark holder to include any particular features, to maintain any
particular level of quality, or even to disclose the identity or location of
the actual decision makers that orchestrate the production and distribution
of the marked goods and services.25
Consider the fact that the catalog clothing company Lands’ End is
now owned by Sears Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”), which hopes to use the
Lands’ End mark, associated by some consumers with “quality,” to lure
affluent college-educated shoppers who are conditioned to paying “full
price” to the clothing departments of Sears’ retail stores.26 Sears
apparently believes that the Lands’ End mark connotes better products
than its own Sears mark, but Sears is now the actual, factual producer of
goods distributed bearing Lands’ End labels. Sears advertises the fact
that its retail stores now carry Lands’ End clothing, but it does not
broadcast the fact that it is now the source of Lands’ End clothing.27
25. See, e.g., Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845, 1845 (2003) (writing that
“[t]o the extent that the purpose of trademark law is to reduce consumer decision costs
and to induce producers to make high-quality products, it ought to [but does not] reflect
both positive and negative consumer preferences”). But see Gerard N. Magliocca, One
and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949,
957 (2001) (writing that “[i]n a world with marks . . . consumers can easily gauge a
product’s quality based on advertising or on the prior performance of items that bore the
same mark”).
26. Sandra Guy, Sears Changes Look, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 45; Doris
Hajewski, Lands’ End in Stores; Sears Hopes Shoppers Bite as it Begins Brand Rollout,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 28, 2002, at D1.
27. The Lands’ End homepage bears the following notice: “Sears® stores are now
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One might say that in this instance trademark usage is intended to
confuse consumers, rather than protect or inform them.28 While the use
of trademarks to obfuscate source and deceive consumers may be an
inevitable consequence of trademark protections generally, the possibility
certainly ought to weigh against strong trademark rights.
B. Problems with Broad Trademark Protection: Value to
Producers Underestimated
Concurrently, Landes and Posner contend that companies benefit from
trademark protection to the extent that the products or services
associated with their marks enjoy a good reputation with consumers.29
Corporate interests often view protected trademarks as mechanisms for
insuring that they receive the full benefits of their investments in
producing quality goods and services and as tools to strengthen the
ability of commercial advertising to promote brand identification.30
Advertising and the attributes of goods and services themselves give
trademarks meaning. Trademarks give consumers mechanisms for
offering a colorful array of bestselling Lands’ End products. See our Sears Store
Directory for a location near you.” Lands’ End, at http://www.landsend.com (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004).
28. A recent commentator provides this example of the phenomomon:
As AirTran Flight 446 taxied to the runway, the wild-eyed man in the seat next
to me began to fidget, making me a bit uncomfortable facing my first flight on
this new budget airline. It was not until the plane actually began to take off
that the man turned to me and, without introduction, stated plainly, “You know,
AirTran used to be ValuJet.” No, I hadn’t known. But as the plane gained altitude
and images of the much-publicized 1996 ValuJet crash in the Everglades
drifted through my mind, I knew it would be a long flight back to Boston.
Note, Badwill, supra note 25, at 1845, 1846 (observing also that “a company whose
mark has captured significant consumer badwill because of dangers related to its
associated product or service—for example, the badwill associated with the ValuJet
Airlines mark after its 1996 crash—can shed this badwill by producing the product or
service under a different mark”).
29. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270; see also United States v. Torkington,
812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987).
It . . . is important to recognize that the enforcement of trademark laws benefits
consumers even in cases where there is no possibility that consumers will be
defrauded. For, to the extent that trademarks provide a means for the public to
distinguish between manufacturers, they also provide incentives for manufacturers
to provide quality goods. Traffickers of these counterfeit goods, however,
attract some customers who would otherwise purchase the authentic goods.
Trademark holders’ returns to their investments in quality are thereby reduced.
This reduction in profits may cause trademark holders to decrease their
investments in quality below what they would spend were there no counterfeit
goods. This in turn harms those consumers who wish to purchase higher
quality goods.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270.
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responding to the perceived meanings of trademarks by facilitating the
making or avoiding of purchases of marked goods.
A mark’s meaning, however, may not be the marked product’s reality.
Arguably, effective advertisements can substitute for investments in
quality. Research has demonstrated that consumers often prefer one
brand of a product over another (even though the underlying products
are identical) based on their subjective feelings about a trademark.31 For
example, consumers have long paid premium prices for Wisk laundry
detergent even though comparable, less expensive products are readily
accessible, due to the success of the “Ring Around the Collar”
advertising campaign.32 They attribute superlative cleansing properties
to Wisk that they do not impute to products bearing less well-regarded
trademarks, even though minimal experimentation might demonstrate
that collar grime could be more economically eliminated through
judicious use of alternate detergents (or perhaps by more effectively
washing one’s neck).33 The premium prices paid for particular “elite”
brands of bottled water also illustrate the market power of certain
trademarks.34 Consumers are undoubtedly attracted to certain trademarks
for a variety of reasons besides prior experience with the marked
products or services, hence the extensive, diverse, colorful, not to
mention well-compensated, output of the advertising industry.35
31. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1727–28 (1999).
32. What Type of Slogan Attracts the Most Attention?, at http://bellzinc.
sympatico.ca/en/content/503045?skin=sli (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Wisk Laundry
Detergent, Simpson’s Contemporary Quotations, at http://www.bartleby.com/63/83/
2483.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
33. Landes and Posner assert that consumers will knowingly pay more for a
product that can be found in cheaper, identical iterations because of the “assurance” that
a particular trademark provides them. Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 270.
34. See, e.g., AboutWater.com, Brands, at http://www.water.com/who_we_are/
swg1520_bra.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2003); The Bottled Water Web, Facts, at http://www.
bottledwaterweb.com/indus.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2003); The Bottled Water Web, News,
at http://www.bottledwaterweb.com/news/nw_061600.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
35. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 657, 672–73 (1985).
Empirical studies establish that consumers’ beliefs about a product are affected
not only by advertising, but also by a number of other factors, including their
prior experience with the product, their inspection of the product’s observable
characteristics, the price of the product, the reputation of the seller, and the
presence or absence of a warranty. Since consumers are likely to differ in their
knowledge of each of these factors, they will also differ in the inferences they
draw from any given advertisement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Judicious abstention of the use of certain trademarks can help an entity
escape the repercussions of a bad reputation, as well as reap the benefits
from the positive meanings represented by a trademark. Referencing the
earlier example of Sears, while this company hopes to benefit from the
quality associations that the Lands’ End mark evokes due to business
practices that occurred before Sears assumed ownership and control of
the company, it simultaneously intends to avoid any negative connotations
the Sears mark carries in connection with clothing by not appending the
Sears mark to Lands’ End labels or tags, even though Sears is now the
authentic source of the goods.
The producers of commercial goods and services are arguably the true
targeted and intended beneficiaries of the statutory, administrative, and
legal trademark infrastructures. That trademark usage accrues to the
benefit of consumers at all is, in reality, only a coincidental byproduct of
a labeling and identification system that mark holders are free to
manipulate to their greatest commercial advantage. Manufacturers and
service providers can manipulate trademark usage to provide source
identification to consumers when it is useful, or obfuscate information
when doing that appears beneficial. If consumer associations with a
trademark are positive in nature, the mark holder can continue to invest
in the mark, commercially exploit the positive associations as profitably
as is feasible, and protect the mark from use by competitors. If a mark
acquires negative associations, the mark holder can attempt to change
the perception of the marked products or services by improving quality,
by lowering prices, or through aggressive and creative advertising.
Alternatively, the mark can simply be jettisoned and replaced,
providing the underlying product or service with a clean associative slate
and a fresh start in the marketplace. Producers are not burdened by
trademark law with any legal obligation to inform the public about
trademark changes that are made to goods and services that continue to
be offered or manufactured by the same entity. A consumer who
contracts food poisoning from a commercially purchased prepared food
can certainly steer clear of products bearing the trademarks of the
product that sickened her. She cannot, however, avoid goods from the
same source that bear different, unrelated trademarks, such as those that
might be adopted in the wake of bad publicity, at least not by relying on
the “information” provided by trademarks alone.
Over the past few years, the corporation long known as Philip Morris
Companies, Inc. received widespread criticism and censure for
disingenuousness and dishonesty about the addictive properties and
deleterious health effects of cigarettes and other tobacco products.36
36.
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Apparently to escape lingering negative associations in the future, the
entity has decided to change its name to Altria Group, Inc.37 The
company currently avoids negative associations in the present by
marketing many of its products under other rubrics, such as the Kraft
Foods umbrella, which in turn utilizes hundreds of other trademarks
across a broad range of products including the following: Sanka, Yuban,
General Foods International Coffees, Maxim, and Maxwell House for
coffee, a long list of Post breakfast cereals,38 Good Seasons and Seven
Seas for salad dressings, and Athenos, Churny, Di Giorno, Hoffman’s,
and Polly-O for cheeses.39 A grocery shopper has a pretty formidable task
in terms of self-education and selective shopping if she affirmatively
undertakes to avoid enriching Philip Morris, Inc. by eschewing the
corporation’s brands.
Adding to the difficulty of cognitively linking sources to products due
to the mutability of trademarks (which can be changed at will) is the fact
that trademarks can be transferred to other entities. That the same
trademark appears on a product over time does not even remotely
guarantee that the same source was producing it during that interval. For
example, the Philip Morris website listed Claussen Pickles as one of its
trademarked products at the time this sentence was written.40 However,
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1374938.stm; Media Backgrounder & Commentary, Brooklyn
Jury in Smoker’s Trial Issues First Punitive Damages Award on East Coast in a Tobacco
Case—$20 Million, Jan. 9, 2004, at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/litigation/cases/Backgrounders/
frankson2.htm; Barry Meier, Punitive Damages Added in Smoking Case Verdict (Nov.
28, 2000), at http://www.yourlawyer.com/practice/news.htm?story_id=3802&topic=
Light%20Cigarettes; Statement of Matthew L. Myers President, Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, Illinois Verdict Against Philip Morris Is Appropriate Response to Decades of
Deception About Light Cigarettes (Mar. 21, 2003), at http://tobaccofreekids.org/
Script/DisplayPressRelease.php3?Display=617; Phillip Morris Hit with Record Tobacco
Liability Verdict, CNN.COM (Mar. 30, 1999), at http://www. cnn.com/US/9903/30/
tobacco.trial.02/. See generally Philip Morris USA, Inc., at www.pmdocs.com (providing a
complete database of documents from Philip Morris Tobacco Litigations).
37. See Altria, Altria Group, Inc. Overview, at http://www.altria.com/about_altria
/01_00_AboutAltriaOver.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2004); Altria, Corporate Identity, at
http://www.altria.com/about_altria/01_01_corpidenchange.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2004).
38. These include Alpha-Bits, Banana Nut Crunch, Blueberry Morning, CinnaCluster Raisin Bran, Cranberry Almond Crunch, Frosted Shredded Wheat, Fruit & Fibre,
Golden Crisp, Grape-Nuts, Grape-Nuts O’s, Great Grains, Honey Bunches Of Oats,
Honeycomb, Natural Bran Flakes, Oreo O’s, Pebbles, Raisin Bran, Shredded Wheat,
Shredded Wheat ‘N Bran, Spoon Size Shredded Wheat, Toasties, Waffle Crisp, and
100% Bran. See http://www.altria.com/about_altria/01_04_02_KraftFoodsNorth.Ameria.asp
(last visited May 1, 2004).
39. See id.
40. Id.
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a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) action in October of 200241
pertained to the possible acquisition of the Claussen mark by another
entity. The FTC’s description of the “parties to the transaction” is
instructive with respect to the manner in which the sources of
trademarked goods can change:
Vlasic, which makes and sells shelf-stable and refrigerated pickles, was spun off
by Campbell Soup Company as Vlasic Food International in 1998, after which
it was purchased by Hicks, Muse in May 2001. Hicks, Muse is a Dallas-based
private investment firm that owns Pinnacle Food Corporation (Pinnacle), the
firm that now operates the Vlasic business and which is the nation’s largest
pickle producer. Pinnacle produces Vlasic pickles at its plants in Imlay,
Michigan and Millsboro, Delaware.
Claussen, which makes and sells primarily refrigerated pickles, is a business
operated by Kraft’s Oscar Mayer Foods division. Oscar Mayer bought the
Claussen Pickle Company in 1970, before being acquired by Kraft, which is
owned by Philip Morris. Philip Morris is a Virginia corporation with its
principle place of business in New York. In addition to owning Kraft, it is a
prominent producer of cigarettes, beer, and food, including Post cereal,
Maxwell House coffee, Jell-O desserts, and Altoids mints.
On May 4, 2002, Pinnacle and Kraft entered into an agreement under which
Pinnacle would acquire Claussen’s pickle business, including relish, sauerkraut,
and pickled tomatoes. The Claussen assets being sold include the brand
trademark, as well as a Kraft production facility in Woodstock, Illinois used to
make dill pickles.42

Thus, nothing definitive or permanent about the source of the pickles
is established by the Claussen mark. The actual source of the pickles has
changed repeatedly and may do so again, without notice to consumers.
The content and quality of the pickles may change as well; there is
nothing in trademark law that prevents this, impedes this, or provides
consumers with any notification at all. Trademarks clearly do not
provide information or assurance to consumers—quite the contrary.
Consider a more ominous example: Television networks NBC and
MSNBC are owned by General Electric,43 one of the largest defense
contractors on earth.44 General Electric stands to make incredible profits
41. See Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Votes to
Challenge Hicks, Muse’s Proposed Acquisition of Claussen Pickle Company, Oct. 22,
2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/vlasic.htm.
42. See id.
43. See General Electric, NBC, at http://www.ge.com/en/company/businesses/ge_
nbc.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
44. See General Electric, Aircraft Engines, at http://www.ge.com/en/company/businesses/
ge_aircraft_engines.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003); see also Mike Ward, Top Ten
Conspiracy Theories of 2002, Jan. 2, 2003, at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?storyID=14873.
Examine this question for even a minute and you will stumble onto a proven,
card-carrying evil conspiracy: It’s called the U.S. Congress, and conclusive
evidence links them to a truly terrifying document known as the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
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from weapons build-ups and wars. Trademark law does not require
General Electric to remind television viewers that it is the owner of NBC
and MSNBC news. Instead, trademarks affirmatively hamper the ability
of consumers to keep the “source” of the information in mind when
General Electric’s subsidiary media outlets are reporting the news,
enabling General Electric to rely on the shield of alternative trademarks
to aid and abet any consumer confusion this corporation finds useful.45
Reflection on the ways in which trademarks are actually deployed and
employed by commercial interest makes the assertion that trademarks
protect consumers from being confused, mistaken, or deceived in their
purchasing decisions46 almost laughable, and the contention that broadly
protecting trademarks permits consumers to rely on trademarks as
accurate source indicators47 is bizarre indeed.48 The benefits allocation
This legislation is relevant post-9/11 because it allowed the megamergers of
media conglomerates to become ultra-monstermergers. As a result, today a
handful of multinationals control most of what is said in the U.S. about
military actions overseas and the reasons for them. At least one of these
companies—General Electric—has financial stakes in the weapons racket as
well, but this blatant conflict of interest gets as much coverage as the
Telecommunications Act originally got when it was on the floor of Congress:
next to none. Some media observers and academics, like MIT’s Noam
Chomsky and Norman Solomon of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, have
doggedly pointed out that the bloated media emperor has no clothes. Too bad
they stand little chance of appearing regularly on Face the Nation.
Id.; see also Annie Lawson, US Media Dig Deep for Politicians, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 7,
2003, available at http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,930075,00.html.
45. One apparently independent website, The Memory Hole, rather cleverly
follows articles it reposts from MSNBC with the notice: “News article(s) copyright 2002
MSNBC/Microsoft/NBC/General Electric. Reprinted here for the purposes of education,
media criticism, and political comment.” See, e.g., The Memory Hold, at http://www.
thememoryhole.org/media/msnbc-iaea-report.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
46. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, at §§ 2.1–2.3.
47. Id.
48. On the other hand, trademarks can become undesirable for reasons that have
nothing to do with product qualities or corporate behavior. For example, at present,
citizens of many countries are engaged in boycotts of American products that are
recognized by American-identified trademarks such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola. See,
e.g., Erik Kirschbaum, EU: Boycott of American Goods over Iraq War Gains Momentum,
CORPWATCH, Mar. 25, 2003, at http://www.corpwatch.org/news/PND.jsp? articleid=6072;
Saudis Boycott American Products and Services, ARABICNEWS, May 8, 2002, at
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/020508/2002050806.html; UAE: May 11
World Day to Boycott USA Products and Services, ARABICNEWS, May 6, 2002, at
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/020506/2002050602.html; David Pallister, Arab
Boycott of American Consumer Goods Spreads, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 8, 2003, at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,870412,00.html; Calls in Syria to
Boycott American Goods, ARABICNEWS, Apr. 12, 2002, at http://www.arabicnews.com/
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generated by trademark rights is clearly tilted toward mark holders. If
trademark rights are to be further strengthened and broadened, such
actions should be forthrightly linked to advantaging commercial
interests, rather than pretextually and inaccurately justified as being
helpful to consumers.
III. APPLICATION OF U.S. TRADEMARK LAW: CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING
In most aspects and applications of U.S. trademark law, context is
everything. For example, whether a word can even function as a
protectable trademark can only be determined within the context in
which it is used in conjunction with the good or service. The trademark
taxonomy is generally deemed to contain four categories: “generic,”
“descriptive,” “suggestive,” and “arbitrary or fanciful.”49 Sorting marks
into these malleable categories is performed as a matter of law, and judges
generally accomplish this task by referencing their internal visceral
impressions. This type of subjective contextualizing by courts deciding
trademark disputes is seemingly required by extant legal doctrine and
accustoms judges to using intuition, and to make instinctive rather than
evidence driven legal determinations under the Lanham Act.
A. Trademark Categories
1. Generic Marks
Words that are generic with respect to the associated product or
service can never be protected as trademarks, because this would be
unfair to competitors:50 For example, to allow one company a monopoly
on the words “ice cream” when the product is ice cream would force
another entity marketing the same substance to call its product
something along the lines of “sweet frosty dairy confection.” If that
second company obtained an enforceable trademark on “sweet frosty
dairy confection,” a third competitor might have to resort to the
somewhat unappealing appellation “frozen flavored high fat milk solids”
to communicate the nature of the goods it was selling to consumers. A
ansub/Daily/Day/020412/2002041216.html.
49. These are often referred to as the “Abercrombie & Fitch” categories because
they were first specifically enunciated in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976).
50. See, e.g., Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1980).
Trademarks can also become unprotectable over time if they “commit genericide”—that
is, become used as the generic term for a product or service. See, e.g., International
Trademark Association, FAQs, at http://www.inta.org/info/faqsD.html#4 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2004); Candi Hinton, When Good Marks Go Bad, International Trademark
Association, at http://www.inta.org/press/news2002_10.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
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fourth competitor, if sufficiently cowed by the threat of a trademark
infringement suit, might forgo entering the ice cream marketplace
altogether, thus freezing out the presumptive benefits in terms of quality,
price, and selection that consumers might otherwise milk from
commercial competition. Keep in mind the fact that ice cream is only
generic in certain contexts, and would not be so if invoked as a
trademark for, say, furniture polish.
2. Descriptive Marks
A descriptive term references a quality or characteristic of the
underlying good or service, such as “Arthriticare” for a topical heat
analgesic designed to provide arthritis relief,51 “Pet Pals” for a program
that promotes the well-being of pets,52 and “Skinvisible” when applied to
medical and surgical tapes through which the skin of the user is visible.53
A descriptive term can only function as a valid trademark if it acquires
“secondary meaning,” which means the mark is recognized by the
consuming public as referencing a particular product from a unitary
source.54 For example, all businesses in which eyeglasses and contact
51. Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964 F.2d 1338, 1339 (2d Cir. 1992).
52. P.A.W. Safety Charities v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 3-99-CV-0212-P,
2000 WL 284193, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2000).
The concept of descriptiveness is broadly construed. A mark need not convey
every relevant piece of information about the nature of a product to be
characterized as descriptive. Rather, it must only “immediately convey[] an
important attribute of plaintiffs’ products.” The noun “pet” commonly refers
to “a domesticated animal kept for pleasure rather than utility.” The dictionary
defines “pal” as “a close friend.” Thus, the literal interpretation of “pet pal” is
one who is a friend to his or her pet. It is a common and distinctive quality of
friendship to care for and seek the well-being of one’s friend. Thus, it takes no
imagination or perception to conclude that a program called “Pet Pals” is one
that promotes the well-being of pets. The mark describes the essence of
plaintiff’s program, even though it does not specifically spell out all the
associated services.
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
53. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1179
(C.C.P.A. 1972).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2000); see also Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 774
F. Supp. 103, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
[W]here the issue [in a trademark infringement action] becomes one of
establishing secondary meaning, the relevant inquiry focuses upon whether the
mark, “although not inherently distinctive, comes through use to be uniquely
associated with a single source,” that is, “whether the public is moved in any
degree to buy an article because of its source.” Moreover, the burden of proof
rests upon the party claiming rights in the mark, and “entails vigorous
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lenses are available for purchase may be referred to as “vision centers”
but one specific enterprise cannot obtain a valid trademark in the
descriptive words “Vision Center” unless it can demonstrate that the public
distinctly associates the term “Vision Center” with its particular optical
merchandise establishment.55 Though proving that a mark connotes a
specific source rather than a general concept may sound as difficult and
perhaps metaphysical as other aspects of trademark law, courts generally
require mark holders to produce empirical evidence to that effect.56
3. Suggestive Marks
A suggestive term is one that suggests, rather than describes, an
attribute of the marked good or service, and requires imagination to
cognitively link the trademark to the exact nature of the product.57 The
term “Pizza Rolls” was held to be suggestive when “used in association
with party snacks consisting of pillow shaped egg batter crusts filled
with various food products to obtain different flavors.”58 The court concluded:
The term PIZZA ROLLS could suggest a number of items, including small
pizzas, pizza rolled up, pizza flavored candy, or a bread dough roll filled with
pizza flavoring. It takes imagination and thought to perceive the nature, quality,
characteristics or ingredients of plaintiff’s products based upon the mark PIZZA
ROLLS, all of which clearly indicate that the term is suggestive.59

Other marks that have been deemed to be suggestive include
“psychocalisthenics” for a combination of “various yoga systems, dance
and calisthenics” designed to produce “specific mental, emotional and
spiritual results,”60 “brown-in-bag” for transparent plastic film bags in
evidentiary requirements.” Direct or circumstantial evidence may establish
secondary meaning, including the use of survey evidence by a representative
sample of consumers. The extent of public exposure to the mark as determined
by the sales volume, length of time of use, and promotional efforts may also be
utilized to establish secondary meaning.
Id. (citation omitted).
55. See Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 119 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. See, e.g., Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1999);
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 254 (5th Cir. 1997); Soweco, Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1980); First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. U.S.
Bancorp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1070–71 (D. Kan. 2000).
57. Soweco, Inc., 617 F.2d at 1184.
58. Jeno’s Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents & Trademarks, 227 U.S.P.Q 224, 228 (D.
Minn. 1985) (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7–8).
59. Id.
60. W. & Co. v. Arica Inst., Inc., 557 F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1977).
While “psychocalisthenics,” as noted, bears some relationship to the physical
exercises conducted by Arica, this would be expected of any suggestive mark,
and, in fact, would be one of the purposes of the mark. But we cannot say that
“psychocalisthenics” merely describes “a combination of various yoga
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which foods could be cooked,61 and “The Money Store” for money
lending services.62
Trademarks held to be suggestive are deemed inherently distinctive
and therefore valid and enforceable without proof of secondary
meaning.63 This makes the distinction between “descriptive” and
“suggestive” very important to the mark holder.64 However, where to
situate the taxonomic division between the two categories can be
difficult to ascertain. According to one court:
In the 1930s two courts split on the question of whether the trademark “Chicken
of the Sea” for tuna was descriptive or suggestive. The indirectness of the
association between “Chicken of the Sea” and tuna may thus be taken as a
rough indicator of where the borderline between descriptive and suggestive
marks lies.65

As another court observed, “The line between descriptive and
suggestive terms is often blurred, and the categorization of a name as
‘descriptive’ or ‘suggestive’ is frequently ‘made on an intuitive basis
rather than as a result of a logical analysis susceptible of articulation.’”66
4. Arbitrary and Fanciful Marks
“Arbitrary” trademarks are usually defined as those that adapt a
systems, dance and calisthenics” which require continual motion and are
designed to produce specific mental, emotional and spiritual results. We think
the term does “requir[e] imagination, thought and perception to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of [the services].”
Id. (alterations in original).
61. In re Application of Reynolds Metals Co., 480 F.2d 902, 904 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
62. The Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 673–74 (7th Cir. 1982).
63. See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791
(5th Cir. 1983).
64. See, e.g., W. & Co., 557 F.2d at 342.
In the broad middle ground where most of the trademark battles are fought are
the terms which are primarily descriptive and those which are only suggestive.
The distinction, while not always readily apparent, is important, because those
which are descriptive may obtain registration only if they have acquired
secondary meaning, while suggestive terms are entitled to registration without
such proof.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co., v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 661 (2d Cir.
1970).
65. Lewis Mgmt. Co. v. Corel Corp., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1534, 1537 (S.D. Cal. 1995)
(citations omitted).
66. Calamari Fisheries, Inc. v. The Village Catch, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 994, 1008 (D.
Mass. 1988) (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 (1984)).
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common word to an unfamiliar circumstance, such as “automobile” as a
mark for a brand of paper napkins, for a line of plumbing supplies, or
any other good or service not even remotely associated with motorized
transportation.67 The identical word can be generic or arbitrary
depending on context; generic if it is the name of the good or service in
common parlance (“car” as a textual mark for an automobile), and
arbitrary if it has no logical association whatsoever with the underlying
product (“car” as a textual mark for fabric softener).
The “fanciful” appellation is generally reserved for words and
symbols that are “invented solely for their use as trademarks.”68 Fanciful
marks include Kodak, Xerox, and “the word ‘CHAMS’ on the top side
of a curved, inverted almost-equilateral triangle with a triple-bar winglike design and a heavy letter ‘C’ superimposed in the center of the
shield,” embroidered on garments.69 Like trademarks held to be suggestive,
arbitrary and fanciful marks are considered inherently distinctive and
protectable without proof of secondary meaning.70
Arbitrary and fanciful marks are the strongest marks in the sense that
associations between these types of marks and the marketed goods and
services can be accorded entirely to the mark holder’s efforts. “Kodak”
signifies cameras and film to the consuming public only because the
Eastman Kodak Company has created this associative meaning through
its long term, widespread production of Kodak goods and services and
extensive marketing campaigns.71 However, made-up words are not
strong trademarks in a commercial sense if few consumers recognize
them or perceptually link them to underlying goods and services. The
strength of a mark is a function of both its categorical denotation and the
quantum of recognition it enjoys among the targeted members of the
consuming populace.72
67. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12; see also McKee Baking Co. v.
Interstate Brands Corp., 738 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (explaining that
fanciful marks are coined terms with no dictionary meaning, while arbitrary marks are
common words applied in an unfamiliar, nondescriptive way).
68. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12.
69. Chams De Baron Ltd. v. H. Cotler Co., No. 84 Civ. 1237, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18993, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1984).
70. See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791
(5th Cir. 1983).
71. See, e.g., Kodak, History of Kodak: Introduction, at http://www.kodak.com/
US/en/corp/aboutKodak/kodakHistory/kodakHistory.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
72. See, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d
188, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
It is well settled that the strength of a mark refers to “the distinctiveness, or
more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as
emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous source.” A mark’s
strength is measured by considering two factors: “its inherent distinctiveness,
and its distinctiveness in the marketplace.”
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B. Trademark Categorization Requires Context
The word “apple” is the generic word for a particular tree-growing
fruit, so “apple” cannot be a valid trademark for apples. It is, however,
an arbitrary or fanciful trademark for computers, or for musical sound
recordings, hence Apple Computers73 and Apple Records.74 Similarly,
“popcorn” is generic when it references eponymous kernels of snack
food drenched in butter and salt, but was found suggestive when
pertaining to a line of oddly shaped silver anodes.75
The word “ice” is generic for cubes of frozen water, but was held to be
a suggestive and therefore protectable mark with respect to chewing
gum.76 “Ice” also has been used as a trademark for beer, and in one
lawsuit was asserted to be generic by one litigant, while the mark holder
claimed that the relationship between ice and beer was “either arbitrary,
fanciful or suggestive.”77 The keys to correctly categorizing the mark are
consumer understanding and common usage of the term at the time the
issue is presented to a court.78 Thus, categorizing trademarks can require
substantial amounts of intuitive contextualizing by jurists, who perhaps
become acclimated to or enamored of the practice, and too readily apply
it to other trademark precepts such as consumer-confusion analysis.

Id. (citations omitted); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782
F. Supp. 457, 462 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
[T]he Gallo mark itself has been held by a sister court of this Circuit to have
achieved “virtually universal recognition as a trademark for wine,” and that it
is “universally known both nationally and in California, and has become an
extraordinarily strong and distinctive mark.” This conclusion is further
supported by Gallo’s undisputed showing that it has used the Gallo mark in
relation to its wines for over 50 years; it has spent some $500 million in
advertising its wines distributed under the mark; and it has sold to consumers
some 2 billion bottles of wine bearing the Gallo mark.
Id. (citations omitted).
73. U.S. Trademark No. 78,170,383 (filed Oct. 2, 2002); see Apple Computer,
Inc., at http://www.apple.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
74. U.S. Trademark No. 74,693,839 (filed June 26, 1995); see Apple Records, at
http://www.schomakers.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
75. RFE Indus., Inc. v. SPM Corp., 105 F.3d 923, 925–26 (4th Cir. 1997).
76. Nabisco v. Warner-Lambert Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding that to trademark “ice” for mint flavored chewing gum was suggestive).
77. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd., No. 4:93CV02516, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5341, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 1995) (writing that “A-B [Anheuser-Busch]
argues that the ‘ice’ marks are generic while Labatt argues that they are either arbitrary,
fanciful or suggestive.”).
78. Id.
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C. Consumer-Confusion Analysis
Legal protections for trademarks are doctrinally justified by the need
to prevent consumer confusion, which potentially disadvantages both
individuals who are tricked by confusing or deceptive trademarks into
purchasing goods and services other than those they intended to procure,
and the providers of goods and services who lose sales when consumers
are confused or deceived.79 Alternatively phrased, trademark infringement
occurs when one party adopts a trademark that is the same as or is so
similar to an existing mark that, when it is applied to the second user’s
goods or services, the purchasing public is likely to be confused,
mistaken, or deceived about the source of goods or services themselves,
or about the relationship between the parties that make the goods or
provide the services.80 Referentially compressed into the term “likelihood
of confusion,” this concept is the touchstone of trademark infringement
liability.81
79. Leaffer, supra note 19, at 5–6.
A reliable, stable, and efficiently structured trademark system benefits
consumer and business interests alike. Trademarks serve the interests of
consumers because they reduce search costs and allow buyers to make rational
purchasing and repurchasing decisions with speed and assurance. Just as
important, a strong trademark system creates incentives for firms to create and
market products of desirable qualities, particularly when these qualities are not
observable before purchase.
Id. (footnote omitted).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
81. Id.; Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Rauh Rubber, Inc., 130 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th
Cir. 1997) (writing that the “likelihood of consumer confusion . . . is the ‘hallmark of any
trademark infringement claim’”) (quoting Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74,
80 (2d Cir. 1994). See generaly Case Law, Sabel v. Puma, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135
(1998) (discussing the German Supreme Court’s establishment of a uniform “likelihood
of confusion” standard for trademark protection in the Federal Republic of Germany);
Kristan Friday, How the Ninth Circuit Interprets “Likelihood of Confusion,” 12 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 246 (2001); Patricia J. Kaeding, Comment, Clearly Erroneous
Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion
Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1291 (1992) (outlining features of
the Ninth Circuit’s “likelihood of confusion” analysis); Richard L. Kirkpatrick,
Likelihood of Confusion Issues: The Federal Circuit’s Standard of Review, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1221 (1991) (outlining features of the Federal Circuit’s “likelihood of confusion”
analysis); Lisa Kobialka, Note, Not Likely, But Possible: A Lesser Standard for
Trademark Infringement in Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co., 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 477
(1997) (arguing the Third Circuit had disrupted standard “likelihood of confusion”
analysis in Versa Products Co. v. Bifold Co.); David J. McKinley, Proving Likelihood of
Confusion: Lanham Act vs. Restatement, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 239 (2001)
(arguing that potentially relevant “likelihood of confusion” factors have converged for
all the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal); Micah D. Nessan, Marca Mode CV v. Adidas
AG: An End to the “Confusion”?, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 629 (2001) (discussing the
European Court of Justices’ application of the “likelihood of confusion” test in Marca
Mode CV v. Adidas AG, 2 C.M.L.R. 1061 (2000)); Jacqueline Pasquarella, Confusion
over the Likelihood of Confusion?: Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar, 38 VILL. L.
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A trademark can be infringed by the unauthorized use of exact replicas
of the mark on the same products (where the act might be characterized
as counterfeiting) or on related goods.82 Trademarks can also be infringed
83
by the nonpermissive use of “colorable imitations” of the mark.
Whether a mark accused of infringing another mark is similar enough to
constitute an actionable colorable imitation is a subjective decision that
courts make and is usually articulated as a judgment about whether the
contemporaneous coexistence of the marks underlying the dispute is
likely to cause consumer confusion.84
When trademark holders attempt to convince a court that the
trademark related activities of another entity should be enjoined, they
argue overtly or by implication that consumers are easily confused
because this helps them prevail in both infringement and dilution
actions, which in turn broadens the scope of, and increases the strength
of, their trademarks. Strong, broadly enforceable trademarks are desirable
because they may discourage competitors from using otherwise attractive
and advantageous trademarks of their own that are even mildly similar,
and simultaneously frighten away those who might otherwise make
noncompeting or even arguably noncommercial uses of the mark
REV. 1317 (1993) (discussing the Third Circuit’s standard of review of lower court’s
“likelihood of confusion” determinations); David M. Perry, Comment, Possibility of
Confusion in Third Circuit Trademark Infringement: A Standard Without a Test, 71
TEMPLE L. REV. 325 (1998) (outlining the development of the “likelihood of confusion”
test in Third Circuit trademark cases); Jonathan Pavlovcak, Recent Decisions, Johnny
Come Lately Gets Some Relief from the Third Circuit—A & H Sportswear Inc. v.
Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 1999 WL 23441 (3d Cir. 1999), 17 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH.
J. 193 (1998) (discussing the Third Circuit’s formulation of the “likelihood of confusion”
test in A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc.); Stephen C. Root, Trade
Dress, the “Likelihood of Confusion,” and Wittgenstein’s Discussion of “Seeing As”:
The Tangled Landscape of Resemblance, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 757 (2000) (arguing
“likelihood of confusion” test will necessarily remain “contingent, incomplete, and . . .
unsatisfactory” given the philosophical issues involved in determining “similarity”);
Jeffrey J. Rupp, Trademark Law: The Third Circuit’s Rejection of the Possibility of
Confusion Test, 5 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 16 (1999) (discussing the Third Circuit’s
formulation of the “likelihood of confusion” test in A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria’s
Secret Stores, Inc.); Richard E. Stanley, Jr., Comment, Reverse Confusion as Applied in
Dream Team Collectibles, Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball, and Illinois High
School Association, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1007 (1998) (discussing the application of the
“likelihood of confusion” factors in “reverse confusion” cases among the Federal Courts
of Appeals).
82. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
83. Id. § 1114(1)(a).
84. See, e.g., Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d
488, 501 (E.D. Va. 1999).
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without the mark holder’s explicit authorization.
1. Colorable Infringement
Accusations of trademark infringement are generally raised when one
entity makes use of a mark that is the same or similar to a mark that is
“owned” by another. In this context, the term “ownership” connotes the
holding of trademark rights, often (but not always) by virtue of use of
the mark in commerce,85 and by federal registration of the mark obtained
through the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. If a competitor makes
unauthorized use of another’s exact trademark in a clearly deceptive
manner, that rival may be accused of criminal counterfeiting86 as well as
trademark infringement.87
While there is fairly universal agreement that unauthorized uses of
confusingly similar trademarks by competitors is unfair and should be
prevented, a meaningful explanation of what “confusingly similar”
means eludes even a careful reader of the Lanham Act, the federal statute
85. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1052; id. § 1127 (defining “commerce”).
86. See, e.g., Department of Justice, 1701 Trademark Counterfeiting—Introduction, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01701.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2004).
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, §
1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178 (1984), and the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996), address the growing
problem of trafficking in counterfeit trademark goods, which has primarily
involved the clandestine manufacture and distribution of imitations of wellknown trademarked merchandise. The 1984 Act created an offense, codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2320, which provides that “(w)hoever intentionally traffics or
attempts to traffic in goods and services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark
on or in connection with such goods or services” shall be guilty of a felony. 18
U.S.C. § 2320(a). Section 2320(b) enables the United States to obtain an order
for the destruction of articles in the possession of a defendant in a prosecution
under this section upon a determination by the preponderance of the evidence
that such articles bear counterfeit marks.
These Acts also amend the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., to create
stronger remedies in civil cases involving the intentional use of a counterfeit
trademark. They provide mechanisms for obtaining statutory damages, treble
damages and attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1117. The Lanham Act also
provides for ex parte application by a trademark owner for a court order to
seize counterfeit materials and instrumentalities where it can be shown that the
defendant is likely to conceal or transfer the materials. Id. § 1116(d). New
amendments permit the seizure order to be served and executed either by
federal law enforcement officers or by state or local law enforcement officers.
Id. § 1116(d)(9). The Lanham Act also requires applicants to file a notice of
application for an ex parte seizure order with the United States Attorney, who
may participate in such proceedings if they appear to affect evidence of a
federal crime.
Id.
87. “Counterfeit” is defined as “a spurious mark which is identical with, or
substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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underpinning trademark law. The Lanham Act defines infringement as the
“use in commerce of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation of a registered mark” in commerce in a manner “likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,”88 and then rather
circularly and unhelpfully defines “colorable imitation” as a term that
“includes any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely
to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.”89 This means that for all
practical purposes, a confusingly similar mark is statutorily defined as a
mark likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive that is used in a
manner likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. This
certainly provides a powerful conceptual illustration of the word
“confusing,” but gives little guidance to courts about when a competing
mark accused of being infringing is “confusingly similar.” As a result,
federal judges give meaning to the term on a case-by-case basis as they
issue verdicts and opinions in the context of trademark litigation.
Actual confusion of consumers need not be demonstrated to prevail in
an infringement action, merely likelihood thereof.90 If the judges
assume the average shopper is rather guileless and simpleminded, then
anything that is even arguably mildly perplexing can be understood to
meet this low threshold. Once it is met, the jurist’s task is essentially
complete because likelihood of confusion connotes likelihood of success
on a trademark infringement claim, and irreparable injury to the mark
holder is then presumed.91 Judges who enjoin infringers conveniently
88. Id. §§ 1114(1), 1125.
89. Id. §§ 1114(1), 1127.
90. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867,
875 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Of course, it is black letter law that actual confusion need not be
shown to prevail under the Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove
and the Act requires only a likelihood of confusion as to source.”); Scarves by Vera, Inc.
v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1175 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that “‘a showing of
actual confusion is not necessary and in fact is very difficult to demonstrate’ with
reliable proof”) (quoting W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d 1970);
see also Kobialka, supra note 81, at 488.
The “likelihood of confusion” standard is a happy medium between a
“possibility of confusion” standard and an “actual confusion” standard.
Demonstrating a possibility of confusion is quite easy. On the other hand,
proof of actual confusion is difficult, if not impossible, to establish. However,
evidence of actual confusion is only one of several factors employed to make a
likelihood of confusion determination. Any proof of actual confusion is
persuasive evidence that there is a likelihood of confusion, but a lack of actual
confusion is not dispositive.
Id. (citations omitted).
91. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., 799 F.2d at 875.
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escape the difficult task of precisely articulating how likely confusion
has to be before “likelihood of confusion” is found. They are not required
to ground their determinations in even euphemistically quantitative
constructs like “preponderance of the evidence,”92 by finding that a
majority of consumers are likely to be confused. Nor do they typically
elucidate any theory of causation, neither explaining how likelihood of
confusion in a given context leads to harm, nor specifying how to
measure the amount of confusion that is likely to be generated by a
particular usage or substantiality of similarity.
Even the very nature of the confusion inquiry is ambiguous. The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition characterizes the conclusion
that “likelihood of confusion [is] a question of fact subject to the clearly
erroneous rule” as “the better view, adopted by the majority of courts.”93
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, views likelihood
of confusion as a question of law,94 while the Second and Sixth Circuits
assert that it is a mixed question of law and fact.95 The authors of one of
92. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999).
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. m (1993).
94. See, e.g., Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
Some circuit courts hold that the question of likelihood of confusion is one
of fact and is subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a). However, other courts hold that it is a conclusion of law. Our
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, recognized in Du
Pont that the question of likelihood of confusion “has been termed a question
of fact” by other courts, but did not specifically adopt that view. It went on to
say that “if labeled a mixed question or one of law, it is necessarily drawn from
the probative facts in evidence.” Subsequently in the case of Interstate Brands
v. Celestial Seasonings, Chief Judge Markey . . . stated for the majority that the
question of likelihood of confusion “is a legal conclusion” and cannot be
“admitted” as a fact.
However the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion is characterized, it is
clear that our predecessor court did not apply the “clearly erroneous” standard
of review to the issue. In Du Pont, Chief Judge Markey wrote that “ . . . it is
the duty of the examiner, the board, and this court (emphasis added) . . . “ to
determine the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion. A review of cases in
which the CCPA reversed the decision of the TTAB on this issue will
demonstrate that our predecessor court did not consider itself bound by a
narrow standard of review of the question. We have held that the decisions of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are binding upon us. Therefore, we
hold that the issue of likelihood of confusion is the ultimate conclusion of law
to be decided by the court, and that the clearly erroneous rule is not applicable.
Id. (citations omitted).
95. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033,
1043 (2d Cir. 1992).
In this Circuit, a district court’s determination of the individual Polaroid
factors are subject to review as findings of fact, subject to reversal only if
clearly erroneous, while the ultimate balancing of all the Polaroid factors to
determine the likelihood of confusion in any given case is done de novo by this
Court.
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the leading trademark law textbooks have written: “Predictably, the
diverging viewpoints in this area have produced a muddled body of case
law, characterized by such inconsistency among and within the circuits
that it has become difficult to predict how a court will deal with a
particular case.”96
Trademark holders of textual trademarks do not “own” the words that
their trademarks are comprised of for all communicative purposes.97
Neither do they hold a monopoly over all uses of these words for

Id.; Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988).
This Circuit considers the question of whether there is a likelihood of
confusion a mixed question of fact and law. When reviewing a lower court’s
decision in these cases, we apply a clearly erroneous standard to findings of
fact supporting the likelihood of confusion factors, but review de novo the
legal question whether, given the foundational facts as found by the lower
court, those facts constitute a “likelihood of confusion.”
Id.
96. JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 419 (3d
ed. 2001). Because this Article critiques published opinions, the emphasis here is on
judicial rather than jury-based “likelihood of confusion” determinations, regardless of
whether they are characterized as factual or legal in nature. One might surmise that
juries asked to decide whether consumer confusion is likely could be greatly influenced
by the manner in which the inquiry was framed: “Are you likely be confused?” is apt to
generate more negative responses than “Is anyone likely to be confused?” In
consequence, both jury biases, and judicial biases that improperly affect or color jury
instructions, could lead to unjust and unjustified outcomes for individual parties, but
such issues are not specifically considered here.
97. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is
Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 720 (1992) (“Certainly, one may conceptualize
trademarks as property in the Lockean sense . . . . In American law, of course, it is axiomatic
that trademarks are not property in this sense.”); Megan E. Gray, Defending Against a
Dilution Claim: A Practitioner’s Guide, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 205, 209–10 (1996).
The trademark right is an exclusionary right, not a property right in the word
itself. To be more specific, trademark owners do not actually own the
underlying mark at issue—they only possess a right to exclude others from
using the mark in a manner that would harm consumers. A pure ownership
right in a mark has not been granted, nor is it likely to be granted, because of
the potential monopolization of language to which this could lead. Dilution
statutes obviously grant broader protection than traditional trademark law since
a dilution cause of action allows a trademark owner to exclude those who use
the mark in a non-confusing manner. However, dilution statutes only grant a
quasi-property right in a mark.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But cf. Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property
Paradigm and Trademark Incontestability: A Call for Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 303, 306 (2000) (“Trademarks are not—or at least, were not—
property prior to the passage of the Lanham Act; incontestability . . . raises a serious
question, descriptively speaking, as to whether trademarks now are property.”) (footnote
omitted).
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trademark purposes.98 If two products or markets are sufficiently unrelated,
two entities can use the same words as trademarks without triggering
legally actionable consumer confusion. As one court put it:
[T]wo marks that serve to identify products in two unrelated markets may very
well coexist without confusion in the public’s eye. Thus Notre Dame brand
imported french cheese has been permitted to coexist with Notre Dame
University; Bulova watches with Bulova shoes; Alligator raincoats with
Alligator cigarettes; “This Bud’s for you” in beer commercials with the same
phrase used by a florist; White House tea and coffee with White House milk;
Blue Shield medical care plan with Blue Shield mattresses; Family Circle
magazine with Family Circle department store; Ole’ cigars with Ole’ tequila;
and Sunkist fruits with Sunkist bakery products. The list continues.99

Two parties may have legitimate, discrete national trademark rights
that conflict only when they operate conterminously in a specific
marketplace using the same or similar trademarks on the same or similar
products or services. This is what might be described as a classic
“innocent” trademark dispute in the sense that there is no indication
either party has chosen its mark with any nefarious “free riding” or
“palming off” motivation, but cognizable numbers of consumers could
plausibly be confused, to the detriment of both mark holders. The mark
holders would not fully reap the benefits of their “good reputations” and
“desirable product features” and might be forced to invest in communicative
advertising simply to distinguish its goods or services from those offered
by competitors. They may alternatively feel compelled to change their
trademarks, or to use whatever legal mechanisms are available to try to
get a competitor to stop using a mark, or both. These cases can arise
when companies expand into new geographic regions,100 when two
companies begin using the same or similar marks contemporaneously,101
when an entity adopts a mark unaware that another business has been
using it, or when a mark is adopted with knowledge of prior use but with
the assumption that either the preexisting marks or the underlying goods
and services are sufficiently dissimilar such that the adoption and use of
98. Trademarks deemed “famous” receive very broad protections under the
Lanham Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (2000). Section 1125(c) lists eight
factors for determining whether a mark is famous, but application of these factors by the
courts has been varied. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, A Circus Among the Circuits: Would
the Truly Famous and Diluted Performer Please Stand up? The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act and Its Challenges, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 158, 173–90 (1999).
99. Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 210 (D. Md. 1988).
100. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 94–95
(1918); Thrifty Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1179 (1st Cir.
1987); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).
101. See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (5th Cir.
1975); Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 253, 254–55 (D.
Del. 1997); Shalom Children’s Wear Inc. v. In-Wear A/S, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1517
(T.T.A.B. 1993).
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a particular mark will not be viewed as a problem.102
2. Trademark Dilution and Even More Confusion
In the United States, holders of “famous” trademarks103 can assert a
statutory right to prevent others from “diluting” their marks.104 Dilution
as defined by the Lanham Act “means the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of—(1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake,
102. See, e.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079,
1080–81 (7th Cir. 1988); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp.
1185, 1190–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. A definition of famous is not provided in the Lanham Act and has developed
somewhat inconsistently in case law. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar
Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2001) (using legislative intent to find
that “famous marks” under the Landham Act must carry “a substantial degree of fame”);
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 163–66
(3d Cir. 2000) (determining a mark can be “famous” within “a niche market”); Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that famous
marks are “truly famous and registered”); Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F.
Supp. 1030, 1033 (D. Haw. 1996) (using eight nonexclusive factors from the act to
determine famous marks); Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp.
688, 692 (D. Md. 1996) (failing to define “famous marks”). See generally Edward E.
Vassallo & Maryanne Dickey, Protection in the United States for “Famous Marks”: The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act Revisited, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
503 (1999) (providing an overview of “famous marks” case law). As one commentator
has observed:
The Dilution Act unfortunately provides no instructions for resolving its
ambiguous language. The Act mandates that for a mark to enjoy protection it
must be “famous,” but does not define the term famous. On one hand, the Act
extends protection to famous marks against diluting use of that mark after it
has become famous. On the other hand, the act requires the diluting use to
cause “dilution of the distinctive quality of the [famous] mark” and provides
eight factors to determine whether the mark is “distinctive and famous.” This
leads to numerous unanswered questions. Must a mark be both famous and
distinctive? Is distinctive a synonym for fame? Should an independent inquiry
for distinctiveness be conducted in addition to a fame analysis? What are the
factors a mark must possess in order to be distinctive or famous? Can a mark
be distinctive and not famous? Is a famous mark automatically a distinctive
mark? Is a distinctive mark also a famous mark? Can a famous mark be
distinctive? Does distinctive under the Dilution Act have the same meaning as
distinctive in the traditional trademark infringement context? Given such
ambiguity, it is not a surprise to see that the terms distinctive and famous have
been subject to a wide range of interpretations.
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving Fame and Dilution
Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 201, 209–10 (1999).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
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or deception.”105 Trademark dilution is thus the use of a mark, or the use
of a “too-similar” mark, by an unauthorized entity that does not fit
traditional notions of infringing conduct because there is little risk that
consumers will be confused or misled by the use.106 A mark holder
could argue that unauthorized use of a trademark on a dissimilar,
noncompeting good or service diluted the mark, undermining the mark’s
uniqueness and unfairly usurping the goodwill associated with the mark
that the mark holder had worked hard to generate. The nationwide right
to enjoin trademark dilution is a fairly recent development, as it was
codified in the federal trademark statute in 1995,107 though many states
had antidilution laws previously.108
By giving famous mark owners the ability to prevent dilution, in
addition to infringement, some critics assert that these mark holders are
given improperly expansive property rights (sometimes called
“trademarks in gross”) in words and symbols.109 Customarily, a mark
105. Id. § 1127.
106. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 212 F.3d at 163; Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 949, 959 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see also Jacqueline R. Knapp,
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act: The Circuit Split Makes a Desparate Call to the
Supreme Court for Uniformity, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 877–78 (2003); Dickerson M.
Downing, From Odol to Lingerie: Dilution and the “Victoria’s Secret” Decisions, 744
PLI/PAT 273, 283 (2003). But see Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217–
18 (2d Cir. 1999); Terry Ahearn, Comment, Dilution by Blurring Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: What Is It and How Is It Shown?, 41 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 893, 907 (2001) (“Although still used in some state court cases, judges and
commentators have largely discredited the test for being too similar to the tests used for
determining likelihood of confusion in traditional trademark infringement cases.”).
107. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 took effect on January 16, 1996.
108. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 97, at 207–08.
Dilution statutes are a relatively new phenomenon in the trademark
protection field. The first dilution law was passed in Massachusetts in 1947.
Since then, approximately twenty-five states have adopted dilution laws of
their own. Three states include dilution as part of their common law. In fact,
one court has recently noted that a dilution claim is practically boilerplate in
trademark actions. The vast majority of states with dilution laws have adopted
statutes that are much the same as section 12 of the Model State Trademark
Bill. Despite this similarity in language, courts have been wildly inconsistent
in their interpretations of dilution statutes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
109. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 875 (noting that dilution laws,
“much more so than infringement and unfair competition laws, tread very close to
granting ‘rights in gross’ in a trademark”); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999) (“This
radical dilution proposal, whose practical effect if fully adopted would be to create as the
whole of trademark-protection law property rights in gross in suitably ‘unique’ marks,
never has been legislatively adopted by any jurisdiction in anything approaching that
extreme form.”); see also Matthew D. Caudill, Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What
“Causes Dilution” Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)—A Recommendation to Whittle Away the
Liberal Application of Trademark Dilution to Internet Domain Names, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231 (contending that the liberal application of dilution
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could not be registered unless it was in use, or the registration applicant
asserted an intention to begin using the mark in commerce shortly.
Warehousing of trademarks for future uses remains doctrinally
discouraged.110 Under antidilution principles, however, famous mark
owners gain the ability to “reserve” preexisting marks for a wide variety
of future uses, even if they have no intention of ever utilizing the marks
in alternative ways. For example, the General Motors Corporation may
have no interest in making or marketing Chevrolet ice cream, but can
bring a trademark dilution suit against any dairy company that attempts
it. As one commentator explained:
Trademark dilution is based not on the notion of protecting consumers from
deception, but on protecting mark owners from a possible diminution in the
value of their marks. The theory of dilution . . . is that a second use of a wellknown mark, even where the second use does not confuse consumers, gradually
erodes the unique symbolism of that mark. Over time, many such uses erode
the unique connection between a well-known mark and goods produced by the
mark’s owner. Once that connection is partially severed by the presence of
other (usually non-competing or non-similar) goods with the same brand name,
the value of the trademark as a marketing device is eroded. Dilution proponents
have cited these as potential examples of diluting uses of a mark: Buick candy
bars, Kodak laundry detergent, and the like. In contrast to ordinary trademark
infringement, dilution is not predicated on any showing of likelihood of
confusion. The injury is the reduced marketing value of the mark, rather than
confusion in the marketplace.111

laws produces property rights in gross and frustrates the purpose of trademark law);
Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 864–66 (1997) (finding the FTDA may
create property rights in gross for holders of famous marks). But see Paul J. Heald,
Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 642–43 (1996).
Article 16 of TRIPS requires that a dissimilar use “indicate a connection
between [the infringing] goods or services and the owner of the registered
trademark.” The requirement of a mistaken belief in a “connection between
those goods” seems much closer to the traditional Lanham Act false
sponsorship cause of action than to a cause of action for dilution.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
110. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 485 F. Supp.
1185, 1203–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Buti v.
Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 1998); Michael B. Landau, Problems
Arising out of the Use of “WWW.Trademark.Com”: The Application of Principles of
Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 467
(1997) (writing that “[o]ne cannot simply create ‘catchy’ marks, not use them and then
assert them against the users. In order to maintain rights in a mark, the trademark owner
must maintain the mark’s usage in connection with goods and/or services”).
111. David S. Welkowitz, Protection Against Trademark Dilution in the U.K. and
Canada: Inexorable Trend or Will Tradition Triumph?, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
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Thus, dilution was intended to create a cause of action for famous
mark holders who objected to uses of the same or similar marks in
commerce on unrelated goods or services that did not confuse consumers.
Consumer confusion plays no overt role in dilution analysis where the
interloper uses the exact same mark as the famous one. Judicial confusion
is often apparent when U.S. courts attempt to articulate what it means to
“lessen distinctiveness,”112 as is judicial bewilderment, judicial bafflement,
and judicial befuddlement; on the other hand, whether consumers are
perplexed or deceived by the use of a preexisting mark on unrelated
goods is, at least according to some courts, doctrinally irrelevant.113
However, dilution claims are not limited to exact copying. Famous
marks are also protected from dilution by similar marks, and deciding
whether an accused mark is similar enough to trigger dilution concerns
requires a determination of whether or not it is similar enough to be
confused with the famous mark. In the context of dilution claims by
similar marks, some courts have even required proof of consumer
confusion.114 Though consumer confusion in the dilution context is
theoretically a somewhat different construct, the reasoning used by many
courts in making this subjective determination often substantially
REV. 63, 67–68 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
112. See, e.g., Port, supra note 15, at 831. Port analyzed section 43(c) of the
Lanham Act and concluded:
[T]his congressional expansion of the trademark right in the United States has
created a state where circuit courts have no real idea of what a likelihood of
dilution means and therefore, conclude, in most instances, that a famous mark
is a diluted mark without any real justification for this conclusion.
Id.; see also Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 953 (2001).
Courts repeatedly throw up their hands in frustration when asked “to identify
the legal interest sought to be protected from ‘dilution,’ [and] hence the legal
harm sought to be prevented.” Since any concurrent use of a mark diminishes
that mark’s distinctiveness in some sense, separating unauthorized uses that
dilute from those that do not has proven quite difficult. Unless dilution is read
to prohibit virtually all unauthorized uses of a given mark, the doctrine can
begin “to lose its coherence as a legally enforceable norm.”
Id. (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
113. Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that
trademark dilution laws protect “distinctive” or “famous” trademarks from certain
unauthorized uses of the marks regardless of a showing of competition or likelihood of
confusion).
114. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989).
Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to hold that, although violation of an
antidilution statute does not require confusion of product or source, the marks
in question must be sufficiently similar that confusion may be created as
between the marks themselves. We need not go that far. We hold only that the
marks must be “very” or “substantially” similar and that, absent such
similarity, there can be no viable claim of dilution.
Id. (citations omitted).
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parallels the analyses applied when ascertaining whether consumer
confusion is likely in trademark infringement disputes. For example,
one of the first dilution cases was brought by a company that owned the
mark Wawa for convenience stores, against an entity that began using
the mark HaHa for its own convenience stores.115 Wawa submitted a
marketing survey in support of its dilution claim, and the court found the
survey persuasive, writing: “Plaintiff buttresses its position by introducing
evidence of a marketing survey which concludes that persons in
HAHA’s neighborhood who were interviewed about Defendant’s market
tended, in 29% of the cases, to associate Defendant’s market with a
Wawa market.”116 How this “tendency to associate” differed from a
likelihood of confusion was not articulated and is difficult to distill from
the wildly oscillating and inconsistent case law that has developed
subsequent to this decision.117 Several courts have overtly adopted
aspects of the trademark infringement analysis pertaining to consumer
confusion for use in deciding trademark dilution cases.118
115. Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
116. Id. at 1632.
117. Criticism of the inconsistent ways in which courts apply antidilution laws
come from a variety of normative viewpoints. See, e.g., W. Whitaker Rayner, In Search
of a Dilution Solution: Implementation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 20 MISS.
C. L. REV. 93, 93–94 (1999) (“[F]ederal courts have struggled with the development of a
body of case law interpreting the FTDA. As more fully described below, the various
circuits have, on occasion, reached diametrically opposed conclusions as to the
interpretation of certain provisions of the FTDA.”); Ahearn, supra note 106, at 893–94.
The FTDA was designed to provide uniform national protection to the value of
trademarks and replace the “patch quilt system” of state laws that had
produced inconsistent and unenforceable results. However, dilution theory has
never been unanimously accepted as a viable extension of traditional
trademark protection, and as previous failed legislation and state court
experience has shown, the application of dilution theory is intensely debated
and begrudgingly applied.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Nguyen, supra note 98, at 158.
Each of the circuit courts that has had the opportunity to address the Act has its
own idea about dilution and fame, the meaning of dilution, how to establish
fame, and how to prove dilution. With the conflicting rulings from these
circuits, there is a circus among the circuits. Each performer at the circus is
carrying its own act leaving trademark owners a federal anti-dilution system
that is almost as chaotic as the original patchwork system of more than twentyfive state statutes.
Id.
118. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476 (6th Cir.
2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports
News, 212 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2001); Mead Data Cent., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1031;
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
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As one observer has written, “the harm that dilution seeks to address
might best be described as a loss of consumer attention due to the
proliferation of similar or identical symbols of trade.”119 Generally,
judges do not address what, in fact, causes consumers to lose attention
and how to quantify attendant damages. In fact, U.S. courts have not
consistently required evidence of any actual harm to substantiate claims
of trademark dilution. In one case, the court stated that requiring proof
of lost revenue “seem[ed] inappropriate,”120 as did judicially setting
forth any specific definition of, or test for, trademark dilution. Instead,
the judge wrote that “courts would do better to feel their way from case
to case, setting forth in each those factors that seem to bear on the
resolution of that case . . . .”121 This approach cannot help but create great
uncertainty among any entity that is considering adopting a new mark.
There is some possibility that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue122 will bring needed clarity to the
meaning and correct application of the trademark dilution statute. After
the Court heard oral argument in this case on November 12, 2002,
courtroom observers opined that the lawyers on both sides had a hard
time articulating a consistent definition of trademark dilution, and the
Justices seemed quite frustrated by the exercise.123 Ultimately, on
March 4, 2003 the Court concluded that under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act mark holders were required to show “actual dilution” to
prevail.124 The Court stopped short of requiring proof of the consequences
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000); Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v.
Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 797–98 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev’d, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998);
Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
119. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 713 (2d ed. 2001) (emphasis in original).
120. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 223.
121. Id. at 227.
122. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
123. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Thong of the South: How a Kentucky Smut Shop Put
the Starch in Victoria’s Secret’s Shorts, SLATE, Nov. 12, 2002, at http://slate.msn.com/
?id=2073884.
The case end[ed] on the same confused note on which it began. There is a
trademark dilution statute that is supposed to protect more than traditional
trademark law, but no one is quite sure how much more or how to prove it.
It’s not at all clear to me, or the court, that Victoria’s Secret cat litter or
aluminum siding really tarnishes the image of the lingerie giant. Nor is it clear
why the cat litter people would choose that name unless they intended to
unfairly profit from Victoria’s Secret’s success. The court will need to decide
how much copycatting is acceptable, and how much more trademark
protection to afford the famous, merely because they’re famous.
Id.; see also Bill Adair, Victor v. Victoria, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at A1;
Joan Biskupic, High Court Mulls What’s in a Name, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 2002,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2002-11-12-victor-usat_x.htm;
Tony Mauro, Victoria’s Trademark May Carry the Day, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 18, 2002, at 6.
124. See, e.g., Bassam N. Ibrahim & Bryce J. Maynard, Supreme Court Opinion
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of dilution, such as actual loss of sales or profits, but held: “[A]t least
where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers
mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not
sufficient to establish actionable dilution.”125 How a mark holder might
adequately demonstrate a reduction in the capacity of a famous mark to
identify the goods of its owners was not spelled out, though the opinion
suggested that establishing that the defendant’s mark caused consumers
to “form a different impression” of the plaintiff’s mark was necessary.126
The Court did not appear to explicate the concept of trademark
dilution in a manner straightforward enough to allow for consistent
application across a broad range of factual situations. Mark holders,
courts, and defendants still have little additional guidance beyond the list
of eight nonexclusive factors for assessing distinctiveness and fame,
which do not address how distinctive and famous the mark should be, or
what degree of fame, notoriety, or recognition the mark should possess,
to qualify for protection.127 It is possible, however, that the Court’s
holding that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires a showing of
actual dilution will curtail the invocation of “likelihood of confusion”
analysis when considering dilution claims. It is also worth considering
that if more than a mental association is required to sustain a dilution
claim pertaining to nonidentical marks, than something beyond mere
mental associations may be necessary to support likelihood of confusion
assertions concerning “colorable imitations” as well.
A recent decision by the Second Circuit in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue suggests that some
judges will avoid the remaining uncertainties pertaining to the trademark
dilution doctrine by shoehorning dilution analysis into the trademark
infringement framework. For example, in Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v.
Nawab128 in the context of an appeal from a denial of a preliminary
injunction, the court ruled that Virgin Enterprises was entitled to enjoin
the use of the marks “Virgin Wireless” and “Virgin Mobile” by another
entity that had used these marks in commerce and had pursued
Rules That the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) Requires Proof of Actual
Dilution, FINDLAW, at http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00320/008759/
title/Subject/topic/Intellectual%20Property%20Law_Trademark/filename/intellectualpro
pertylaw_1_237 (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
125. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 1124.
126. Id. at 1125.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
128. 335 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2003).
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registration of them with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.129
One disquieting aspect of the case is the certitude of the language used
by the court to express its finding that “Plaintiff’s VIRGIN mark
undoubtedly scored high on both concepts of strength,”130 though it does
not appear to be supported by any evidence, such as the extent of the
advertising invested in the mark, or the volume of sales in Virgin
stores.131 In another place the opinion states, “There can be no doubt
that plaintiff’s VIRGIN mark, as used on consumer electronic
equipment, is a strong mark . . . .”132 This is a startling conclusion for
the court to reach at all, no less with “no doubt,” because there is no
indication anywhere else in the opinion concerning how often the
plaintiff was using the Virgin mark on consumer electronic equipment.
The equipment listed at the company’s website appears to bear only the
trademarks of the manufacturers of the equipment, such as Sanyo,
Nintendo, and IBM.133 The plaintiff’s trademark registration with the
129. See ITU Serial Numbers 75,845,508, 75,845,511 (abandoned Apr. 9, 2003) (on
file with USPTO, accessible via TESS, at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Oct. 24,
2003)). After stating that its inquiry was whether “a significant number of consumers
would be confused about the sponsorship of defendants’ retail stores,” the Virgin court
decided there was a significant likelihood of confusion, writing that “[c]onsumer
confusion was more than likely; it was virtually inevitable,” without ever defining or
quantifying “significant” in any way. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 146, 151. The
only evidence on this point that is discussed in the opinion is an affidavit from a former
employee of the defendant who worked at a Virgin Wireless mall kiosk, stating that
individuals used to ask him if the kiosk was affiliated with plaintiff’s Virgin stores. Id.
at 151. The exact number of people who asked him is not articulated, and whether they
were still confused when he answered “no” is not addressed either. Assuming arguendo
that the result was correct, it is still unsettling that the court seems to base the holding on
intuition rather than consumer survey evidence.
130. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 148.
131. See, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d
188, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
In the instant case, as Kendall-Jackson argues and Banfi more or less
concedes, ROBERT PEPI COLLINE DI SASSI is an arbitrary mark because it
has no meaning to the average consumer, nor does it suggest the qualities and
features of the wine. However, a finding that a particular mark is arbitrary
does not guarantee a determination that the mark is strong. Instead, this Court
still must evaluate the mark’s distinctiveness in the marketplace.
Courts may consider several factors in determining a particular mark’s
distinctiveness in the marketplace. For example, the “strength of a mark is . . .
often ascertained by looking at the extent of advertising invested in it, and by
the volume of sales of the product.” In addition, “extensive third-party use can
dilute the strength of a mark.”
Id. (citations omitted).
132. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 149.
133. A search on the Virgin.net website under the word “electronics” reveals as
much. See Virgin.net, Search Results, at http://gps.virgin.net/search/sitesearch?submit.
x=1&start=0&format=1&num=10&restrict=site&sitefilter=site%2Fsite_filter.hts&si
teresults=site%2Fsite_results.hts&sitescorethreshold=28&scope=virgin&q=electronics (last
visisted Feb. 20. 2004).
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U.S. Patent & Trademark Office134 lists Virgin goods and services that
include:
[direct mail advertising for others]; dissemination of advertising materials for
others; preparing advertising, promotions, and public relations materials for
other; [management of promotional and incentive plans and services for others];
business organization promotional consulting for others; demonstration of the
goods and services of others and the promotion thereof; promoting and
advertising the goods and services of others by [aircraft], airships and air
balloons; outdoor advertising such as by billboards; and distribution of
advertising, promotional materials and sample materials of others. . . .
. . . transportation of goods and passengers by road, [rail], air [and sea]; freight
transportation services; [tourist agency services]; travel agency services;
[arranging travel tours; and transportation reservation services]. . . .
. . . [clubs, nightclubs]; bars; [hotels; resorts; hotel reservation services; hotel
and resort management for others; carry-out restaurant and restaurant services;
catering; computer programming for others; computer software design services
for others; artwork and graphic design services for others]; and retail store
services in the fields of [cosmetics and laundry preparations, metal hardware],
cameras, records, audio and video tapes, [audio and video recorders], computers
and electronic apparatus, [jewelry, clocks] and watches, [musical instruments,
stationery], sheet music, books and photography, handbags, purses, luggage and
leather goods, clothing, [lace, embroidery, gifts and sewing materials, toys],
games, video game machines and video game cartridges, [processed foods,
jellies and jams, coffee, tea, bakery items and candy, beer, ale, mineral and
aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks, wines, spirits and liqueurs, and
tobacco and smokers’ articles].135

Given this diverse range of uses, whether the Virgin mark is strong in
terms of consumer recognition with respect to any particular good or
service listed cannot reasonably be a matter of judicial intuition.
Whether the mark is actually “strong” with respect to consumer electronic
equipment, because significant numbers of consumers associate it with
consumer electronic equipment, is susceptible to evidentiary proof, which
the court ought to have required, and to have referenced in its opinion.
Far more problematic is the court’s repeated assertion that the Virgin
mark is “famous.”136 Marks do not have to be famous to receive
protection from infringement; famousness is not relevant to an infringement
inquiry at all. Famousness is, however, a requirement to receive federal
dilution protection under the Lanham Act, which requires a mark holder
134. U.S. Trademark No. 1,851,817 (issued Aug. 30, 1994).
135. Id. (brackets in original).
136. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 146 (writing that “the district court accorded
plaintiff too narrow a scope of protection for its famous, arbitrary, and distinctive
mark”); see also id. at 149 (writing that “Plaintiff’s VIRGIN mark was also famous”).
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asserting famousness to make a fairly substantial evidentiary showing.137
While Virgin may have been able to make such a showing, there is no
indication that it actually did. In addition, even though the court never
mentions the word “dilution” in the entire opinion, it appears to award
dilution style protection to the mark holder, a right to own the mark in
gross. After asserting, without statutory or case law support, that “the law
accords broad, muscular protection to marks that are arbitrary or fanciful
in relation to the products on which they are used,”138 the court stated:
If a mark is arbitrary or fanciful, and makes no reference to the nature of the
goods it designates, consumers who see the mark on different objects offered in
the marketplace will be likely to assume, because of the arbitrariness of the
choice of mark, that they all come from the same source. For example, if
consumers become familiar with a toothpaste sold under an unusual, arbitrary
brand name, such as ZzaaqQ, and later see that same inherently distinctive
brand name appearing on a different product, they are likely to assume,
notwithstanding the product difference, that the second product comes from the
same producer as the first.139

This is a description of the trademark “problem” that the dilution
cause of action is intended to remedy. It does not accurately portray an
infringement claim, as absent dilution protections, a mark holder cannot
prevent others from using the same trademark on products or in markets
that are sufficiently unrelated.140 One can observe additional creeping
dilution analysis in this subsequent passage from the opinion:

137. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 states in pertinent part:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to—
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
138. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 147. In fact, this statement is contrary to
much case law. See, e.g., Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F.
Supp. 2d 188, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that “a finding that a particular mark is
arbitrary does not guarantee a determination that the mark is strong”).
139. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 148.
140. See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text; infra notes 260–351 and
accompanying text.
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If a mark has been long, prominently and notoriously used in commerce, there
is a high likelihood that consumers will recognize it from its prior use.
Widespread consumer recognition of a mark previously used in commerce
increases the likelihood that consumers will assume it identifies the previously
familiar user, and therefore increases the likelihood of consumer confusion if
the new user is in fact not related to the first. A mark’s fame also gives
unscrupulous traders an incentive to seek to create consumer confusion by
associating themselves in consumers’ minds with a famous mark. The added
likelihood of consumer confusion resulting from a second user’s use of a famous
mark gives reason for according such a famous mark a broader scope of
protection, at least when it is also inherently distinctive.141

Again, the court is articulating the rationale for dilution protection for
famous marks, but couching it in “likelihood of confusion” language.142
In so doing, it accorded the mark holder dilution-like protection without
ever inquiring into, no less finding as an evidentiary matter the “actual
dilution” that the Supreme Court’s Moseley opinion seems to require.143
IV. CONSUMER-CONFUSION ANALYSIS, JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVITY, AND
JUDICIAL NOTICE
The court takes no offense at the possible inference, accurate or
not, that Georgia might be a more advantageous forum because
there are more rednecks here than in Connecticut.144
In an infringement dispute, a federal court will consider allegedly
conflicting trademarks in the contexts in which they are used and make a
determination about whether the dual usages create a “likelihood of
141. Virgin Enters., Ltd., 335 F.3d at 148 (citation omitted).
142. Id. The court ultimately concluded: “Because there is no intrinsic reason for a
merchant to use the word ‘virgin’ in the sale of consumer electronic equipment, a
consumer seeing VIRGIN used in two different stores selling such equipment will likely
assume that the stores are related.” Id. at 149. While this may be correct, the trademarks
were different in appearance, as “Defendants’ logo used a difference typeface and
different colors from plaintiff’s.” Id. In addition, the trademarks were somewhat
different textually (Virgin Megastores versus Virgin Wireless), the stores were very
different (large retail space versus mall kiosks), and the goods were different (plaintiff
sold a wide range of products but did not sell telephones, while the defendant sold only
telephones and related equipment). Therefore, the conlsuion may have been incorrect
and is not a one a court should reach simply on the basis of intuition.
143. See, e.g., Bassam N. Ibrahim & Bryce J. Maynard, Supreme Court Opinion
Rules That the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) Requires Proof of Actual
Dilution, FINDLAW, at http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00320/008759/title/subject/
topic/intellectual%20property%20law_trademark/filename/intellectualpropertylaw_1_237
(last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
144. Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1208 n.11 (N.D. Ga.
1995).
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confusion.” If so, the mark holder with inferior rights to the disputed
mark (usually because usage commenced later in time) may be restricted
to using the mark in a limited geographic area or may be ordered to stop
using it in commerce altogether.145
As a general policy matter, when the goods produced by the alleged
infringer compete for sales with those of the trademark owner,
infringement usually will be found if the marks are deemed sufficiently
similar that confusion can be expected.146 For example, an attempt to
launch a line of “Levy” denim jeans would almost certainly be met with
a trademark suit and would likely be found to infringe the “Levi’s”
trademark even if “Levy” was the surname of the individual behind this
doomed entrepreneurial effort.147
When the goods are related, but not competitive, several other factors
are added to the confusion calculus including strength of the plaintiff
mark, proximity of the goods or services, similarity of the marks,
evidence of actual confusion, marketing channels used, type of goods or
services, the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser,
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and the likelihood of expansion
of the product lines.148 The mark “Ben’s Bread” was deemed confusingly
similar to the Uncle Ben’s mark for rice products, premised in part on
the observation that: “While there are some obvious differences between
the marks UNCLE BEN’S and BEN’S BREAD, they both contain the
possessive form of the name ‘BEN.’”149 That both products were sold in
grocery stores, and that Uncle Ben’s also used its mark on stuffing mix,
were also deemed important.150 In a similar vein, the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board held that artificial sweeter and salt are “closely
related, complimentary products,”151 and concluded:
145. See, e.g., Thrifty Rent-a-Car Sys. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1180–81
(1st Cir. 1987).
146. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979).
147. Under the Lanham Act, trademarks that are “primarily merely a surname”
cannot be registered with the USPTO on the principal register. 15 U.S.C. § 1502(e)(4)
(2000). “The common law also recognizes that surnames are shared by more than one
individual, each of whom may have an interest in using his surname in business, and by
the requirement for evidence of distinctiveness, in effect, delays appropriation of
exclusive rights in the name.” In re Etablissements Darty Et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 17 (Fed.
Cir. 1985), aff’d, 222 U.S.P.Q. 260 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
148. AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 348.
149. Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Stubenberg Int’l, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1310, 1312 (T.T.A.B.
1998).
150. Id. at 1313.
151. NutraSweet Company v. K & S Foods, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1964, 1967 (T.T.A.B.
1987).
While artificial sweeteners and salt with trace minerals are obviously different
products, we think it likely that they would be sold in the same sections of
grocery stores and supermarkets and would appear side by side in restaurants
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We think it quite likely that purchasers familiar with the NUTRASWEET
product, either as an ingredient in EQUAL artificial sweetener or as an
ingredient in various other food products, would, upon viewing NUTRA SALT
salt with trace minerals, be likely to believe that this was a new product line put
out by the same producer as the NUTRASWEET producer or that the salt
product was somehow associated with or sponsored by the people producing the
NUTRASWEET product.152

If the goods are totally unrelated, as a doctrinal matter an infringement
action should not be supportable because confusion is unlikely.153 For
this reason, Smith Brothers’ Auto Repair and Smith Brothers’ Cough
Drops can independently coexist without spawning trademark infringement
litigation,154 and there are (for exampled) almost three hundred different
federally registered trademarks featuring the word “lighthouse.”155
In assessing whether confusion is likely, judges are relatively free to
base their findings on their purely subjective reactions. As one judicial
opinion proclaimed: “The determinative test cannot focus on how close
or related the industries or products are, but rather by whether confusion
is created so that an appreciable number of typical consumers will likely
be confused.”156 Note that the test is not premised on proof that an
appreciable number of typical consumers have been confused, only that
they are likely to be confused in the court’s estimation.
Though evidence of actual confusion is helpful to trademark holders,
the absence of any actual confusion does not usually affect them at all,
as courts embrace the idea that a showing of actual confusion would be
very difficult to demonstrate with reliable proof.157 In consequence,

Id.

and on kitchen tabletops of ordinary consumers. We further note that the
respective products are low-cost impulse type items where the purchasing
decision is not likely to be as careful as it would be with a higher-priced
product. In short, we conclude that the artificial sweetener and salt products
are closely related, complementary products and that the use of the same or of
a similar mark in connection with these products would likely result in
confusion as to source or sponsorship.

152. Id. at 1968.
153. AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 348.
154. Trademark dilution, however, is another matter, as is discussed above. See
supra Part III.C.2.
155. Per free search conducted by Author via TESS, Free Form Search, at
http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
156. Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 210 (D. Md.
1988).
157. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867,
875 (2d Cir. 1986). “Of course, it is black letter law that actual confusion need not be
shown to prevail under the Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove
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mark holders do not have to prove much of anything to prevail; they
simply have to persuade a judge that it is likely that some consumers
could be confused some of the time. Given the low opinions of
consumers that some judges hold, this can be fairly easy to accomplish.
One has a difficult time imagining a judge holding that a plaintiff in a
personal injury suit did not have to submit evidence of soft tissue
damage or psychological impairment because such injuries would be too
difficult to prove and that compensable harm could be presumed from
the fact that the plaintiff had been involved in some sort of accident.
Nevertheless, in the realm of likelihood of confusion, evidentiary
showings are not required, and judges are free to decide whether
consumer confusion is likely to occur based upon their own gut
reactions.
It is the application of the likelihood of confusion test that is the
problem, rather than the test itself, but the net effect is that judges appear
to address the confusion requirement through a framework of judicial
notice,158 rather than by weighing evidentiary showings. Although it is
reversible error to explicitly rule in favor of trademark holders based on
findings of “possibility of confusion,”159 courts rarely require more from
plaintiffs than articulations of plausible scenarios in which some
unquantified cohort of harried, inattentive, and uninformed consumers
are likely to experience confusion. Judges start with the proposition that
“[t]he category of a buyer protected by trademark law against this
confusion includes not only the careful or discriminating buyer, but also
the ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible.”160
A. Bad Intent
It is fairly well established by case law that “[p]roof of an intent to
confuse the public is not necessary to a finding of a likelihood of
confusion,” but “[i]f a mark was adopted with the intent to confuse the
public, that alone may be sufficient to justify an inference of a likelihood
of confusion.”161 In consequence, if something about a defendant’s behavior
and the Act requires only a likelihood of confusion as to source.” Id.; see also Scarves
by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1175 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that “‘a
showing of actual confusion is not necessary and in fact is very difficult to demonstrate’
with reliable proof”) (quoting W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d
Cir. 1970)); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Chattem, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 3671, 1986 WL 6167
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1986).
158. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201.
159. See, e.g., A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d
197, 199 (3d Cir. 1999); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 208 (3d
Cir. 1995).
160. Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1696 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
161. Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203 (5th Cir. 1998).
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strikes a judge as evidencing bad intent, likelihood of confusion can be
sustainably inferred regardless of lack of similarity in the disputed marks
or underlying goods or services.
A paradigmatic indicator of bad intentions is intentional copying.
Acts of intentional trademark copying fall along a continuum, and at the
scurrilously evil end is counterfeiting—the exact duplication of a mark
to fool customers about the nature or origin of a product or service. At
the other extremity of the continuum, the “lawful and justifiable behavior”
side, is copying or colorable imitation of only descriptive marks, or
aspects of descriptive marks, because doing so seems necessary to
communicate attributes of the product or service itself to potential
customers. Consider this tart example: The dominant brand of bottled
lemonade may have a fanciful picture of a ripe yellow lemon on its label
that it has registered and advertised as a trademark. A competitor may
also choose to put a picture of a lemon on its retail container, not so that
customers confuse the two products or sources, but to communicate to
consumers the fact that inside is a citrus juice beverage. The lemon
image is thus legitimately used to convey product attributes.
In the middle of the intentional copying continuum are trademark and
packaging similarities in goods that deliberately market themselves as
lower priced, comparable alternatives to brand name products. Many
successful “national” producers hate this sort of “off brand” or “store
brand” competition and will tenaciously work to increase barriers to
entry to slow or incapacitate any entity that attempts to compete with
them. As a result, mark holders of this ilk will bring trademark suits if
there is a reasonable possibility they can prevail and thereby hinder a
competitor. Meanwhile, the manufacturers of cheaper, private label
alternatives seek to increase their sales and may prefer to do this without
incurring advertising expenses by packaging their goods in ways that
evoke brand name products and selling them in the same venues, and
even from the same shelves where possible. These competing desires
are clearly in direct conflict and inexorably lead to trademark litigation,
the result of which may be difficult to predict. Some courts have
decided that marketing lower priced comparable products in packaging
that evocates national brands is legitimate, lawful competition,162 while
162. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); see also Andrew Corydon Finch, Comment, When Imitation Is the Sincerest
Form of Flattery: Private Label Products and the Role of Intention in Determining
Trade Dress Infringement, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1243, 1275–76 (1996).
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other courts have deemed it illegitimate, actionable free riding.163
While it is easy to see why reasonable minds might disagree on how
“off brand” behavior ought to be characterized, application of “likelihood of
confusion” analysis in this type of trademark dispute is apt to be
convoluted and unsatisfactory to all concerned. Whether trademark law
allows a store brand of shampoo, with its own trademark, to adopt a
formula, color, scent, and bottle style and shape similar to those of a
highly advertised and correspondingly more expensive national brand
may be a confusing query. However, any question about whether consumers
can tell the difference between the two can usually be straightforwardly
answered as follows: Of course they can. Enjoining a producer from
calling a fragrant green shampoo in an ovoid bottle “Herbs of
Reference,” may seem like a fair and appropriate response to a plea for
relief from the mark holder that makes and markets the eerily similar
“Herbal Essence,” but premising the injunction on probable likelihood
of consumer confusion is preposterous, as label and price disparities will
clearly signal the differences between the goods and sources to the vast
majority of consumers. Yet, a likelihood of confusion finding is what
trademark law requires to support an infringement holding.
B. Confusion in Gross
Before passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, statutory law
granted mark holders protectable interests in trademarks that were
restricted in scope to the use of the marks in commerce. Mark holders
were not accorded “trademarks in gross,”164 and did not have a right to

Id.

The presumption of a likelihood of confusion from intentional copying has
outlived its usefulness. With the explosion of private label manufacturing, it no
longer makes sense to infer that one who deliberately copies the trade dress of
a competitor does so with the intention of confusing consumers. By copying
the trade dresses of their brand name competitors, private label manufacturers
can effectively describe to consumers the brand name products to which their
private label products correspond. A presumption of a likelihood of confusion
from intentional copying would discourage such instances of beneficial
copying and therefore harm rather than protect consumers by depriving them
of information about—and access to—lower-cost alternatives to brand name
products. Thus, unless a clear intent to confuse consumers is proved by direct
evidence, courts should decline to infer anything at all from evidence of
intentional copying. Instead, courts should focus their efforts on the real issue:
whether two trade dresses are so similar as to create a genuine likelihood of
confusion among consumers.

163. See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Guardian Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066, 1074
(E.D. Mich. 1997).
164. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs. Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331,
1334–35 (D. Or. 1997).
Unlike a patent or copyright, a trademark does not confer on its owner any
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prevent usage of even an identical mark on an unrelated product or
service unless this was deemed likely to confuse consumers. As
discussed above, dilution protection creates something akin to
trademarks in gross for eligible marks. However, even absent dilution
doctrine or analysis, where a large corporation uses the same mark on a
diverse variety of products, some courts have been willing to accord a
presumptive right on the part of the entity to be the only user of the mark
in any commercial context on the grounds that multiple users of a mark
will cause consumer confusion.165 For example, the fact that Virgin
Enterprises Limited and its related companies (collectively, the “Virgin
Group”) operated various worldwide businesses that included an airline,
a travel-related company, a limousine service, a soft drink bottler and
distributor, and a chain of retail stores selling CDs, books, and clothing,
all using the Virgin trademark and service mark, gave it the right to
prevent an unrelated retail gasoline establishment from calling itself
“Virgin Petroleum.”166 This despite the fact that the Virgin Group was
not in the fuel business at all, and there were of hundreds of federally
registered trademarks using the word “virgin,” most of which had no
connection to the Virgin Group and many of which predated Virgin
Group’s assertion of broad trademark rights in the word.167
Similarly, the use of the name Phones-R-Us by a business that sold
retail phones, accessories and answering machines was found “likely ‘to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive’ consumers into believing
some sponsorship, association, affiliation, connection or endorsement
exists” between the toy store chain Toys “R” Us and the defendant.168
While Toys “R” Us might now be able to reasonably assert dominion over
“Anything R Us” through a dilution claim under the FTDA, a likelihood
of confusion determination and subsequent infringement finding gave the
company de facto dilution protection and trademark rights in gross five
years before Congress authorized federal dilution causes of action.

Id.

rights in gross or at large. The law does not per se prohibit the use of
trademarks or service marks as domain names. Rather, the law prohibits only
uses that infringe or dilute an owner’s trademark or service mark.

165. This right is doctrinally available only to famous marks under dilution
principles. See supra Part III.C.2.
166. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Virgin Petroleum, Inc., No. CV 99-12826, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8100, at *1–2, *42 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000).
167. A “TESS” query returned 320 trademarks using or referencing the word
“virgin.” TESS, Free Form Search, at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
168. Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1694 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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Mobil Oil Corporation was deemed to have confusion-rooted
trademark dominion over the word “mobile” in any automotive context,
even though mobility is a defining feature of automobiles, and mobile is
a descriptive term for movable goods and services. In Mobil Oil
Corporation v. Mobile Mechanics,169 the court held:
Here the marks are so similar that confusion is not only likely but
practically inevitable. The mark “mobile” differs from “Mobil” only by the
addition of one letter and by the absence of an initial capital. . . .
The minor variations defendants point out do not sufficiently differentiate
their name from plaintiff’s mark. The fact that they make the letter “o” larger
than the other letters and accent it with a gear or wheel design if anything
increases the likelihood of confusion.170

Rather than requiring Mobil Oil Corporation to prove likelihood of
confusion between a large, well-known petroleum company and a small
start up mobile auto repair service, this court opined that: “It was
defendants’ obligation to avoid confusion and it remains defendants’
burden as subsequent user to demonstrate that confusion is not likely to
result.”171
C. Confusion Deemed Incurable
Likelihood of confusion can be found even when it is anticipated that
consumers will resolve or overcome any actual confusion well before
reaching the point of sale. Mark holders can win infringement suits
simply by proving so called “initial interest” confusion, which is what
piano consumers were deemed likely to experience when they were
drawn to Grotrian-Steinweg pianos, though it was clear to the court that
no one would actually purchase a Grotrian-Steinweg piano believing it
to be a product of the Steinway & Sons company.172 One somewhat
stunning articulation of the adequacy of initial interest confusion to
support an infringement finding occurred in a dispute between the
Blockbuster chain and an upstart competitor that called itself Video
169. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Mobile Mechs., Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 744 (D. Conn. 1976).
170. Id. at 747.
171. Id.
172. Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975).
The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a GrotrianSteinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection
with Steinway and Sons. The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a
consumer, hearing the “Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some
connection with “Steinway,” would consider it on that basis. The “Grotrian-Steinweg”
name therefore would attract potential customers based on the reputation built
up by Steinway in this country for many years. The harm to Steinway in short
is the likelihood that potential piano purchasers will think that there is some
connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Busters. The fact that even clueless consumers would quickly figure out
that Video Busters was a different entity was deemed “unimportant” and
“irrelevant” by a court that held:
[T]he issue in this case is the degree of likelihood that the name “Video
Busters” would attract potential customers based on the reputation built by
Blockbuster. That a customer would recognize that Video Busters is not
connected to Blockbuster after entry into a Video Busters store and viewing
the Video Busters membership application, brochure, video cassette jacket,
and store layout is unimportant. The critical issue is the degree to which
Video Busters might attract potential customers based on the similarity to
the Blockbuster name. The court finds that Video Busters might attract
some potential customers based on the similarity to the Blockbuster name.
Because the names are so similar and the products sold are identical, some
unwitting customers might enter a Video Busters store thinking it is
somehow connected to Blockbuster. Those customers probably will realize
shortly that Video Busters is not related to Blockbuster, but . . . that is
irrelevant.173

The implication that a mark holder only has to convince a court that
consumers are likely to be confused momentarily suggests the burden of
proof on this issue can be feather-light indeed. In addition, the
proposition that fleeting confusion cannot be effectively cured at any
point in a transaction is confusing in its own right. Consumers who
prefer to rent videos from Blockbuster were free to seek that store out,
and to leave Video Busters if they were drawn in by an incorrect
perception that the two entities were affiliated. Consumers who found
the Video Buster offerings attractive and desirable, and who remained
there to rent movies rather than seeking out a competing Blockbuster,
arguably benefited from any misperception that led them to enter. The
judge’s ruling saved the first group of consumers a few minutes, but
deprived the second group of opportunities for beneficial transactions,
while conceding that no one was confused when exiting the premises.
While some observers might agree with this outcome, explaining why
trademark law requires it proves problematic.
At least according to some courts, consumer confusion cannot be
cured, much less avoided, by the use of disclaimers.174 Ironically, the
173. Blockbuster Entm’t Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 513 (E.D. Mich.
1994).
174. “House marks” are a related concept. A house mark is an umbrella sourceidentifying mark that may be used on a range of different products in addition to
product-specific trademarks. House marks are sometimes given substantial weight in
trade dress infringement cases. See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988
F.2d 1117, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973
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evidentiary burden on a defendant attempting to prove a disclaimer is
effective at preventing or alleviating consumer confusion can be
much heavier than the burden on a plaintiff asserting that confusion is
likely to occur.175 However, this makes perfect sense if one’s analysis
starts with the assumption that consumers are incurably stupid.
D. Confusion, Sophistication, and Class
The sophistication of purchasers is one factor that courts will usually
consider when making a likelihood of confusion determination.176 In a
trademark dispute involving a petroleum trading company, a court found
that even sophisticated oil traders dealing in large quantity transactions
were likely to be initially confused about whether there was a connection
between the defendant and the plaintiff based on a perceived similarity
between their trademarks.177 Apparently, the court took judicial notice
F.2d 1033, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992). However, in other cases, likelihood of confusion has
been found despite the use of a house mark. See, e.g., Americana Trading Inc. v. Russ
Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992); Gen. Foods Corp. v. Borden, Inc.,
191 U.S.P.Q. 674, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
175. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 832
F.2d 1311, 1316 (2d Cir. 1987). But see Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,
214 F.3d 658, 672 (5th Cir. 2000); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d
1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 1987).
Like fraudulent speech, speech that misleads or creates confusion is not protected
under the First Amendment. Where the allegedly infringing speech is at least partly
literary or artistic, however, and not solely a commercial appropriation of another’s
mark, the preferred course is to accommodate trademark remedies with First
Amendment interests. One obvious mode of accommodation is a disclaimer that
will officially dissociate the junior user of the mark from the senior user’s product.
Disclaimers have frequently been approved by this court and others when
trademark and First Amendment interests intersect.
Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 672 (citations omitted).
176. “The sophistication of the buyers” is the eighth of the “Polaroid Factors”
articulated by the Second Circuit for the purpose of evaluating likelihood of confusion
between nonidentical good or services. Derived from the holding in Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), they have close analogues in
other circuits. See Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th
Cir. 1993) (describing the “Helene Curtis” factors of the Seventh Circuit); E. & J. Gallo
Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the
“Sleekcraft” factors of the Ninth Circuit); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg.
Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1992) (describing the “Scott Paper” factors of the
Third Circuit); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir.
1992) (describing the “Pizzeria Uno” factors of the Fourth Circuit); Coherent, Inc. v.
Coherent Techs., Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing the “Beer Nuts”
factors of the Tenth Circuit); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc.
931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing the “Frisch’s” factors, of the Sixth
Circuit); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir.
1986) (describing the “Roto-Rooter” factors of the Fifth Circuit); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up
Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (describing the “Squirtco” factors of the Eighth
Circuit); see also GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 96, at 391–93.
177. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987).
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that even experienced businesspeople might neglect to ask or ascertain
with whom they were considering conducting commerce, or speaking to
on the phone.
The sophistication of purchasers is even less highly esteemed by
judges when, rather than transacting important business, individuals are
simply purchasing goods and services for their own consumption.178
The standard, facially economic, class neutral analysis is that consumers
are least likely to pay careful attention to inexpensive purchases and
therefore would be most likely to be confused by similar trademarks on
the same or similar low cost products.179 However, at other times the
178. See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 204–05 (3d Cir. 1995).
Much as courts are required to police the boundaries of similarity within
which a jury may be permitted to find a likelihood of confusion under the
Lanham Act, courts must also establish the perimeters of ordinary care that
constrain likelihood of confusion.
The following non-exhaustive
considerations should guide a court’s determination of the standard of ordinary
care for a particular product. Inexpensive goods require consumers to exercise
less care in their selection than expensive ones. The more important the use of
a product, the more care that must be exercised in its selection. In addition,
“the degree of caution used . . . depends on the relevant buying class. That is,
some buyer classes, for example, professional buyers . . . will be held to a
higher standard of care than others. Where the buyer class consists of both
professional buyers and consumers, . . . . the standard of care to be exercised
by the reasonably prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least
sophisticated consumer in the class.”
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
179. See, e.g., BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185,
215–16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
In conducting this analysis, this Court notes the distinction case law
recognizes regarding the likelihood of confusion involving expensive versus
inexpensive goods. The ordinary, reasonably prudent and reasonably informed
customer is expected to be more discerning and less likely to be confused in
inverse proportion to the price of the product. Thus, greater likelihood of
confusion is presumed in the case where relatively inexpensive items are
purchased.
The price of the products here in contention may not be great, but seems
sufficiently high to reduce the buyers’ clicking impulse and to serve to define
more narrowly one segment of the relevant web market to the more interested,
probable purchasers of the parties’ products. Defendants’ registration fee for
each entrant is $19.95. The unit price of plaintiff’s videocassettes, DVDs and
merchandise, though it not entirely clear from the record, could be under
$20.00 per item.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934,
941 (10th Cir. 1983) (“Buyers typically exercise little care in the selection of inexpensive
items that may be purchased on impulse. Despite a lower degree of similarity, these
items are more likely to be confused than expensive items which are chosen carefully.”)
(citing Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 191 (5th
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sophistication of the consumers themselves appears to be at issue, rather
than the price-driven levels of attention paid to particular purchases.
Consider the analysis articulated in a case involving competing
“horizontal fly” men’s underwear, where a court wrote:
Generally, the more sophisticated the average consumer of a product is, the less
likely it is that similarities in trade dress and trademarks will result in confusion
concerning the source or sponsorship of the product. . . . The purchasers of
relatively inexpensive goods are held to a lesser standard of purchasing care and
do not give much thought to the purchase of such inexpensive goods.180

This court’s language makes it sound like people with few financial
resources are inherently the least discerning consumers and thereby
more susceptible to confusion. Yet there is no indication that this court
based its conclusion on credible empirical research or any actual
evidence whatsoever. Instead, this analysis seems rooted in instinct and
personal opinion.
It is certainly possible that poor people are easily confused and
unsophisticated in their purchasing habits. It is at least equally
plausible, however, that the exact opposite is true—that individuals
with few economic resources pay careful attention to how they spend
their scarce and highly-valued dollars, while wealthy people are
comparatively more apt to spend small amounts of money somewhat
carelessly or recklessly. One might expect courts to require specific
and persuasive evidence about consumer behavior before weighing in
on this issue, but they do not appear to do so. Instead, judges
sometimes make very loaded judgments, seemingly on their own
volition. Consider this characterization, in the context of a dilution
case, of the low level of sophistication of people who attend
performances of a circus: “[C]onsumers of Ringling’s product do not
have a high level of sophistication. Unlike the attorneys in Mead
Data, who identified the LEXIS mark with the LEXIS service and
Cir. 1981); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (D. Kan. 1977));
ConAgra, Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 784 F. Supp. 700, 736 (D. Neb. 1992) (taking
the position that, generally, consumers of low-cost goods are less careful, and therefore,
more likely to be confused by a similarity in marks); Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Stubenberg
Int’l, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1310, 1313 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (“Further, the fact that we are here
dealing with relatively inexpensive food products means that the average purchaser may
exercise less care in the purchasing decision.”); NutraSweet Company v. K & S Foods,
Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1964, 1967 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (“We further note that the respective
products are low-cost impulse-type items where the purchasing decision is not likely to
be as careful as it would be with a higher-priced product.”). But see L.A. Gear, Inc. v.
Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that “[p]urchasers
in discount stores are sufficiently sophisticated, we believe, to know whether they are
buying the cheaper copies or the expensive originals”).
180. Munsingwear, Inc. v. Jockey Int’l, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146, 1151–52 (D.
Minn. 1994), aff’d, 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1994).
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made conscious, knowledgeable decisions to purchase the product,
Ringling’s consumers commit no such deliberate, reflective and
willful acts.”181 Since the defendant would have benefited from a
finding that circus goers were highly sophisticated, it is extremely
unlikely that the defendant made this argument to the judge. This
means that either Ringling Brothers specifically urged the court to
find that its own patrons were unsophisticated, inattentive, and
impulsive in their ticket buying, or that the court made this unflattering
and textually unsupported determination on its own.
Articulated judicial perceptions about particular sorts of consumers
demonstrably vary, sometimes dramatically, even within similar
factual situations.
Wine consumers, for example, are viewed
somewhat schizophrenically by judges. In one case a district court
found that “wine drinkers tend to be older, wealthier, and better
educated than the adverage population.”182 However, a different
district court in a different case concluded that “the average
American consumer is unlearned in the selection of wine.”183 In so
doing, it relied on a prior court’s opinion, which stated as follows:
“[T]he average American who drinks wine on occasion can hardly
pass for a connoisseur of wines.”184 This judge distinguished the
determination by yet another court that “the wine-buying public—
insofar as their selection and purchase of wine is concerned—is a
highly discriminating group,”185 with the somewhat snide, startling,
and completely unsupported assertion that, “with all due respect to
Alabama, it would seem common knowledge that wine was not a
widely appreciated beverage in the South in 1959.”186
In counterfeiting situations in which cheap “knock offs” appropriate
the actual, identical trademarks of upscale goods, deeming their
purchasers as “confused” is almost certainly an analytic stretch; presumably,
consumers who buy luxury items, such as designer perfumes, luggage,
181. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
182. Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).
183. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 465
(N.D. Cal. 1991).
184. Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc. 569 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1978).
185. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Ben R. Goltsman & Co., 172 F. Supp. 826, 830 n.2
(M.D. Ala. 1959).
186. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 782 F. Supp. at 465.
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jewelry, or watches, at low prices from street vendors know that the
trademarks are not used legitimately. Nevertheless, it is hard to
begrudge a mark holder a cause of action against abject counterfeiters, as
the unauthorized use of identical marks on identical goods is the
prototypical act of infringement against which the Lanham Act was
enacted to protect.187 Additionally, a plausible argument can be made
about whether the consumer purchasing luxury goods from street
vendors at astonishing discounts might be confused, mistaken, or
deceived about whether the goods are counterfeit, or legitimate in the
trademark sense, but illegitimate in a chain of acquisition context, which
is to say, stolen.
Less doctrinally coherent cases arise when the “knock off” goods at
issue look like more expensive products in form and appearance but bear
dissimilar trademarks. Courts will often concede that consumers are not
confused about what they are purchasing, but instead express concern
that the lesser merchandise enables those in possession to confuse
observers into thinking they have spent money (or have the money to
spend) on expensive goods. This is generally framed as one variety of
post-sale confusion.
Concerns about post-sale confusion led to a finding of trademark
confusion in Hermès International v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue,
Inc.188 The court found that because the defendants did not use the name
“Hermès” on their products, and openly acknowledged to customers that
their products were copies of Hermès designs, they “had not deceptively
attempted to ‘pass off’ or ‘palm off’ their products as genuine
Hermès.”189 However, the defendants had still “attempt[ed] to encourage
consumer confusion in the post-sale context” and were therefore guilty
of trademark infringement.190 As construed by the Hermès court,
trademark law protects unwary observers from mistakenly assuming,
based on a cursory inspection, that a handbag carried by another person
was Hermès if she was actually toting a less expensive or elite
pocketbook. The court held: “[A] loss occurs when a sophisticated
187. See, e.g., Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th
Cir. 1993); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir.
1992); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir.
1992); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 1992);
Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Techs., Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1225 (10th Cir. 1991);
Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir.
1991); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir.
1986); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495–96 (2d Cir. 1961).
188. Hermès Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000).
189. Id. at 107.
190. Id. (alteration in original).
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buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it off to the public as the genuine
article, thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving the status of
owning the genuine article at a knockoff price.”191 This post-sale confusion
principle thus facilitates trademark actions against “goods [that] offer
consumers a cheap knockoff copy of the original manufacturer’s more
expensive product,” illegitimately allowing a buyer to acquire the prestige
of owning what appears to be the more expensive product.192
The “doctrine of illegitimate prestige” was also invoked in a dispute
between two clock manufacturers, where the court concluded:
[S]ome customers would buy plaintiff’s cheaper clock for the purpose of
acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’
homes would regard as a prestigious article. Plaintiff’s wrong thus consisted of
the fact that such a visitor would be likely to assume that the clock was [the
more expensive] clock.193

While it is clear that owning items bearing elite trademarks can
signal affluence and good taste, it is less apparent that the Lanham
Act countenances using trademark rights to “protect” exclusivity in
conspicuous consumption,194 or that trademark law is even necessary
to perform this role. One suspects that people who actually care how
much someone else paid for a wrist watch easily discern the
difference between a Timex and a Rolex, regardless of any similarity
in design.

191. Id. at 109.
192. Id. at 108; see also McCarthy, supra note 22, at 3338 (arguing that “in light of
the dual aim of trademark law to protect the interests of both the public and the
trademark owner, the use of a trademark likely to cause confusion among the general
public in a post-sale context should be actionable under federal trademark law”).
193. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).
194. See Lunney, supra note 1, at 406–08 (asserting that confusion is irrelevant in
the case of prestige goods, and that liability analysis seems to rest on the court’s feeling
that the ordinary rule of competition should not apply to prestige goods because
otherwise a producer will not be able to maintain the artificial scarcity necessary to
preserve the status of a prestige good); Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When
Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain—with an Example from the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392 (1993).
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E. Gendered Confusion195
In pondering the curious tendency of judges to disparage purchasers,
195. Trademark law might not strike the casual observer as having particularly
compelling gender-related dimensions, at least in comparison to areas such as family law
and employment law, but neither should gender neutrality be presumed. The Author
strongly recommends to the reader a rather astonishing and compelling article: Elizabeth
Warren, What Is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other GenderNeutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19 (2002). Warren persuasively asserts that
politically active women tend to ignore supposedly gender-neutral business issues that,
in fact, profoundly affect many women. Her particular focus is on bankruptcy law, but
her more general observations and critiques would apply to trademark law as well.
Given the fluid and extraordinarily subjective nature of trademark infringement
determinations as discussed herein, a court could take the opportunity to advance its
vision of social justice and gender equality when resolving trademark disputes. This was
attempted in 1979 when a federal district court found a limited right for the Philadelphia
Jaycees to continue to call themselves the “Jaycees” even after the national organization
revoked its charter because it had begun admitting women as members, as the long as the
prefix “Philadelphia” was always used and the group made clear in the printed material
that it disseminated that it was not affiliated with the national Jaycees. U.S. Jaycees v.
Phila. Jaycees, 490 F. Supp. 688, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.
1981). However, after referencing “the halcyon days of the 1920s” in which “the United
States Jaycees limited membership to young men,” the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding:
This case . . . centers on the infringement of trademark rights. The exclusion
of women is wholly independent of the protection provided by the Lanham Act
to trademarks. The action terminating the Philadelphia charter for admitting
women to membership was not dependent on the Lanham Act. Nor would a
decision in this Lanham Act case favorable to the Philadelphia Jaycees alter
the fact of the discrimination; it would not restore the Philadelphia chapter’s
affiliation or change the National’s membership policy.
U.S. Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 1981). The appellate court
appeared ignorant of, though probably affirmatively chose to ignore, the impact that
allowing the Philadelphia club to continue calling itself Jaycees might have had on the
national organization’s willingness to compromise on the gender segregation issue and
accept female members.
In 1986, a similar trademark dispute arose involving the Kiwanis, provoking a federal
district court judge to write:
It is somewhat astonishing in the year 1985 to hear an officer of a wellknown international organization (boasting more than 300,000 members) say
that it is fine for women “to help make the pancakes” but not for them to be
members of the organization sponsoring the sale of those pancakes. The issue
squarely presented by this case is whether such a blatant and admitted sexist
attitude, and the discriminatory membership policy arising from it, are entitled
to the protection of a United States District Court. For Kiwanis International
asks this court to enjoin a local chapter from using the Kiwanis name and logo
solely because that local has admitted a woman into its ranks.
Kiwanis Int’l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1382 (D.N.J. 1986)
(emphasis in original), rev’d, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
The Kiwanis Ridgewood had accepted a female member and despite pointed
instructions by the national organization, refused to revoke her membership. Kiwanis
International then filed suit in federal court under the Lanham Act, claiming that Kiwanis
Ridgewood had forfeited its license to use the Kiwanis marks, and sought preliminary
and permanent injunctions prohibiting Ridgewood’s continued use of the mark. In
response, Kiwanis Ridgewood filed suit in New Jersey Superior Court seeking an
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one notices that many of the most demeaning conceptions of consumers,
and of their intelligence and discriminatory powers (or lack thereof),
tend to be articulated in trademark cases in which the underlying goods
and services are primarily designed for, marketed to, or purchased by
women. Women are perceived to do most of the shopping, and this
perception is accurate.196 While court-made trademark law often presumes
injunction against International’s license revocation and a declaration that the woman at
issue was a bona fide member of the Ridgewood club. Kiwanis Ridgewood asserted in
its complaint that the revocation would violate the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination. Id. at 1381. After removal to federal court, the district court held that
Kiwanis Ridgewood was a place of public accommodation and therefore prohibited from
restricting membership on the basis of sex under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination. Id. at 1387–90. The court further held that Kiwanis International was
precluded from enforcing its illegal discriminatory membership restrictions against
Ridgewood, concluding:
To suggest that this case involves solely the right of Kiwanis to protect its
name and logo because of a violation of its constitution or bylaws is to ignore
reality. What is truly at issue here is whether Kiwanis can, directly or
indirectly, enforce its policy of discrimination against women with the
imprimatur of this court. This opinion concludes that it cannot. Kiwanis’
trademark rights are subject to the right of women to be free of discrimination,
as indeed they should be.
Id. at 1395. However, as with the district court opinion in the Jaycees case, this too was
reversed by an appellate court; in this case, it was reversed on the grounds that Kiwanis
Ridgewood did not constitute a place of public accommodation. Kiwanis Int’l v.
Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986).
196. See, e.g., “Radical Change” Hits Supermarket Industry, CHAIN DRUG REV.,
July 2, 2001, at 37 (“Supermarket shoppers are overwhelmingly female, 77%, according
to the 2001 edition of Chain Drug Review’s ‘Where Consumers Shop—and Why’
survey. Average shoppers range in age from 35 to 65, with 75% matching that profile,
and they visit a supermarket once a week.”); Cele Otnes & Mary Ann McGrath,
Perceptions and Realities of Male Shopping Behavior, J. RETAILING, Spring 2001, at
111, 112.
Long associated with the domestic sphere, shopping primarily has been
regarded as a feminine activity. Witkowski (1999) observes that “as early as
200 years ago, American society already had begun to concede that the
acquisition and use of domestic goods was within a woman’s sphere of
responsibility.” Nava (1997) notes that when department stores opened in the
early 20th century, it was women who patronized them and “decoded and
encoded the changing images of class” symbolized in store merchandise.
Reekie (1992) argues that even on the more “sexually ambiguous” floors of
early department stores, women constituted the majority of customers.
Id. (citations omitted).
According to a January 2001 study by MarketResearch.com, women’s
footwear and sports apparel sales will hit $39 billion by 2005. And, because
women buy athletic wear for boyfriends, husbands and kids, as well as for
themselves, they account for 81% of all athletic apparel purchases, according
to the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association.
David Sokol, Where the Boys Aren’t, SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Nov. 1, 2002, available
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that all consumers of a particular class of goods or services require
protection from deceptive or confusing trademarks,197 it is when the
consumers are likely to be female that paternalistic intervention, supposedly
on the consumers’ behalf, is often considered most necessary and appropriate.
This Author’s strong impressionistic reaction, provoked by exposure
to numerous written opinions in the context of teaching courses in
trademark law, is that judges will more readily find sufficient consumer
confusion likely where the underlying products or services are female
oriented in some manner. As a consequence, trademark holders seeking
broad protections may be more willing to litigate infringement cases
involving goods and services with feminine aspects as straightforward
confusion issues because they would have a greater expectation of
success in convincing a court that female consumers are more likely to
be confused by allegedly similar trademarks. Where the product or
service is more male identified, trademark holders may either adopt a
more attenuated or nuanced theory of confusion (for example, initial
interest confusion, or the possibility of confusion) or strategically focus
their energies on trademark dilution claims, which can be supported by,
but do not require proof (or even argument) that the challenged mark or
use creates confusion among consumers.
1. Certain Consumers Are Presumed to Be Exceptionally
Easily Confused
Hey, whatever happened to the women’s liberation movement?
The what?
You know. The women’s movement. Why aren’t people interested anymore?
Oh, that. You see, what happened is, it became tainted.
By what?
By its close association with women.198
at 2002 WL 8859009. See generally THOMAS HINE, I WANT THAT!: HOW WE ALL
BECAME SHOPPERS (2002) (describing why people shop and how people use shopping to
gain acceptance and establish their place in society).
197. The original justification for recognizing enforceable rights in trademarks was
premised on the idea that trademarks could simultaneously profit both consumers and
producers of goods and services. See Leaffer, supra note 19, at 5–6.
A reliable, stable, and efficiently structured trademark system benefits
consumer and business interests alike. Trademarks serve the interests of
consumers because they reduce search costs and allow buyers to make rational
purchasing and repurchasing decisions with speed and assurance. Just as
important, a strong trademark system creates incentives for firms to create and
market products of desirable qualities, particularly when these qualities are not
observable before purchase.
Id. (footnote omitted).
198. ALIX KATES SHULMAN, DRINKING THE RAIN 90 (1995).
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The “reasonable person” construct in tort law historically was (and
some would argue still is) masculine, both conceptually and
linguistically the “reasonable man.”199 The gender of the “reasonably
prudent consumer,”200 however, is perceptually tied to the products or
services with which disputed trademarks are associated. Where the good
or service is intuitively linked to women as primary purchasers and
consumers, a trademark holder’s burden of convincing the court that
another mark is likely to cause confusion (and is therefore infringing, or
dilutive, or possibly both) observationally seems to be an easier one to
meet in many cases.201 This watered down standard is, however, almost
199. See, e.g., Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769, 770.
Until the late 1970s the law’s measure of reasonableness was openly and
exclusively male. For example, the still influential American Law Institute’s
Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965, refers to the negligence
standard of care as that of “the reasonable man.” While in recent years “the
reasonable person” has, for the most part, replaced the reasonable man as the
standard by which the law and its players measure conduct, I will show that the
reasonableness standard continues to be male.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398,
1404 (1992).
The reasonable man standard remains an entrenched and pervasive standard
by which courts measure potentially illegal conduct. Tort law, criminal law,
and employment discrimination law all employ this standard to determine
whether conduct is appropriate. That conduct is acceptable if it is “reasonable”
is one of those “neutral” principles with which everyone can agree. As one
critique points out, “[t]he notion that reason is divorced from ‘merely
contingent’ existence still predominates in contemporary Western
thought . . . .”
The standard actually incorporates two different, although interrelated,
requirements: first, that conduct be “reasonable,” and second, that conduct be
that expected of a “man.” By “reasonable man,” of course, the standard
purports to be universal, to include all “mankind,” and in practice courts have
applied it to women as well as men.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
200. This phrase has been used in several trademark cases. See, e.g., Entrepreneur
Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[t]he test for
likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is
likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks”)
(quoting Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.
1998)); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1060 (9th Cir. 1999).
201. Dianne Klein asserted a similar gender based analytic disparity in the context
of tort law, writing:
While a first-year law student and the mother of a young son and daughter, I
was constantly struck by the frequent appearance in the torts casebook of boys
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always articulated in a putatively gender neutral way, so that it creates
puddles in the jurisprudence that sometimes splash and dampen
standards in trademark litigation concerning even “male” goods and
services.
The very first time a court decided to expand trademark rights such
that they could be enforced against related but noncompeting goods
(rather than just against the same or similar products) was in the context
of breakfast foods in 1917 and is still referred to as the “Aunt Jemima
Doctrine.”202 The court concluded that buyers of pancake batter would
likely become confused by the use of the same trademark on pancake
syrup and erroneously assume that the goods came from the same
source.203 “Perhaps they might not do so, if [Aunt Jemima] were used
for flatirons,”204 the court observed, signaling quite clearly that they
believed that the likely confused pancake batter and syrup purchasers
were also consumers of flatirons, which is to say, female. 205
suffering injuries as the result of their own or another boy’s seeming
foolhardiness. Both through their own negligence, and that of others, boys
seemed continuously to find themselves in harm’s way. I naturally wondered
if this phenomenon simply reflected the truth of the proverb that “boys will be
boys” and, therefore, engage in more risky and dangerous play, or whether
there was a more complicated relationship between boys’ exposure to risk,
consequent litigation, and tort law negligence concepts.
A closer look reveals that the current understanding of “the reasonable man
[or person] standard,” a central device of tort law, includes an uneasy
incorporation of the economists’ notion of “risk aversion,” a deviation from
ideally rational “risk neutrality,” that both reflects and reproduces structures of
gender hierarchy and stereotyping. Exceptions to uniform rules regarding the
standard of care reflect the same gendered understanding, including protection
or even subsidy for the risk-seeking or foolhardy behavior of boys.
Inefficiencies are tolerated when they support modes of behavior in which men
believe themselves to have an interest. Yet the systematic risk-aversion of
women, which is well-established and may have far more pervasive
consequences for both the efficiency and equity goals of tort law, is not
acknowledged. In domains where men are known to be risk-averse, however,
reasonableness is identified with risk aversion.
Diane Klein, Distorted Reasoning: Gender, Risk-Aversion and Negligence Law, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 629, 629 (1997).
202. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int’l v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 211 (D.
Md. 1988).
203. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409–10 (2d Cir. 1917).
204. Id. at 410.
205. Judge Learned Hand concurred in the Aunt Jemima case and then used the
freshly baked “Aunt Jemima doctrine” in the context of consumers arguably more likely
to be male, holding that the Yale trademark that identified the source of locks could not
be used by a competitor on flashlights. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974
(2d Cir. 1928). However, he did so with little enthusiasm, writing:
[T]he fact that flash-lights and locks are made of metal does not appear to us to
give them the same descriptive properties, except as the trade has so classed
them. But we regard what the trade thinks as the critical consideration, and we
think the statute meant to make it the test, despite the language used.
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A contemporary court might be willing to overlook seemingly very
similar trademarks on virtually identical products if the packaging of the
products (the contexts in which the marks appeared) were quite
different. When Nabisco alleged that their “Cream of Wheat” cereal
mark was infringed by Quaker Oats’ use of “Creamy Wheat” on a very
similar rival foodstuff, a court concluded it was unlikely that Nabisco
would be able to demonstrate that consumer confusion was likely
because even though Nabisco and Quaker Oats were competing for the
same consumers, the differences between the product packages were
more significant than their similarities, and therefore consumers
probably would not buy Creamy Wheat believing that it was Cream of
Wheat.206 Similarly, another court concluded that consumers could
Id. He thus blamed the confusion conclusion he reluctantly endorsed on “the trade.”
About the Aunt Jemima case Glynn Lunney has written:
During the course of the twentieth century, courts, and to a lesser extent
Congress, gradually broadened the scope of the trademark owner’s exclusive
use right. Expansion with respect to use of the mark on different goods, for
example, began in 1917 when the Second Circuit ruled that the Aunt Jemima
Mills Co. was entitled to exclude another from using “Aunt Jemima” as a mark
on pancake syrup. Aunt Jemima had itself only used the mark with respect to
self-rising flour, but the court found that the defendant’s syrup, though
different, was sufficiently related “that the public, or a large part of it . . .
would conclude that [the defendant’s syrup] was made by the [plaintiff].”
Although the Aunt Jemima court retained confusion as to source as the
relevant test, its recognition that use of the trademark on related goods could
create actionable confusion opened the door to claims of infringement based
upon such use. After opening the door to such claims, the Second Circuit
found it almost impossible to define any sensible stopping point. If the
defendant’s goods were not identical, they might nonetheless be sufficiently
related that consumers would likely believe that the plaintiff had produced
them. If not so related to create confusion as to source, consumers might
nonetheless believe that the plaintiff had sponsored the defendant’s goods or,
given the complexities of corporate ownership, that the plaintiff and defendant
were somehow affiliated. In short, by opening the door to infringement claims
with respect to noncompeting goods, the Second Circuit found itself on the
often-invoked, but rarely encountered, slippery slope. Although no less a jurist
than Learned Hand set himself the task of identifying the appropriate stopping
place, the court was unable to do so. In Polaroid Corp. v Polarad Electronics
Corp., the Second Circuit eventually abandoned the same goods limitation
almost entirely, merely incorporating proximity of goods as a factor to be
considered in resolving the likelihood of confusion issue.
Lunney, supra note 1, at 392–93 (citations omitted).
206. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Quaker Oats Co., 547 F. Supp. 692, 699 (D.N.J. 1982).
Another decision that is very respectful of consumer intelligence and discretionary
powers is BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 215–16
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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successfully differentiate between the “Tallia” and “Italia” trademarks
even though both were associated with clothing.207
However, it is unusual for courts to presume that consumers are
observant and shrewd enough to distinguish between two disparate
cereal boxes or clothing retailers. The theory of consumer-as-idiot
prevails in many trademark infringement cases, often seeming glaringly
pretextual, invoked only to comport with the doctrinal requirements
necessary to reach the outcome that the trademark holder desires and the
court apparently endorses. Where the benchmark consumer is likely to
be perceived as female, this predisposition seems to be exacerbated.
Illustrations include determinations that consumers cannot distinguish
between the “Nailtiques” and “Pro-Techniques” marks on bottles of nail
polish,208 or between an over-the-counter drug called “Premesyn PMS,”
intended to relieve premenstrual syndrome symptoms, and a prescription
drug, “Premarin,” used in estrogen replacement therapy to treat the
symptoms of menopause.209 In this Author’s estimation, most women
can tell one brand name from another and have no difficulty whatsoever
in distinguishing between over-the-counter and prescription drugs, or
between premenstrual syndrome and menopause. Admittedly, this
Author’s opinion is experiential, intuitive, and transcendently subjective,
yet so are the vague presumptive foundations upon which judges in
trademark cases often base their legal analyses.
In a recent case in which the relevant consumers were “shoppers,” the
court upheld a jury verdict finding that the mySimon Internet-based
comparison shopping service infringed a trademark held by the Simon
Property Group, which used the name “Simon” in connection with its
real space mall development, mall management, and retail shopping
services.210 This verdict was affirmed despite the fact that the only
survey evidence in the case “tend[ed] to show virtually no threat of
actual confusion between the two companies[,] . . . . a ‘completely
negligible’ likelihood of confusion with under 2 percent of respondents
indicating relevant confusion.”211 The judge clearly felt that judicial
207. Hartz & Co. v. Italia, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 5657, 1998 WL 132787, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1998); see also Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 171 F. Supp.
293, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that Plaintiffs’ trademark was not infringed by
noncompeting products in adjacent markets because there was no likelihood of
confusion, defendants’ use was in good faith and reasonable, and plaintiffs were not
injured).
208. Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Scis. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998
(S.D. Fla. 1997).
209. Am. Home Prods., Corp. v. Chattem, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 3671, 1986 WL 6167,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1986).
210. Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., No. IP 99-1195-C H/G, 2001 WL
66408 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2001).
211. Id. at *15.
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intuition outweighed the evidence and ruled accordingly.
In another well-known case, one jeans maker, Lois Sportswear, was
enjoined from using a stitching pattern on the back pockets of the
upscale designer denim pants it marketed because the configuration was
held to be substantially similar to Levi’s trademark stitching pattern, “a
fanciful pattern of interconnected arcs.”212 The court announced that
similar back pocket stitching on defendant’s wares would confuse
consumers, despite the fact that the defendant’s jeans were designer
jeans and therefore sold to a different market segment than Levi’s jeans,
and the designer jeans bore very disparate, exceeding dissimilar labels,
hang tags, and product features.213 This conclusion was premised upon
the stated concern that an individual’s eyes might sweep the backside of
another who was wearing a pair of the defendant’s jeans, notice the back
pocket stitching design, and erroneously conclude the fanciful pattern of
interconnected arcs indicated a connection between the source of those
designer jeans with the Lois Sportswear labels and the makers of
Levi’s.214 Framed as “post-sale confusion as to source,” the court
212. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d
Cir. 1986).
213. Id. at 877–78 (Miner, C.J., dissenting).
[T]he evidence is clear that Lois employs a variety of temporary and
permanent labels distinguishing its jeans from those of Levi. For instance,
Lois jeans are sold with “hang tags” displaying the Lois brand name and the
trade symbol of a bull. There are two stitched-on cardboard tags, one
measuring approximately five inches by three inches and the other measuring
approximately one inch by three inches. Both tags display the Lois brand
name and bull symbol as well as the legend “imported from Europe” in
conspicuous print. Affixed permanently to Lois jeans are various identifying
features: a two inch by one inch leather tag attached to the left rear pocket
bearing the brand name and bull symbol; a sizing and care tag stitched to the
inner waist seam bearing the Lois brand name and indicating that both the
fabric and product are made in Spain; a brass button on the waistband bearing
the Lois brand name; and a quarter circle leather or fabric patch, stitched to the
right front pocket, bearing the bull symbol.
Id.
214. Id. at 874.
We are trying to determine if it is likely that consumers mistakenly will
assume either that appellants’ jeans somehow are associated with appellee or
are made by appellee. The fact that appellants’ jeans arguably are in a
different market segment makes this type of confusion more likely. Certainly a
consumer observing appellee’s striking stitching pattern on appellants’
designer jeans might assume that appellee had chosen to enter that market
segment using a subsidiary corporation, or that appellee had allowed
appellants’ designers to use appellee’s trademark as a means of reaping some
profits from the designer jeans fad without a full commitment to that market
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assumed this allegedly anticipated harm was of adequate magnitude to
support injunctive relief.215 The court’s qualitative view of the
purchasers of the defendants’ designer jeans can be surmised from the
following: While the text of the opinion states that “[t]he district court
found, and the parties do not dispute, that the typical buyer of ‘designer’
jeans is sophisticated with respect to jeans buying,”216 an appended
footnote acerbically notes that: “[i]t is quite possible of course to draw
the opposite inference from the fact that these buyers are willing to pay
almost $100 for a pair of jeans.”217
On occasion, adult shoppers are explicitly presumed to be less
perceptive and discerning then their young children. One of the most
startling cases in this regard involved fish shaped snack crackers.218

Id.

Id.

segment. Likewise, in the post-sale context a consumer seeing appellants’
jeans on a passer-by might think that the jeans were appellee’s long-awaited
entry into the designer jeans market segment. Motivated by this mistaken
notion—appellee’s goodwill—the consumer might then buy appellants’ jeans
even after discovering his error. After all, the way the jeans look is a primary
consideration to most designer jeans buyers.
215. Id. at 871.
We agree with the district court, however, that the two principle areas of
confusion raised by appellants’ use of appellee’s stitching pattern are: (1) the
likelihood that jeans consumers will be confused as to the relationship between
appellants and appellee; and (2) the likelihood that consumers will be confused
as to the source of appellants’ jeans when the jeans are observed in the postsale context. We hold that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (1982),
as interpreted by our Court, was meant to prevent such likely confusion.
216. Id. at 875.
217. Id. at 875 n.5.
218. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1999).
In spring 1998, Nickelodeon Television Network approached Nabisco to
explore a possible joint promotion for Nickelodeon’s new cartoon program,
“CatDog.” In August 1998, Nabisco and Nickelodeon entered a Joint
Promotion Agreement (“JPA”), giving Nabisco the right to produce cheese
crackers in shapes based on the CatDog cartoon. The agreement required
Nabisco to print on its packages that “CatDog and related titles, logos and
characters are trademarks of” Nickelodeon’s parent, Viacom International, Inc.
Nabisco’s CatDog product was intended to compete with other animal-shaped
cheese crackers marketed to children.
The star of the CatDog cartoon program is the CatDog—a two-headed
creature that is half cat and half dog. Each half of the CatDog has a distinct
personality. The fish is the favorite food and the symbol for the cat half; the
bone is the preferred meal and emblem for the dog half. Other characters that
are featured on the cartoon include a mouse, a rabbit, a squirrel, and several
dogs. In its first three months, the CatDog show garnered a 3.9 Nielsen rating,
making it close to the most widely watched program for children.
Pursuant to its agreement with Nickelodeon, Nabisco developed a CatDog
snack that consists of small orange crackers in three shapes: half the crackers
in a package are in the shape of the two-headed CatDog character, one-quarter
in the shape of a bone, and one-quarter in the shape of a fish. The fish-shaped
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Pepperidge Farms, makers of Goldfish crackers, objected to the presence
of fish shaped crackers in packages of “CatDog” crackers produced by
Nabisco to exploit the popularity of the Nickelodeon network cartoon by
the same name.219 Nabisco had developed a CatDog snack that consisted of
small orange crackers in three shapes: Half the crackers in a package
were in the shape of the two-headed CatDog character, one-quarter in
the shape of a bone, and one-quarter in the shape of a fish.220 In
concluding that the fish crackers would improperly “lessen the
distinctiveness” of Pepperidge Farm’s product, the court acknowledged
that the children at whom the Nabisco crackers were pitched would
likely know the difference, but asserted that their parents would be
markedly less astute, writing:
Nabisco argues that . . . children will have no difficulty recognizing the
Nabisco product as a reference to the CatDog and will thus keep the two marks
separate and distinct. Even if Nabisco is correct in that surmise, it seems to us
to have only moderate importance, for two reasons. First, while children may
be the primary ultimate consumers of the crackers, they are generally not the
purchasers. Adult purchasers of crackers may be less sophisticated than
children in recognizing the differences between the two fish. Even if, in the
minds of children, the addition of Nabisco’s CatDog family to the cheese
cracker landscape does not lessen the distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm’s
mark in its Goldfish, it is likely to do so among adults who will have less
awareness of Nickelodeon’s CatDog and of the differences between the two
competing crackers.221

This conclusion contrasts dramatically with the much more typical
(and intuitive) assumption generally made by courts that children are
more easily confused than adults.222 It was, however, necessary to

Id.

cracker closely resembles Pepperidge Farm’s Goldfish cracker in color, shape,
and size, and taste, although the CatDog fish is somewhat larger and flatter,
and has markings on one side. The CatDog product was to be sold in boxes
featuring the CatDog and showing fish and bones in the background.

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 220–21. The Court further noted:
Nabisco claims some protection from the fact that its fish shape is not
arbitrary but acts as a reference to the fish in Nickelodeon’s CatDog story.
The weakness in its argument lies in the fact that when the Nabisco crackers
are served in a bowl, consumers who are not familiar with the Nickelodeon
entertainment and its cross licensing with Nabisco will see simply crackers
very similar to Pepperidge Farm’s fish (together with other shapes) and will
not know that it celebrates Nickelodeon’s CatDog entertainment.
Id. at 221–22.
222. See, e.g., Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th
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justify the outcome of the case, as the lower court had previously
ascertained that Pepperidge Farm had “failed to show a likelihood that
its target consumers, children in the 6–12 year-old age group, will be
confused by the Nabisco product.”223 Implicit in the Second Circuit
analysis is the belief that children will either not be present when snack
Cir. 2001).
As we noted above, the principal at an elementary school testified that when
she wore the Duffy costume at a school rally, the children shouted “Barney.
Barney. Barney,” and parents testified that when they rented the Duffy
costume for their children’s birthday parties, the children believed that the
person dressed as Duffy was in fact Barney. In addition, Lyons offered
newspaper clippings that evidenced actual confusion between Duffy and
Barney, not only by the children who were the subject of the articles, but by
the reporters themselves, who erroneously described Duffy as “Barney.”
Id.; Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1418 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“The
Court must also consider the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised
by the purchaser. Under this analysis, adults would presumably be less prone to
confusion than young children.”); Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947,
953 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (“Finally, the fact that small children, incapable of reasoning, may
have been confused by the Chicken’s act, does not amount to actual confusion.”);
Harlem Wizards Entm’t Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1084, 1098
(D.N.J. 1997) (“Actual confusion is not the same as clear mistake or misidentification on
the part of consumers, many of whom it turns out were children. Moreover, there is no
evidence that these purported instances of actual confusion could have any effect on
consumer purchasing decisions.”); Three Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk, Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 303, 312 (D. Mass. 1995) (“Stewart has also been asked to autograph defendant’s
goods on several occasions, including once by a group of children on a golf course.
Stewart has presented six examples of actual confusion.”); Geoffrey Inc. v. Stratton, 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1696 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (“The category of a buyer protected by
trademark law against this confusion includes not only the careful or discriminating
buyer, but also the ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible. In this case, it is not
only children but also adults who may be confused.”) (citation omitted); Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1038
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (“While there are differences in the parties’ products and retail outlets,
the purchasers of the parties’ items are often substantially similar. The evidence also
suggests that young children were more likely to be confused than others.”); Bulk Mfg.
Co. v. Schoenbach Prods. Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. 664, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
[T]he Court does not find that the manufacturer’s name is prominently
displayed so that prospective purchasers of the machine would be alerted to the
different origin, especially in view of the almost identical appearance of the
machines. Second, the designation of the manufacturer could not prevent
confusion among children who purchase the “eggs” dispensed from the
vending machines, and who could hardly be expected to place any significance
on the designation, even if they could read it.
Id.; Gen. Foods Corp. v. Mellis, 203 U.S.P.Q. 261, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The
sophistication of the buyers of these products cannot be considered high; the consuming
universe to which the products are directed is that of children.”); Blake Publ’n Corp. v.
O’Quinn Studios, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. 848, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The nature of the
market to which the two magazines appeal further enhances the likelihood of confusion.
Children under 16, who comprise a substantial portion of plaintiff’s readership, are not
likely to bring a great deal of care and sophistication to their purchasing decisions.”).
223. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 211 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d,
191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
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crackers shaped like cartoon characters are purchased or will be unable
to dispel the confusion of accompanying adults. A contrary (though
admittedly similarly intuitive) argument is that purchases of snack
crackers shaped like cartoon crackers are unlikely to be made by adults
at all, unless children are present and urging their specific acquisition.
Though the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ostensibly decided the
case on trademark dilution grounds, it did so only after conflating
confusion with dilution,224 writing: “Consumers’ actual confusion of the
junior and the senior mark may also be a factor in finding dilution. . . .
Confusion lessens distinction. When consumers confuse the junior mark
with the senior, blurring has occurred.”225 This confusion, the court decided,
was likely to arise once the crackers were removed from their packaging,
such as when served to adults as snacks accompanying cocktails.226
How often Catdog crackers were likely to be served to grown ups at
cocktail parties was not specified.
In a dispute between the producers of Tylenol and a competitor
marketing a dental analgesic it labeled Tempanol, the court stated that to
prove trademark dilution, the “plaintiff must simply show that there is a
mental association by the reasonable consumer between the two
names.”227 The judge decided that the reasonable consumer was likely
to make this detrimental and actionable association because “[b]oth
marks in issue begin with the letter ‘T,’ both have three syllables with
the accent on the first syllable, and the last syllable of both is ‘nol.’”228
He further explicitly noted that he believed consumers were likely to
purchase pain relievers in an unsophisticated manner, without any
significant time or thought.229 In describing the “great renown” of the
224. The court also made the remarkable assertion that “[a] mark can be famous
without being at all distinctive, as in the cases of American Airlines, American Tobacco
Company, British Airways, Federated Department Stores, Allied Stores or the First
National Bank of whatever.” Id. at 227–28. This is in conflict with bedrock trademark
law and doctrine that requires a trademark to have either inherent or acquired
distinctiveness if it is to be protectable under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
1052 (2000) (providing in part that “nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration
of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in
commerce”). Section 43(c)(1) discusses dilution of the “distinctive quality” of a mark
and lists factors for “determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous.”
225. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 221.
226. Id. at 220–21.
227. McNeil Consumer Brands, Inc. v. U.S. Dentek Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d 604,
608 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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Tylenol mark, he wrote:
The name even found its way into the script of the 1980 popular movie
“Airplane,” when the traffic controller, in describing the endangered passenger
plane, announced, “Well, it’s a big pretty white plane with a red stripe, curtains
at the windows, wheels, and it just looks like a big Tylenol.”230

Assumptions about female shoppers surface even when an underlying
product is targeted at males, if a judge believes that the goods will be
purchased for men by women. In Tailor Tee v. Steadman Manufacturing
the court wrote:
With reference to the marketing of the product although there is evidence that
appellant’s goods are sold in women’s specialty shops, the record also reveals
that the products of both parties are sold in department stores although in
different departments of the stores. A more significant factor in this connection
is the fact that women not only buy for themselves but, according to the record,
they purchase a substantial percentage of the underwear for the adult male
members of their families and between 90 and 95% of the undergarments of
their male youngsters. Obviously under these circumstances, a female
purchaser of tee shirts could very easily become confused as to the origin of
these garments when one manufacturer uses the trademark Tailor-Tee and the
other, Tailored T.231

When female consumers are also assumed to be racial minorities, a
variety of conjectures may influence judgments about likelihood of
consumer confusion. In one case, despite the fact that there was no
evidence of actual confusion caused by the coexistence of Sheer Essence
pantyhose and Essence magazine, and notwithstanding a determination
by the Patent and Trademark Office that there was no likelihood of
confusion between the two marks,232 a court decided that confusion in
the marketplace was likely, apparently premised on that fact that both
products were targeted to black women.233
230. Id.
231. Tailor Tee, Inc. v. Stedman Mfg., Co., 286 F.2d 612, 614 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
232. Ithaca Indus., Inc. v. Essence Communications, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1195, 1200
(W.D.N.C. 1986).
The record shows that the United States Patent and Trademark Office
determined that there was no likelihood of confusion between the mark
SHEER ESSENCE, used on pantyhose, and any other registered mark, except
Bancroft’s ESSENCE registration for pantyhose, which developed to have
been cancelled and passed Ithaca’s application for publication on June 21,
1983. At the time this determination was made there was of record
Defendants’ Registration (‘774) for ESSENCE for a magazine and (‘615) for
ESSENCE for T-Shirts.
Id.
233. Id. at 1209.
[T]he Court finds and concludes that in view of the present use by ECI of its
mark ‘615 ESSENCE “for clothing—namely, T-shirts” and its mark ‘902
ESSENCE STYLE “for a retail mail order service for women’s clothing and
accessories” there is a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace. ECI is now
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2. Ungendered or Male Consumers and Assumptions of Astuteness
“Unlikely indeed is the hapless Internet searcher who, unable to find
information on the schedule of upcoming NASCAR broadcasts or ‘Dukes
of Hazzard’ reruns, decides to give up and purchase a computer network
maintenance seminar instead.”234
While trademark jurisprudence on the whole does not present a very
optimistic view of the intelligence or gullibility of consumers, many
opinions implicitly suggest that the typical female shopper is especially
easily fooled and lacking in powers of discernment. While it bears
repeating that courts often express low opinions about the intelligence,
discretion, and observational powers of shoppers even where the context
seems wholly gender neutral, some judges reserve their lowest
expectations for presumptively female consumers, who are apparently
assumed to be a cohort of dull-witted, easily confused girls.
In the context of competing or related goods or services, the threshold
at which courts are willing to assume “ungendered” or even predominantly
male consumers are likely to be confused certainly may be a low one at
times. For example, one wholesale oil company, Pegasus Petroleum,
was forced to change its moniker simply because it was named for the
mythological creature that happened to be used in picture form as a logo
by Mobil, which uses a red “flying horse” symbol in conjunction with its
retail gasoline sales.235 To reach its conclusion that consumer confusion
was likely if the marks continued to coexisted, the court accepted
Mobil’s assertion that seeing the textual words “Pegasus Petroleum”
made observers think that the entity must be related to Mobil Oil
because Mobil sometimes uses a graphic red flying horse logo, but the
court did not require Mobil to proffer any evidence demonstrating how

Id.

actually engaged in selling by mail order women’s apparel and accessories and
these goods, like Ithaca’s pantyhose, are directed specifically to the black
woman’s market. It would be easy for customers to assume that sheer
pantyhose sold under the name SHEER ESSENCE and other apparel and
accessories sold under the name of ESSENCE STYLE, all for black women,
were made and sold by the same company. Ithaca will be enjoined from the
use of the word essence in the sale of its pantyhose.

234. The Network Network v. CBS Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(emphasis added).
235. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 255 (2d Cir. 1987)
(decribing the likelihood of confusion between Mobil’s “flying horse” symbol and
Pegasus Petroleum’s use of the word “Pegasus” as a mark).
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frequently this might occur, if at all.236
However, there are many examples of courts having a much higher
estimation of consumer discretionary abilities when the marked good or
service is directed at a male target audience. When Terri Welles wanted
to (accurately) describe herself on a website as a former “Playmate of
the Year,” she was found to have a right to do so despite the objections
of Playboy Enterprises, Inc., which claims “Playmate of the Year” as a
trademark. The court wrote:
“[O]ne might refer to . . . ‘the professional basketball team from Chicago,’ but
it’s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago
Bulls.” Likewise, given that Ms. Welles is the “Playmate of the Year 1981,”
there is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe herself and her
services without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases. To describe herself
as the “nude model selected by Mr. Hefner’s magazine as its number-one
prototypical woman for the year 1981” would be impractical as well as
ineffectual in identifying Terri Welles to the public.237

Note that the illustrative example the court employs in the opinion
references a male basketball team. While Welles certainly appears to be
a woman, the court clearly assumed her goods and services would be
marketed to men.
Mead Data Central, the company that (then) owned Lexis, the
computerized legal research service, and held “Lexis” as a registered
trademark, sued Toyota for trademark dilution when Toyota launched a
line of luxury cars under the Lexus trademark. Exhibiting a level of
respect for attorneys not always observed among federal judges, the
court concluded that the recognized “knowledgeable sophistication” of
attorneys238 meant that they would probably be able to distinguish
between Lexus, an expensive car, and Lexis, an online legal research
database. As a result, Mead lost its dilution claim. Similarly, in PPG
Industries v. Clinical Data,239 the plaintiff was deemed to have failed to
prove dilution because it did not establish the likelihood of consumer
236. In analyzing the likelihood of confusion created by the defendant’s use of
Pegasus Petroleum, the court seemingly held the intelligence of the man who selected the
mark against him, writing:
Mr. Callimanopulos is obviously an educated, sophisticated man who, from his
prior shipping business, was familiar with the flying horse and from his own
background and education and awareness of Greek mythology could not have
escaped the conclusion that the use of the word “Pegasus” would infringe the
tradename and symbol of the plaintiff.
Id. at 258.
237. Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1079 (S.D. Cal.
1999), aff’d, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
238. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1031–32 (2d Cir. 1989).
239. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Clinical Data Inc., 620 F. Supp. 604, 608–09 (D. Mass.
1985).

790

OBARTOW.DOC

[VOL. 41: 721, 2004]

9/16/2019 3:49 PM

Likelihood of Confusion
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

confusion, that its goodwill and reputation had been detracted from, or
that the uniqueness and individuality of the “PPG” mark had diminished,
as a result of defendant’s use on medical diagnostic equipment.240 The
court assumed, no doubt correctly, that “medical professionals familiar
with this sophisticated technology” could easily tell the difference
between the defendant’s medical devices and the industrial coatings and
finishes manufactured by the plaintiff.
In a trademark case involving a domain name dispute, the mark
holder, Opryland USA, Inc., registered “TNN” as a service mark for The
Nashville Network, a cable network that broadcasts country music and
country lifestyle programs. The defendant domain name holder, The
Network Network (“Network”), maintained a website at “tnn.com”
related to training information for technology professionals pertaining to
the establishment and maintenance of computer networks. The judge
observed that both parties had devoted a lot of time to the issue of
“whether intrepid Internet explorers, in search of information about
Nashville’s programming, are potentially confused when they alight,
inadvertently, on Network’s website.”241 After considering the parties’
arguments, the court very sensibly concluded that “[t]here is a difference
between inadvertently landing on a website and being confused.”242
This judge’s perception of the relative astuteness of web surfers at issue
can be surmised from the following passage from the written opinion:
“The Court can conceive of few, if any, circumstances in which a person
of average intelligence, seeking information on NASCAR racing
schedules, would be seriously confused upon reaching Network’s
website which, by its terms, offers ‘Strategic Planning, design,
implementation, and management of Broadband Voice/Data/Video
Networks.’”243
When the owner of an upscale restaurant called Jake’s brought suit
against the proprietors of Jake and Oliver’s House of Brews, a court
concluded that while customers for both establishments came from the
greater Philadelphia area, a “restaurant goer” could easily recognize the
differences between the two eateries, noting:

240.
241.
2000).
242.
243.

Id. at 609.
The Network Network v. CBS Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1154 (C.D. Cal.
Id. at 1155.
Id.
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JAKE’S is considered to be a fine dining establishment where one might go for
a special occasion such as a graduation celebration, an engagement or
something of that nature. . . . JAKE AND OLIVER’S, on the other hand, is a
more casual dining experience which customers attend for the variety of beers
that it has on tap . . . , as well as the food it serves.244

Where two trade associations, the Self-Insurance Institute of America,
Inc. and the Software and Information Industry Association, used similar
trademarks, the fact that both used trademarks that incorporated the
letters “SIIA” was not found likely to cause consumer confusion.245 In a
suit brought against the creators and distributors of a movie entitled
“Starballz,”246 the court decided that Lucasfilm’s trademark infringement
claims were weak because it was unlikely that the public would confuse
the wildly successful “Star Wars” cinematic series with the defendants’
animated pornographic film. In still another case, consumers were
deemed unlikely to confuse the mark “New York-New York $lot
Exchange,” which was used as the name of a players club by a Las
Vegas casino, with the New York Stock Exchange.247
All of the “confusion is unlikely” outcomes described in this section
seem intuitively correct, but contrast dramatically with decisions such as
those referenced previously, in which consumers are deemed effortlessly
duped, bewildered, and befuddled. Comparing these cases suggests
courts consider people who wear finger nail polish, patronize grocery
stores, carry handbags, buy analgesics aimed at menstrual pain or fever,
shop at malls, and purchase designer jeans marketed to women are much
more easily confused than people who access Internet pornography, buy
luxury cars, work with industrial coatings, follow NASCAR racing,
maintain computer networks, eat out at a “House of Brews,” or review
mailings from trade associations. While both men and women can and
undoubtedly do engage in all of these pursuits, the former are more
stereotypically female, while the latter activities perceptually skew
toward males.

244. Cooper v. Dearhearts, Inc., No. 96-8172, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8163, at *6
(E.D. Pa. June 11, 1997).
245. Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, 208 F. Supp. 2d
1058, 1060–61 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that Self-Insurance Institute of America, Inc.
and defendant, Software and Information Industry Association, are trade associations).
According to the trademark registration, plaintiff’s registered mark was a composite
mark that included “SIIA” and the eagle design. Defendant uses a composite mark that
included “SIIA,” “Software and Information Industry Association” and a circle design.
Id.
246. Lucasfilm, Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D.
Cal. 2002).
247. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 555 (2d Cir. 2002).
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F. One Appellate Review Saga: Disputes and Nuts
Some judges who resist the notion that consumers are easily confused
learn the hard way that resistance can be futile. One stunning example
of a valiant but failed attempt to credit consumers with basic common
sense concerns a trademark dispute involving nuts marketed to beer
drinkers that evolved into a prolonged and heated dispute about the
“correct” scope of trademark protection between district court and
appellate court judges in the Tenth Circuit. In 1981, the company that
held the “Beer Nuts” trademark sued a competitor that had begun
marketing peanuts as “Brew Nuts” in a package that also bore the image
of an overflowing beer stein. After noting significant differences in the
respective retail containers,248 the district court concluded, “[T]he
product packaging and wording are sufficiently unique so as to preclude
any likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the competing
products.”249 Specifically addressing the breadth of the protection to
which the Beer Nuts mark was entitled, the court wrote:
248. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 520 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D. Utah
1981), rev’d, 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983).
Is there a likelihood of confusion as to origin of the competing products? I
find there is not.
While the peanut product is similar and the markets overlap in those areas of
the United States where Clover Club Foods Company operates, (generally the
Intermountain West), the product packaging and wording are sufficiently
unique so as to preclude any likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the
competing products.
First, the home office of each vendor is plainly stamped on each package:
Bloomington, Illinois and Kaysville, Utah, respectively. The distinctive logo
of each is prominently displayed—plaintiff’s Beer Nuts, Inc.® and defendant’s
distinctive Clover Club mark used by it on hundreds of products.
Second, the color scheme of the package is readily distinguishable as is the
unique design of each package. The eye of this Court is not confused, nor is
the eye of the consuming public likely to be.
Third, the term Beer Nuts® as displayed on plaintiff’s products performs at
least three discreet functions: (1) It identifies the source of the goods. Beer
Nuts, Inc. is the name of the originating company; (2) It refers to the product
inside the package—usually a sweet and salted peanut, and (3) It describes or
suggests use or purpose.
The term “Brew Nuts,” in contrast, has but two discreet functions: (1) It
refers to the product inside the package; and (2) It suggests or describes
purpose or use.
Source or origin of product is indicated by the Clover Club logo confirmed
by home office identification, all as set forth on the package.
Id.
249. Id.
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Clover Club’s use of the words “Brew Nuts” is a description of its product
rather than a trademark, and recognition of the mark “Beer Nuts” does not
convey a monopoly for preparing sweetened and salted peanuts for use with
beer or other beverage, nor does it invest the power in Beer Nuts, Inc. to keep
any other vendor from describing a similar product. Beer Nuts, Inc. retains its
right to use its specific and unique mark on its products to the exclusion of
others, but the scope of the law’s protection extends no farther.250

Beer Nuts, Inc. appealed, and in 1983 a three-judge panel on the Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling that the district court should not
have relied on side-by-side package comparisons when determining
whether consumers were likely to experience confusion.251 Instead, after
noting that the “prospective purchaser does not ordinarily carry a sample
or specimen of the article he knows well enough to call by its trade
name, he necessarily depends upon the mental picture of that which
symbolizes origin and ownership of the thing desired,”252 the district
court was instructed to “determine whether the alleged infringing mark
will be confusing to the public when singly presented.”253
On remand in 1985, the original district court judge wrote, with
obvious frustration and some acid:254
In order to make a finding regarding “the degree of similarity between the
designation and the trademark . . . in appearance,” the court must make a
comparison. Conceptually, it is impossible to make a comparison in a vacuum;
the court must compare the BREW NUTS package with something. Comparing
the BREW NUTS package with the BEER NUTS® package is the most obvious
comparison, but the Tenth Circuit has now ruled that such a comparison, if that
is all that is done, is inappropriate.
The Court of Appeals seems to have directed this court to compare the
BREW NUTS package with a hypothetical customer’s mental picture of BEER
NUTS®. First, the court must determine what a hypothetical prospective
purchaser’s mental picture of BEER NUTS® would be. Second, the court must
compare that picture with the BREW NUTS package to determine whether that
same hypothetical prospective purchaser would be confused about the source of
Clover Club’s BREW NUTS.255

250. Id. at 400 (footnote omitted).
251. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir. 1983).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 605 F. Supp. 855, 858–59 (D. Utah
1985), rev’d, 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986).
255. Id.
The court has examined the probability of confusion with regard to four
groups of potential purchasers: those who have not heard of either BEER
NUTS® or BREW NUTS, those who are aware of both BEER NUTS® and
BREW NUTS, those who have heard of BREW NUTS but not BEER NUTS®,
and those who have heard of BEER NUTS® but not BREW NUTS. The only
group of potential customers that face the potential of confusion over the
source of BREW NUTS is the group that has heard of BEER NUTS® but not
BREW NUTS. Those who know nothing about BEER NUTS cannot be
confused into believing that BREW NUTS comes from Beer Nuts, Inc. In
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After performing the analysis the appellate panel had delineated, the
district judge again concluded that consumer confusion was unlikely,
writing:
The plaintiff asserts that the BEER NUTS® trademark and the BREW NUTS
package are so similar that a hypothetical customer is likely to be misled by
Clover Club’s package. The court disagrees. The plaintiff’s position assumes
that the hypothetical customer will ignore the well known Clover Club®
trademark, will ignore the expansive nature of the word “brew,” will translate
the picture of the stein into the word “beer,” will equate the word “brew” with
the word “beer,” and then will probably believe that the product comes from the
plaintiff. This court is not prepared to assume that much, fully recognizing that
others may find it perfectly reasonable to find a likelihood of confusion if they
make different assumptions about the hypothetical prospective purchaser.256

The court also noted that the plaintiff had not offered a shred of
evidence that actual confusion had occurred, despite the fact that the
products had been competing in the same retail channels for over three
years.257 When the plaintiff again appealed, another Tenth Circuit panel
again reversed and decided the issue itself rather than remand again,258
writing: “The district court considered the appropriate factors in its

Id.

addition, those who are familiar with both will not be confused because they
would recognize that the two products come from different sources.

256. Id. at 861.
257. Id. at 864.
BREW NUTS and BEER NUTS® were marketed in the same area for at
least three years. Both companies sold tens of thousands of packages of their
nuts in the same area during those three years. Throughout the trial, not a
single witness testified that he or she had been confused by the BREW NUTS
package. In addition, there was no survey evidence indicating actual confusion
(or even a likelihood of confusion). To the contrary, Robert J. Brewster, vicepresident of Beer Nuts, Inc., testified that he had no personal knowledge of an
instance of actual confusion between BREW NUTS and BEER NUTS®. The
court finds that this evidence supports the conclusion that confusion about the
source of BREW NUTS is unlikely.
Id. (citation omitted).
258. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1986).
Generally, we do not agree with the position taken by courts that treat the
issue of likelihood of confusion as a matter of law; we favor remand to the
district court for determination of this issue as a question of fact. However, in
the present case, we are faced with an unusual situation. This is the second
appeal in the case. The district court has already been instructed as to the
applicable law and has failed to properly apply it. There is no dispute
regarding the underlying facts. Therefore, under the circumstances of this
case, we decline to remand the case a second time, and instead decide the
likelihood of confusion question.
Id. at 923 n.2 (citations omitted).
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analysis of the likelihood of confusion, but because it did not afford the
BEER NUTS trademark the scope of protection to which it is legally
entitled, its analysis was erroneous.”259 The opinion was primarily based
on the perceived similarities between the marks, rather than the
perceived stupidity of consumers, but the court pointedly noted:
The district court noted that BREW NUTS and BEER NUTS are both relatively
inexpensive snack foods. Furthermore, Clover Club’s president admitted that
Clover Club’s BREW NUTS are purchased as impulse items in that they are not
generally on a shopper’s grocery list. According to this evidence and the law of
this case, the district court should have concluded that the two products are
purchased with little care and are thus likely to be confused.260

One implication of this final resolution is that, for all practical
purposes, the Beer Nuts mark holder has a monopoly over beer
references and beer synonyms on retail nut packaging. Precisely how
the mark holder earned or acquired such expansive trademark rights is
never explicitly articulated—it certainly did not pioneer the idea of
eating nuts with beer. But there seems to be an underlying assumption
by the Tenth Circuit that by marketing and advertising Beer Nuts, the
mark holder will increase demand for nuts by beer drinkers and all of
these additional sales should belong to the Beer Nuts producers alone.
By deeming beer drinking consumers “confused” by competing nuts, the
court gave Beer Nuts a market segment monopoly and did so without
requiring proof of a single instance of actual consumer confusion.
V. CONFUSION, DILUTION, AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Neither noncommercial use of a trademark, nor commercial use of a
mark in a descriptive (rather than trademark) sense can infringe upon or
dilute traditional trademark rights. Under the Lanham Act, unauthorized
entities are free to speak about the trademarks of others in
noncommercial or commercial-but-nontrademark ways. For example, a
259. Id. at 925. The court held:
The district court’s finding that there is no likelihood of confusion is
erroneous. Both BEER NUTS and BREW NUTS are trademarks identifying
the source of the products, and Clover Club’s use of the BREW NUTS mark
constitutes infringement if it is likely to be confused with the BEER NUTS
mark. There is clearly similarity between the trademarks. Moreover, the
similarities in the products and marketing methods, the degree of care
exercised by consumers and the inference of intent on the part of Clover Club
suggest that the products are likely to be confused. When all of the relevant
factors are considered together, we must conclude that there is a likelihood of
confusion between the marks and, as a consequence, Clover Club’s use of the
words BREW NUTS with an overflowing stein as a trademark constitutes
infringement of the BEER NUTS trademark.
Id. at 928.
260. Id. at 926–27 (citation omitted).
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published novel in which a character specifically drinks Coca-Cola
rather than simply soda, or wears Lee Jeans rather than generic pants
as part of the narrative, is not infringing the trademark rights of the
pertinent mark holders. As one commentator articulated:
What trademark law gets you is the exclusive right to make trademark use of a
word on the products you sell in those markets in which you have actually done
business. Dell Computers has an exclusive right to use the mark Dell as a
trademark for computer hardware in connection with the sale of Dell-brand
computer hardware. It can’t stop Dell publishing from using the mark “Dell” on
books, even books about computing. It can’t stop Compaq computers from
advertising that its machines are a better value than Dell’s. It can’t stop New
Line Cinema from making a movie in which the bad guy is a pornographer who
uses a Dell Computer as the server for his x-rated web site. What it can do is
stop anyone from making commercial use of the word “Dell,” or a word similar
to Dell, in a way that is likely to confuse or deceive consumers.261

Similarly, she noted, “Procter and Gamble’s registered trademark
gives it no right to prevent anyone from discussing ‘Tide’ the mark,
‘Tide’ the detergent, or tide, the lunar phenomenon.”262 One court has
written that “trademark laws exist not to ‘protect’ trademarks, but . . . to
protect the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting
the trademark owner’s right to a non-confused public.”263 However,
trademark laws can be used to inhibit speech any time protecting a
trademark (or shielding consumers from confusion) strikes a court as being
more important than a conflicting interest in unrestrained expression.264
Traditional federal trademark law doctrinally averted collision with
free speech interests by authorizing judicial intervention only in contexts
261. Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name
System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 153–54 (2000).
262. Litman, supra note 31, at 1721.
263. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976).
264. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1711–12 (1999).
Trademark laws have been used to preclude artists from painting in the same
style as another, to prevent an author from using the term “Godzilla” in the
title of his book about Godzilla, to prevent a comic book from featuring a
character known as Hell’s Angel, to prevent a satirical political advertisement
from using the “Michelob” trademark to help make its point, to prevent a
tractor manufacturer from making fun of its competitor’s logo in an
advertisement, to prevent a movie about a Minnesota beauty pageant from
using the title “Dairy Queens,” to prevent a political satire of the O.J. Simpson
case called “The Cat NOT in the Hat!” to prevent individuals from setting up
web pages critical of a company or product, and to prevent a theme bar from
calling itself “The Velvet Elvis.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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in which consumers were likely to be confused. Anti-dilution statutes,
however, protect trademarks from the “likelihood of injury to business
reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark” absent even
arguable or pretextual confusion as to the source of goods or services.265
Dilution has been interpreted by some courts to create a cause of action
when there is “blurring” of a trademark’s positive connotations by dissonant
or unfavorable usage,266 and dilution has also been found when the
affirmative associations of a mark were deemed “tarnished” through
unwholesome or unsavory mental associations.267 Therefore, as one
commentator articulated: “The underlying premise of anti-dilution law is
that the primary value of a trademark lies in its ability to convey positive
meaning to the public.”268 As is explained below, numerous courts have
explicitly held that parody of a mark constitutes trademark infringement
or dilution,269 while others have elevated free speech rights over
trademark interests.270
265. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
266. See, e.g., Ahearn, supra note 106, at 904–11.
267. See, e.g., Robert S. Nelson, Unraveling the Trademark Rope: Tarnishment and
Its Proper Place in the Laws of Unfair Competition, 42 IDEA 133, 153–55 (2002).
268. Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech
Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 533–34 (1997).
269. See, e.g., Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1633 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that “Plaintiff has established that its mark will be diluted either through
blurring or parody. Therefore, Plaintiff has shown actual success on the merits”); see
also Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Andy’s Sportswear Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542, 1543 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (allowing the issuance of a temporary restraining order in favor of AnheuserBusch Inc. against a defendant who wanted to distribute T-shirts marked with the word
“Buttwiser”); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 126 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (holding that a picture of figures resembling the plaintiff’s trade characters
“Poppin” Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” engaged in sexual intercourse and fellatio violated
state antidilution statute because despite the lack of actual damages, likelihood that the
defendants’ presentation could injure the business reputation of the plaintiff or dilute the
distinctive quality of its trademarks); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
1183, 1192–93 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
270. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 508 (2d
Cir. 1996); Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228–29 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the mark “Mike,” as a parody, did not present a likelihood of confusion as
to source, affiliation, or sponsorship with the mark “Nike”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L &
L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317, 321 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a T-shirt design
parodying Budweiser trademark fit a conventional definition of trademark parody by
mimicking “the characteristic turns of phrase on the Budweiser label by applying them to
the beach”). The Budweiser label stated: “This is the famous Budweiser beer. We know
of no brand produced by any other brewer which costs so much to brew and age. Our
exclusive Beechwood Aging produces a taste, a smoothness, and a drinkability you will
find in no other beer at any price.” Defendant’s T-shirt design replaced this language
with the following: “This is the famous beach of Myrtle Beach, S.C. We know of no
other resort in any state which lays claim to such a rich history. The unspoiled beaches,
natural beauty, and southern hospitality compose a mixture you will find on no other
beach in any state.” At the bottom of the Budweiser label is the statement that
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A. Barbie Dolls, Girl Scouts, and Full-Figured Women
It was argued above that trademarks on products and services pitched
at women obtain enhanced protections by invoking the specter of the
very easily confused female consumer, who is deemed likely to be
fooled by competitors if a court does not intervene.271 Once speech
concerns enter a trademark dispute, however, almost the opposite effect
can be detected. When the plaintiff trademark is associated with
something unequivocally feminine, some courts actually seem less
willing to offer the sweeping “confusion prevention” and “positive
meaning” protections that other masculine or ungendered trademarks
enjoy. While female-oriented products may be rigorously protected
from confusing behaviors by competitors, they are not always shielded
from employment in communicative acts, regardless of how disparaging
a use may be in nature or effect. Quite the contrary: Speech mocking
and maligning female-identified trademarked symbols is in some
instances accorded surprisingly strong First Amendment protections,
rendering these marks unusually vulnerable to unauthorized uses and
associations.272

Budweiser beer is “Brewed by our original process from the Choicest Hops, Rice and
Best Barley Malt.” Berard’s T-shirt design replaced this language with “Myrtle Beach
contains the Choicest Surf, Sun, and Sand.” Also, where Anheuser-Busch placed the
“King of Beers” trademark under the Budweiser label, Berard substituted “King of
Beaches.” Berard’s design also replaced the Anheuser-Busch slogan “This Bud’s for
You” with “This Beach is for You.” Id. at 319; Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday
Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1989).
[T]he parody cover of Spy Notes, although it surely conjures up the original
and goes to great lengths to use some of the identical colors and aspects of the
cover design of Cliffs Notes, raises only a slight risk of consumer confusion
that is outweighed by the public interest in free expression, especially in a form
of expression that must to some extent resemble the original.
Id.; L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987); Lucasfilm
Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Lyons
P’ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 953 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that a
“good-faith intent to parody is not an intent to confuse”); Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records
Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1419–20 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier,
622 F. Supp. 931, 933–35 (D.D.C. 1985).
271. See supra Part IV.F.
272. Again, the Author agrees with this determination. It is the disparities in
treatment of various trademarks that is the subject of concern. A pithy encapsulation of
the normative claims of this Article is as follows: All consumers should be treated like
men, and all trademarks like Barbie.
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1. Barbie
Barbie273 is typically invoked conversationally to convey negative
sentiments.274 Frequently attacked as a symbol of superficiality and
materialism,275 the doll has been accused of promoting negative body
images in girls276 and being “an insta-symbol of everything that’s wrong
with our culture’s well-worn images of femininity and beauty.”277 In a
biography, Joan Kennedy referred to Barbie278 “in order to indicate that
273. Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, No. 00 Civ. 4085, 2001 WL 1035140, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001).
Mattel is the world’s largest manufacturer of toys, games and playthings.
One of Mattel’s most successful products is the Barbie doll which is one of the
most popular toys in existence. Mattel has caused numerous Barbie related
trademarks to be registered in the . . . United States Patent and Trademark
Office on the Principal Register.
Id.
274. See, e.g., Alyson Lewis, Playing Around with Barbie: Expanding Fair Use
for Cultural Icons, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 61, 76 (1999).
When people see Barbie, some see an economic powerhouse marketed by Mattel,
others see a social icon that programs young girl’s into thinking that Barbie is the
perfect woman. Feminist and cultural scholars alike have critiqued Barbie for
promulgating an impossible feminine mystique. True, she is plastic. However,
even Mattel admits that she is marketed more as a person than as a doll.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
275. Something Fishy: Website on Eating Disorders, Exploring the Role Society
and the Media Play in the Development of an Eating Disorder, at http://www.somethingfishy.org/prevention/society.php (last visisted Feb. 20, 2004).
Barbie-type dolls have often be[en] blamed on playing a role in the
development of body-image problems and Eating Disorders. Not only do these
dolls have fictionally proportioned, small body sizes, but they lean towards
escalating the belief that materialistic possessions, beauty and thinness equate
happiness. Barbie has more accessories available to purchase than can be
believed, including Ken, her attractive boyfriend. She has an assortment of
jobs including: Potty-training her sister Kelly, princess and more recently,
Dentist (in which she wears a mini-skirt and has enough hair that her patients
would choke). While I personally do NOT believe every girl that has a
Barbie-type doll is at risk of disordered eating, I do believe it helps to
perpetuate an ideal of materialism, beauty, and being thin as important
elements to happiness in one’s life.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also What’s Working for Girls in Illinois, Barbie As Icon,
at http://www.aauw-il.org/wwfg/archive/Spr2_3.htm (last visisted Feb. 20, 2004)
(criticizing Barbie products for emphasizing female gender roles centered around
physical attractiveness).
276. See Kate Leary, Barbie’s Legacy: Body Image and Eating Disorders, JOHNS
HOPKINS NEWS-LETTER, Nov. 15, 1996, available at http://www.jhu.edu/~newslett/1115-96/Features/Barbie’s__Legacy._Body_Image_and_Eating_Disorders.html (arguing that
the Barbie dolls’ physical proportions help stress unrealistic images of women’s ideal
body type, thereby contributing to the development of eating disorders); Lewis, supra
note 274, at 77 (writing that “[w]hether Mattel likes it or not, people see this 12” plastic
doll as a reflection of society’s problem with body image”).
277. See, e.g., Ophira Edut, Barbie Girls Rule?, BARBIOLOGY, at http://www.
adiosbarbie.com/bology/bology_barbiead.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
278. “When I campaign alone I’m approachable. Women talk to me, complain, but
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she was treated like a beautiful but empty-headed accessory.”279 In an
episode of the sitcom Ally McBeal, being called “Barbie” was portrayed
as a gross insult to professional women.280 The way the Barbie social
construct affects the psyches of women or young girls is well beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is worth considering how her designation and
impact as a cultural icon affects how nonpermissive communicative uses
of the Barbie trademark intersect with trademark law.
In March of 1997, a Danish musical group called Aqua released a
song entitled “Barbie Girl,” in which female and male vocalists pose as
Barbie and Ken, the two popular dolls produced by Mattel. The
singers refer to Barbie as a “blond bimbo girl,” who loves to party and
whose “life is plastic.” During the course of the musical work, Aqua
sings lyrics that include phrases such as the following: “You can brush
my hair, undress me everywhere”; “I’m a blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy
world”; “You can touch, you can play, if you say ‘I’m always yours’”;
and “Make me walk, make me talk, do whatever you please, I can act
like a star, I can beg on my knees.” Ken sings lyrics such as: “Kiss me
here, touch me there, hanky panky”; and “Come jump in, bimbo friend,
let us go do it again, hit the town, fool around, let’s go party.”281
when I’m with Ted I’m a Barbie doll.” Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
397, 397 (1990) (quoting M. CHELLIS, THE JOAN KENNEDY STORY: LIVING WITH THE
KENNEDYS 191 (1986)).
279. Dreyfuss, supra note 278, at 400.
280. See Lewis, supra note 274, at 77.
281. The full text of the lyrics is reportedly as follows: “Barbie Girl” by Aqua:
- Hi Barbie!
- Hi Ken!
- Do you wanna go for a ride?
- Sure Ken!
- Jump in . . .
I’m a Barbie girl, in a Barbie world.
Life in plastic, it’s fantastic!
You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere
Imagination, life is your creation
Come on Barbie, let’s go party!
I’m a blonde single girl, in a fantasy world.
Dress me up, make it tight, I’m your dolly
You’re my doll, rock and roll, feel the glamour in pink
Kiss me here, touch me there, hanky-panky
You can touch, you can play, if you say: “I’m always yours”
(uu-oooh-u)
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party!
(Ah ah ah yeah)
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The song was commercially released and heavily promoted. The
album containing the song sold 1.4 million copies in the United States
alone.282 In response, trademark holder Mattel brought suit, alleging
among other causes of action that its Barbie trademark was infringed by
use of the word “Barbie” in the song “Barbie Girl” and its accompanying
video.283 Mattel claimed that this unauthorized use of its mark would
lead to confusion among consumers and harm to the Barbie product line
itself because Aqua’s song associated its doll with “antisocial themes
such as promiscuity, lewdness, and the stereotyping and ridiculing of
young women.”284
The defendant band successfully argued that Barbie is a powerful
symbol in contemporary American civilization and that their use of the
trademark in their song to invoke her social meaning was protected by
the First Amendment. The district court specifically held:
[T]he First Amendment concerns raised by prohibiting a parody of a popular
consumer product weigh against granting a preliminary injunction. Presumably,
some consumer confusion is inevitable when a few people fail to realize that
one product is parodying another. This fact should not be used to censor
criticism of or social comments on icons in our popular culture . . . .285

Many people would strongly agree with this outcome, this Author
most emphatically included, given the fact that it is appropriately
anchored by freedom of speech considerations. The question that it raises,
however, is why there appears to be a broader right to invoke the social
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party!
(uu-oooh-u)
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party!
(Ah ah ah yeah)
Come on, Barbie, let’s go party!
(uu-oooh-u)
Make me walk, make me talk, do whatever you please
I can act like a star, I can beg on my knees.
Come jump in, bimbo friend, let us do it again,
Hit the town, fool around, let’s go party
You can touch, you can play, if you say: “I’m always yours.”
You can touch, you can play, if you say: “I’m always yours”
-Oh, I’m having so much fun!
-Well, Barbie, we’re just getting started
-Oh, I love you Ken!
Aqua, Barbie Girl, on AQUARIUM (MCA Records 1997).
282. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1408 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
283. Mattel actually featured a song about Barbie by Brian Wilson, “Living Doll,”
for the purpose of promoting “California Dream” Barbie. See Brian Wilson Session, at
http://www.cabinessence.com/brian/boots/bws.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (providing a
description and track listings for the “Brian Wilson Sessions” including “Living Doll
(a.k.a. ‘Barbie’)”); WFMU, Barbie/Beach Boys, at http://www.wfmu.org/MACrec/barbie.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (providing a brief description of the “Barbie” song’s origin).
284. Mattel, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1409.
285. Id. at 1418.
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meaning of Barbie in a commercial context, without authorization by the
mark holder,286 than for other trademarks.287 After Mattel appealed this
decision to the Ninth Circuit, the affirming opinion cogently elucidated
286. The only context in which this does not necessarily appear to be true is that of
Internet web sites and domain names. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc.,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that “barbiesplaypen.com” was
confusingly similar to the mark “Barbie” because: “(1) both contain the name ‘barbie;’
(2) the name ‘Barbie’ on the front page of the web site and the logo BARBIE both have
approximately the same font, slant, size, etc.; (3) both BARBIE and ‘barbiesplaypen.com’
are inextricably associated with the verb ‘play,’ in the broad sense of the term”); Mattel
Inc. v. Jcom Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1467, 1469 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that defendants’
use of the term Barbie’s Playhouse using the font and color most commonly associated
with the Barbie trademark, plus the use of a doll-like figure similar to the form of a
Barbie doll on the bottom of the web site, diluted plaintiff’s trademark). Mattel’s
success with Internet trademark litigation is often linked to it ability to scare web site
operators rather than persuade judges. See Rosemary Coombe & Andrew Herman,
Trademarks, Property, and Propriety: The Moral Economy of Consumer Politics and
Corporate Accountability on the World Wide Web, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 597, 602–04
(2000).
Barbie Doll Benson, former Miss Nude Canada, has used the Barbie Doll stage
name for sixteen years, but it was only when she produced a Web page that
Mattel complained. In another example, . . . a cultural critic who dedicated his
site to the Barbie icon’s semiotics and deconstruction, was threatened by the
corporation and removed his imagery. His “Distorted Barbie” however was
widely reduplicated in mirror sites designed to subvert Mattel’s legal action.
. . . Barbie doll collectors have dozens of Websites as well as on-line Barbie
auctions. Mattel has tried to shut down dozens of these sites and attempted to
usurp the collectors’ community by creating a commercial alternative that
offers officially licensed “nostalgia dolls” and other paraphernalia.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
287. Cases in which trademark rights have been held subsidiary to speech rights
generally involve what the courts define as noncommercial uses. See, e.g., L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that High Society
magazine’s two-page article entitled “L.L. Beam’s Back-to-School-Sex-Catalog,” which
displayed a facsimile of L.L. Bean’s trademark and featured pictures of nude models in
sexually explicit positions using products, was use of “plaintiff’s mark solely for
noncommercial purposes[,] . . . an editorial or artistic, rather than a commercial, use of
plaintiff’s mark”); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 900
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that although the defendants’ film tarnished the plaintiffs’
family of marks, trademark dilution did not apply to noncommercial use of a mark such
as a parody or satire, and, as such, the plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on their
trademark dilution claim); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 932–35
(D.D.C. 1985) (denying the claim of the owners of the trademark “Star Wars” who
alleged injury from public interest groups that used the term in advertisements to present
their views on President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and stressing that the
sweep of a trademark owner’s rights extends only to injurious, unauthorized commercial
uses of the mark by another, and since the defendants did not affix plaintiff’s trademark
to any goods or services for sale, and were not in competition with plaintiff, there was no
infringement).
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the reason that First Amendment values trump trademark holders’
interest in controlling their marks as a general matter,288 but after
gratuitously mentioning Barbie’s origins as “a doll that resembled a
‘German street walker,’”289 the court’s analysis relied heavily on the fact
that Barbie is “a cultural icon.”290 One gets the distinct impression from
the opinion that the freedom to speak about a trademark is linked to the
particular mark’s cultural importance and societal visibility.291 The
court specifically articulated the conflict between trademarks and speech
rights as follows:
The problem arises when trademarks transcend their identifying purpose. Some
trademarks enter our public discourse and become an integral part of our
vocabulary. How else do you say that something’s “the Rolls Royce of its
class”? What else is a quick fix, but a Band-Aid? Does the average consumer
know to ask for aspirin as “acetyl salicylic acid”? Trademarks often fill in gaps
in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to our expressions. Once
imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes a word in our
language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.292

The difficulty with this exposition is that it gives no guidance about
how to ascertain when any given trademark has transcended its
identifying purpose, entered our public discourse, become an integral
part of our vocabulary, filled gaps in our vocabulary, or added a
contemporary flavor to our expressions. The “when” appears critical
because it seems clear from the text of the decision that only when these
thresholds of cultural permeation are reached by a particular mark that it
is “imbued with expressive value,” “assumes a role outside the bounds
of trademark law,” and is an available part of the lexicon beyond the
control of the mark holder. In other words, one reading of the freedom
of speech analysis articulated here is that only well-known, iconic
trademarks must yield to the public’s expressive interests, and speakers
have to guess about which trademarks are well-known and iconic.
The opinion further states: “Were we to ignore the expressive value
that some marks assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach upon
288. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
“Simply put, the trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse
whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying
function.” Id.
289. Id. at 898.
290. Id. “She remains a symbol of American girlhood, a public figure who graces
the aisles of toy stores throughout the country and beyond. With Barbie, Mattel created
not just a toy but a cultural icon.” Id.
291. A “literary expert” in this case later published an essay which used Barbie as a
dramatic foil because she was asserted to be the “perfect example of the struggle to own
the cultural conversation.” See Richard A. Lanham, Barbie and the Teacher of
Righteousness: Two Lessons in the Economics of Attention, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 499, 511
(2001).
292. Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900 (citation omitted).
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the zone protected by the First Amendment.”293 Yet which marks are
“some marks,” and how a speaker determines which marks have entered
this First Amendment “zone,” is never explained. Neither a logical basis
for differentiating between marks is offered, nor a doctrinal justification
for attributing expressive values only to some of them. The court does
not seem to believe that First Amendment limitations adhere equally to
all trademarks, but offers no information about how to assess whether a
particular mark is susceptible to free speech. If Aqua had written a song
about Raggedy Ann—perhaps something along the lines of “I’ve got
looped yarn hair and triangle nose, and a tattooed heart beneath my
clothes,” or maybe lyrics alluding to the fact that she had a wad of cloth
stuffed into her head in place of a brain—would the outcome of the case
have been the same? What about Chatty Cathy, also a Mattel product,294
or Mrs. Beasley,295 the doll made popular thirty years ago by the Buffy
character on the television show Family Affair, but now largely faded
from the public consciousness? Do they remain iconic enough to be
imbued with expressive value?
In a law review note arguing “that the commercial use of social icons,
or symbols, should be allowed as a means by which our culture
necessarily communicates,”296 one commentator focused on Barbie as a
prime example of the problematic effect of intellectual property
protections on social critiques made in the form of commercial
speech.297 While her observations about the chilling effects that threats
of copyright and trademark litigation can have on such speech were
astute and well taken, the author clearly neither felt nor anticipated any
restrictions on her ability to invoke the semiotic power of Barbie for the
purposes of her legal scholarship. Like Joan Kennedy, the Ally McBeal
writers, and the band Aqua, she intuitively understood that Barbie is, in
some respects, a very vulnerable trademark. It is invoked without
authorization by Mattel in cyberspace with great frequency, as Yochai
293. Id. at 900.
294. See The Original Chatty Cathy Collectors Club, at http://www.ttinet.com/
chattycathy (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
295. See The Select Collection, Collectible Dolls, at http://www.seniors-place.com/
shopping/speccolcollectdolls.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2004) (describing the collectible
Mrs. Beasley doll); see also Bill Morgan, Family Affair’s Biggest Little Star, Apr. 1997,
at http://tvtoys.com/library/beasley (describing the history of the collectible Mrs. Beasley
doll).
296. Lewis, supra note 274, at 63.
297. Id. at 63.
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Benkler observed in another context, writing:
Here is what Google produces when we search for “Barbie”: We see
barbie.com, with “Activities and Games for Girls Online!”, and we see
barbiebazaar.com, with “Barbie, Barbie dolls, Barbie doll magazine, etc.,” but
then very quickly we start seeing sites like adiosbarbie.com, “A Body Image
Site for Every Body.” We see more Barbie collectibles, but then we see “Armed
and Dangerous, Extra Abrasive: Hacking Barbie with the Barbie Liberation
Organization.” Further down we see “The Distorted Barbie,” and all sorts of
other sites trying to play with Barbie.298

2. The Girl Scouts
The Girl Scouts have also had their trademark nonpermissively
utilized for free speech purposes, despite attempts to use trademark law
to “protect” the Scouts’ image. In Girl Scouts of United States v.
Personality Posters Manufacturing Co.,299 the defendant was sued for
distributing a poster that consisted of a smiling girl dressed in the wellknown green uniform of the Junior Girl Scouts, with her hands clasped
above her protruding, clearly pregnant abdomen. The caveat “Be
Prepared” appeared next to her hands. In a well reasoned and arguably
courageous opinion, the court held that the Girl Scouts has failed utterly
to establish the requisite element of customer confusion, writing:
Even if we hypothesize that some viewers might at first blush believe that the
subject of the poster is actually a pregnant Girl Scout, it is highly doubtful that
any such impression would be more than momentary or that any viewer would
conclude that the Girl Scouts had printed or distributed the poster. But it is the
role of the court to rule on evidence, not on hypothesis; and of evidence not a
scintilla has been presented supporting the allegation of confusion or its
likelihood. . . . Plaintiff’s affidavit goes no further than to state that “Plaintiff
has received telephone calls from members of the public expressing their
indignation concerning defendant’s said poster”; but indignation is not
confusion. To the contrary, the indignation of those who have called would
appear to make it clear that they feel that the Girl Scouts are being unfairly put
upon, not that the Girl Scouts are the manufacturers or distributors of the object
of indignation.300

The Girl Scouts’ trademark rights have been found subsidiary to First
Amendment considerations in other commercial contexts as well,301
298. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1259–60 (2003).
299. Girl Scouts v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
300. Id. at 1231.
301. Girl Scouts v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1112,
1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that “this Court is unable to find that there is a likelihood
of confusion between Plaintiffs’ protected trademarks and Defendants’ children’s books
sufficient to overcome the First Amendment value of protecting creative works such as
Defendants’ books”).
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despite the fact that (unlike Barbie) Congress provided the Girl Scouts’
“emblems, badges, marks, and words” with special statutory protections.302
This contrasts dramatically with the virtual inviability accorded another
specially protected mark, “Olympics.”303 In the Gay Olympics case, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the fact that an athletic association
claimed an expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, purpose in
using the word “Olympic” did not give it a First Amendment right to use
the word contrary to the wishes of the United States Olympic Committee
because “Olympics” enjoyed protections broader than ordinary trademarks.304
3. Full-Figured Women
Trademarks linked to jeans designed for larger proportioned women
were also required to yield to parody. In Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg
302. 36 U.S.C. § 80305 is entitled “Exclusive right to emblems, badges, marks, and
words” and provides:
The corporation has the exclusive right to use all emblems and badges,
descriptive or designating marks, and words or phrases the corporation adopts,
including the badge of the Girl Scouts, Incorporated, referred to in the Act of
August 12, 1937 (ch. 590, 50 Stat. 623) [unclassified], and to authorize their
use, during the life of the corporation, in connection with the manufacture,
advertisement, and sale of equipment and merchandise. This section does not
affect any vested rights.
36 U.S.C. § 80305 (2000).
303. Amateur Sports Act, id. § 220506. But see Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S.
Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1119–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a nonprofit
organization’s distribution of posters featuring the word “Olympic” and Olympic
symbols as a means of soliciting contributions for its cause, the opposition to plans to
convert the Olympic Village in Lake Placid into a prison after the 1980 Winter Games,
was not a commercial use of “Olympics” and therefore not violation of section 110 of
the Amateur Sports Act).
304. In S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534
(1987), the Court interpreted the Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220506, in a manner
that gave the USOC exclusive rights in the word “Olympic.” The Court held that unlike
normal trademark holders, the USOC did not have to prove that an unauthorized use was
confusing and that alleged infringers were not permitted to assert the fair use defense.
See also Kelly Browne, Note, A Sad Time for the Gay Olympics: San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987), 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1487, 1524 (1987) (arguing that the Court failed to properly balance free speech
and property rights in its holding and analysis); Kellie L. Pendras, Comment, Revisiting
San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee: Why It Is Time to
Narrow Protection of the Word “Olympic,” 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 729, 761 (2002)
(arguing that the Court ruling is contrary to the expressive freedoms embedded in the
First Amendment). Smell a rat? More recently use of term “Rat Olympics” by a
“Behavioral Learning Principles” course at Nebraska Wesleyan University was objected
to by the U.S. Olympic Committee. See Will Potter, Ratted Out, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Feb. 14, 2003, at A9.
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Wyld, Ltd.305 (and given the name of the defendant, the reader can
already see where this is going), JORDACHE mark and horse appliqué
marks placed on the right rear pocket to provide source identification for
plus size denim jeans were found not to be infringed by a competitor’s
use of the name LARDASHE in similar script lettering stitched into the
right rear pocket of their plus size jeans, together with a pig appliqué.306
Like Barbie and the Girl Scouts, the Jordache mark was deemed
susceptible to unauthorized usage that was successfully defended as free
speech.
B. I’m Pink, Therefore I’m Spam
There are “ungendered” cases in which arguably commercial uses of
trademarks were held noninfringing or nondilutive. For example, in
Hormel Foods Corp, v. Jim Henson Productions, the court refused to
enjoin the use of a character named Spa’am in the movie Muppets
Treasure Island, despite Hormel’s allegations concerning its Spam
trademark for luncheon meat.307 The court seemed to hold little regard
for Hormel’s product, referring to it as a “processed, gelatinous block,”308
and asserting that Hormel should be inured to ridicule, sarcastically
noting:
Although SPAM is in fact made from pork shoulder and ham meat, and the
name itself supposedly is a portmanteau word for spiced ham, countless jokes
have played off the public’s unfounded suspicion that SPAM is a product of less
than savory ingredients. For example, in one episode of the television cartoon
Duckman, Duckman is shown discovering “the secret ingredient to SPAM” as
he looks on at “Murray’s Incontinent Camel Farm.” In a recent newspaper
column it was noted that “[I]n one little can, Spam contains the five major food
groups: Snouts. Ears. Feet. Tails. Brains.” In view of the more or less
humorous takeoffs such as these, one might think Hormel would welcome the
association with a genuine source of pork.309

However, one clearly articulated basis for the holding was the court’s
belief that, though perhaps Hormel was too pigheaded to realize it, the
Henson invocation of the Spam trademark and related associations was
actually constructive in nature;310 because Spa’am was a positive
305. Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.M. 1985).
306. Id. at 55. “There is an additional aspect to the Lardashe name and mark which
compels the conclusion that its use does not infringe upon the Jordache name and marks:
the aspect of parody.” Id.
307. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500 (2d Cir.
1996).
308. Id. at 501.
309. Id. (citations omitted).
310. The court wrote:
Spa’am, however, is not the boarish Beelzebub that Hormel seems to fear. The
district court credited and relied upon the testimony of Anne Devereaux
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character, he was not portrayed as unhygienic, and that a simple comic
reference to the fact that Spam was made from pork would not, in the
court’s estimation, damage its image.311 This diverges considerably
from the “Barbie Girl” court’s willingness to disregard the unsavory
depiction of Barbie characteristics in the disputed song.312 The
spamming jurists sought to reassure Hormel that the contested Spa’am
character did not reflect negatively on its product, while the “Barbie
Girl” court straightforwardly concluded that the First Amendment
includes the right to bash Barbie.
C. For-Profit Parody When the Target Is Not Female
The typical case in which an unauthorized use of a trademark is
protected by the First Amendment is one in which the use is fairly
unambiguously noncommercial. For example, in the “Bally sucks” case,
a disgruntled former health club member was held to have a First
Amendment right to post negative consumer commentary about Bally
Total Fitness, Inc. on a website posted at www.ballysucks.com because
it was a completely noncommercial venture.313 Had the defendant
attempted to sell posters or tee shirts proclaiming that Bally sucked,
there is some suggestion in the opinion that the court might have been
more protective of the Bally trademark.314 In a political commercial in
Jordan, an expert in children’s literature, to find that Spa’am is a positive
figure in the context of the movie as a whole—even if he is not “classically
handsome.” Indeed, Spa’am is a comic character who “seems childish rather
than evil.” Although he is humorously threatening in his first appearance, he
comes to befriend the Muppets and helps them escape from the film’s villain,
Long John Silver. By film’s end, “Spa’am is shown sailing away with the
other Muppets as good humor and camaraderie reign.”
Id. (citations omitted).
311. Id. at 504.
312. See supra notes 275–86 and accompanying text.
313. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
314. Id.
[N]one of the cases that Bally cites involve consumer commentary. In CocaCola, the court enjoined the defendant’s publication of a poster stating “Enjoy
Cocaine” in the same script as Coca-Cola’s trademark. Likewise, in Mutual of
Omaha, the court prohibited the use of the words “Mutant of Omaha,” with a
picture of an emaciated human head resembling the Mutual of Omaha’s logo
on a variety of products as a means of protesting the arms race. Here,
however, Faber is using Bally’s mark in the context of a consumer
commentary to say that Bally engages in business practices which Faber finds
distasteful or unsatisfactory. This is speech protected by the First Amendment.
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which Ralph Nader mimicked MasterCard’s “Priceless” advertising
campaign, MasterCard’s motion for a temporary restraining order
against Nader was denied because the ad was found to be a parody of
MasterCard’s commercial, as well as a comment on campaign financing.315
It was a distinctly noncommercial parody because Nader was not selling
anything except his own Presidential candidacy.
These free speech friendly outcomes stand in stark contrast to those in
cases framed as “for-profit parody” disputes. When there is a commercial
aspect to a trademark parody that does not involve deriding Barbie or
mocking other putatively deserving targets, courts seem more likely to
favor strong trademark protections over speech interests.316 In Elvis Presley
Enterprises v. Capece317 the Fifth Circuit held that calling a nightclub
“The Velvet Elvis” infringed marks held by Elvis Presley Enterprises
because, when considered as a whole, the nightclub’s advertising practices,
service mark, and décor caused a likelihood of confusion as to source,
affiliation, or sponsorship.318 The gaudy, campy nightclub was intended
to parody “a time or concept from the sixties—the Las Vegas lounge
scene, the velvet painting craze and perhaps indirectly, the country’s
fascination with Elvis.”319 In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific
Graphics, a court found that the “Hard Rain” logo on tee shirts which
meant to humorously reference the damp climate of the Pacific
Northwest, was an infringement of the “Hard Rock” logo associated
with the Hard Rock Café, also used extensively on tee shirts.320
In Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Company of Boca, Inc.,321 the defendants
argued unsuccessfully that their ten dollar bottle of popcorn would not
likely be confused with plaintiff’s Dom Perignon Champagne and that
Id. (citations omitted).
315. Mark Hamblett, Judge Backs Nader’s Parody of MasterCard Ad, LAW.COM,
Sept. 12, 2000, at http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=
ZZZTZRDA2DC.
316. But see Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1993), in
which the court very astutely determined that consumers were not likely to be confused
by tee shirts parodying “The Black Dog” which featured “The Dead Dog” and “The
Black Hog,” holding in pertinent part:
Color notwithstanding, a dog and a hog are two very different creatures,
unlikely to be confused in the average person’s mind. Likewise, it can hardly
be suggested that a typical consumer will not distinguish the macabre
overtones of “The Dead Dog” from the more salutary connotations of “The
Black Dog.”
Id. at 55.
317. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
318. Id. at 204.
319. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 795 (S.D. Tex. 1996),
rev’d, 141 F.3d 188.
320. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454,
1462 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
321. 725 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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this was simply a “classic parody” protected under the First Amendment.322
The court ruled that the speech was purely commercial, and therefore
unprotected. Because the defendant was selling a product, the defendant
did not base the parody upon artistic or political expression, and the
underlying purpose of the parody was economic gain.323
Yet another comparable case involved publication of a parody of The
Cat in the Hat, a Dr. Seuss book, that was entitled The Cat NOT in the
Hat,324 in which the defendant author mimicked Dr. Seuss’s literary and
artistic style to comment on the O.J. Simpson murder trial. The
defendant was unable to use a parody defense to defeat a claim for
injunctive relief premised on both copyright and trademark law
violations because the accused work did not parody or comment upon
Dr. Seuss, but merely appropriated the intellectual property of Dr.
Seuss’s estate, to comment upon something else.325 The court explicitly
held that the claim of parody is no defense “where the purpose of the
similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for defendant’s
own commercial use.”326
A diaper bag with green and red bands and the wording “Gucchi
Goo,” that was “allegedly poking fun” at Gucci was found to infringe
the well-known Gucci name and the design mark.327 The use by a
competing meat sauce of the trademark “A.2” as a “pun” on the famous
“A.1” trademark was similarly held infringing,328 offering precedential
support for the contention that parody is no defense “where the purpose
of the similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the
322. Id. at 1322–23.
323. Id. at 1323–24.
324. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405–06
(9th Cir. 1997).
325. Id.
326. Id.
In a traditional trademark infringement suit founded on the likelihood of
confusion rationale, the claim of parody is not really a separate “defense” as
such, but merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are
not likely to be confused as to the source, sponsorship or approval. . . .
. . . [T]he claim of parody is no defense “where the purpose of the similarity is
to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the defendant’s own
commercial use.”
Id. (quoting Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454,
1462 (W.D. Wash. 1991)).
327. Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
328. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D. Conn. 1991).
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defendant’s own commercial use.”329 Merchandise bearing a design
using the words “Mutant of Omaha” and an accompanying logo
depicting a side view of a war-bonneted and emaciated human face was
deemed likely to likely to cause confusion as to the source of the goods
and about whether there was any involvement by or association with the
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company.330 To the defendant’s claim that
he had a right to make political commentary, the court responded:
There are numerous ways in which Novak may express his aversion to nuclear
war without infringing upon a trademark in the process. Just as Novak may not
hold an anti-nuclear rally in his neighbor’s backyard without permission, neither
may he voice his concerns through the improper use of Mutual’s registered
trademark. Under these facts, the First Amendment provides no defense.331

Liability in all of the above cases was premised squarely on likelihood
of confusion determinations. Where a court cannot bring itself to make
that finding even for instrumental, outcome determinative purposes, an
alternate theory can emerge with which to stop for-profit parodists. In
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets,332 the Sixth Circuit held that
the defendant violated (then-host of the Tonight Show) Johnny Carson’s
right of publicity because the defendant “intentionally appropriated his
identity for commercial exploitation” by using the Carson-identified
“Here’s Johnny” phrase to promote its product. The court held that the
defendants could not use the “Here’s Johnny” phrase based upon a right
of publicity theory, rather than a traditional likelihood of confusion test.
According to the court, the defendants did not violate the confusion test
because it was unlikely that the public would believe that Johnny Carson
endorsed or promoted the company’s product.333 Nevertheless, the judge
found an alternative legal mechanism to halt apparently offensive
communicative commercial behavior.
D. For-Profit Parody: Sex, Drugs, Rock & Roll, and Beer
When courts find parodies, satire, and other nonpermissive uses of
trademarks objectionable for content-based reasons, they are very likely
to find either trademark infringement, trademark dilution, or sometimes
both. Courts have energetically enjoined unauthorized commercial uses
or invocations of trademarks which include sex and drug references, and
anything found to be “unwholesome.”

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
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Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., 109 F.3d at 1405–06; see supra note 325.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986).
Id. at 911.
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 833–34.
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In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,334 a
trademark was found to be damaged by the unauthorized use of a
“strikingly similar” mark in a pornographic film entitled “Debbie Does
Dallas.”
The plaintiff was described as the “Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dallas Cowboys
Football Club, Inc.,”335 linguistically characterizing the cheerleaders as a
commercial entertainment service owned by, and aimed at, men. The
court rather scathingly characterized the disputed use of the mark as
follows:
In November 1978 the Pussycat Cinema began to show “Debbie Does Dallas,”
a gross and revolting sex film whose plot, to the extent that there is one,
involves a cheerleader at a fictional high school, Debbie, who has been selected
to become a “Texas Cowgirl.” In order to raise enough money to send Debbie,
and eventually the entire squad, to Dallas, the cheerleaders perform sexual
services for a fee. The movie consists largely of a series of scenes graphically
depicting the sexual escapades of the “actors.” In the movie’s final scene
Debbie dons a uniform strikingly similar to that worn by the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders and for approximately twelve minutes of film footage engages in
various sex acts while clad or partially clad in the uniform.336

The court noted with apparent horror that “Defendants advertised the
movie with marquee posters depicting Debbie in the allegedly infringing
uniform and containing such captions as ‘Starring Ex Dallas Cowgirl
Cheerleader Bambi Woods,’”337 despite the fact that “Bambi Woods, the
woman who played the role of Debbie, is not now and never has been a
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader.”338 Clearly appalled by the film, and
perhaps feeling protective and paternal toward the Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders’ image in commerce, the court articulated the trademark
confusion standard very broadly, holding:
In order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that the owner of the mark
actually produced the item and placed it on the market. The public’s belief that
the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark
satisfies the confusion requirement. In the instant case, the uniform depicted in
“Debbie Does Dallas” unquestionably brings to mind the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders. Indeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen
defendants’ sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from
plaintiff’s cheerleaders. This association results in confusion which has “a

334. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979).
335. Id. at 202.
336. Id. at 202–03 (footnote omitted).
337. Id. at 203.
338. Id. at 203 n.2.
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tendency to impugn [plaintiff’s services] and injure plaintiff’s business
reputation . . . .”339

Concluding that “trademark laws are designed not only to prevent
consumer confusion but also to protect ‘the synonymous right of a
trademark owner to control his product’s reputation,’”340 the court
affirmed the Dallas Cowboy’s Football Club’s right to control the
reputation of its product, the cheerleaders, in commerce, though one
might conclude the reputation of true concern had more to do with
sexuality than trademarks. Though the immediate target of this parody
was an organization of female cheerleaders, the parody was deemed to
effect and demean a male-oriented product, an owned accessory to an
NFL franchise football team.
In General Electric Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co.,341 General Electric
objected to the defendant’s use of a humorous but ribald “Genital
Electric” monogram on underpants and T-shirts that it marketed. The
court found actionable infringement after remarkably concluding that
“there is great probability of confusion among the general public of
plaintiff’s trademarks and defendant’s imitation.”342 Alternatively, in
The Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., the court found
consumer confusion was unlikely, but still enjoined the defendant’s
publication of a parody in which the Pillsbury Doughboy participated in
sexually explicit satirical drawing.”343 The court held that the cartoon
diluted the distinctive value of Pillsbury’s all-American iconic value and
injured the company’s business reputation.344
When New Line Cinema produced a feature film satirizing beauty
contests in rural Minnesota that portrayed them as jealous backbiters,
suggested the participants tend to suffer from eating disorders, and
contained “off-color humor and content,” it was enjoined from calling
the movie “Dairy Queens.”345 The dairy treat retailer that holds the
“Dairy Queen” trademark successfully argued that the title “Dairy
Queens” would “cause the public to associate its trademarked name with
the unwholesome content of the film . . . [an] association [that would]
create negative impressions and confuse its customers, thereby
demeaning and disparaging its mark.”346
339. Id. at 204–05 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
340. Id. at 205.
341. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979).
342. Id. at 1037.
343. The Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 135–36 (N.D.
Ga. 1981).
344. Id.
345. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728–29
(D. Minn. 1998).
346. Id. at 729.
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A different sort of purity was at issue in Chemical Corp. of America v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., in which the slogan for a floor wax containing
insecticide, “Where there’s life . . . there’s bugs,” was held to infringe a
beer marketing slogan, “Where there’s life . . . there’s Bud.”347 The
court held that “the use of the ‘bugs’ slogan would cause confusion in
the minds of the public as to the source of the floor wax product and
would damage the ‘public image’ of [Anheuser-Busch] by associating in
the minds of the public the idea of bugs with a food product.”348
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., a court enjoined the
defendant’s merchandising of posters that partially reproduced a
“familiar ‘Coca-Cola’ trademark and distinctive format” except for the
substitution of the script letters “ine” for “-Cola,” so that the poster read
“Enjoy Cocaine.”349 The court wrote:
Although it contends that the word “Coca-Cola” as such does not appear
anywhere on the poster one would have to be a visitor from another planet not
to recognize immediately the familiar “Coca” in its stylized script and
accompanying words, colors and design. Indeed, defendant’s assertion that “the
poster was intended to be a spoof, satirical, funny, and to have a meaning
exactly the opposite of the word content” would be meaningless except in the
context of an immediately recognizable association with the “Coca-Cola”
trademark. This is buttressed by the only change made in the new poster, i.e.,
“Raid-Mark” in place of “Trade-Mark”—a clear indication of defendant’s
predatory intent, however humorous defendant considers it.350

The court further opined: “To associate such a noxious substance as
cocaine with plaintiff’s wholesome beverage as symbolized by its
‘Coca-Cola’ trademark and format would clearly have a tendency to
impugn that product and injure plaintiff’s business reputation . . . .”351
347. Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.
1962).
348. Id. at 436. This case apparently made an impression on Justice Breyer who
asked during a recent oral argument in a trademark dilution case before the Supreme
Court whether a necessary element of dilution is “tarnishment” of reputation, “giving the
example of ‘Bugweiser’ bug spray, which might not lead Budweiser consumers to
believe that their beer has Deet in it, but which might nevertheless lead them to think,
according to Breyer: ‘Budweiser. Yuck.’” Lithwick, supra note 123.
349. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
350. Id. at 1187.
351. Id. at 1189. Similarly, in Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d
Cir. 1994), a television commercial for a competing lawnmower tractor that humorously
invoked the famous Deere trademark (“a proud, majestic deer”), in the form of a cartoon
deer that was cowardly and afraid, was held to be violation of the New York antidilution
statute. The court wrote, “Alterations of that sort, accomplished for the sole purpose of
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Trademark holders sometimes triumph over speech interests even
when the message is not prurient in nature. Where a company
commercially produced and distributed religious tract cards and window
display stickers which closely resembled Master Charge credit cards,
and bore the legend “Give Christ charge of your life,” the court found
trademark infringement and dilution and admonished the defendant to
“utilize numerous means of conveying their commendable religious
message without the apparent appropriation of the plaintiff’s marks.”352
Thus, amalgams of trademark infringement and trademark dilution
theory have been used by courts to impede or silence speech related uses
of trademarks simply because they are commercial in some respect.
Where the unauthorized use implicates something a court finds
unsavory, such as sex, drugs, or bugs, trademark law is readily invoked
to “protect” the images and reputations of the marked goods and
services. Where a court feels perhaps that a product such as Barbie or
Spam deserves by its very nature to be satirized, or simply values a
broad construction of the First Amendment, marks can be parodied or
otherwise used for speech purposes even in commercial contexts.
Courts have abjectly failed to consistently articulate any logical
framework for balancing speech rights againt trademark interests. This
creates great uncertainty for potential speakers and allows some judges
to react to their personal inclinations, sterotypes, and biases by
overprotecting trademarks at the expense of freedom of speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
The educational and informational assistance trademarks provide to
consumers is often overstated, while the benefits of strong trademark
protections to mark holders are generally underestimated by judges and
commentators. “Protecting consumers” is even less supportable a
justification for broadly enforceable trademark rights when consumers
promoting a competing product . . . risk the possibility that consumers will come to
attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with
inferior goods and services.” Id. at 45; see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1036–39 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that a
merchandiser of “Garbage Pail Kids” stickers and products injured the owner of Cabbage
Patch Kids mark because of the likelihood of confusion as to origin, approval,
endorsement, or other association of defendant’s products and mark with plaintiff’s); DC
Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus. Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115–16 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(finding that the holder of Superman and Wonder Woman trademarks was damaged by
use of similar marks by singing telegram franchisor, and that defendant violated the
Lanham Act by using costumes similar to those used by characters in plaintiff’s comic
books); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839–40 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (holding that defendant’s diaper bag labeled “Gucchi Goo” injured Gucci’s mark).
352. Interbank Card Ass’n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 135 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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are incorrectly and illegitimately assumed to be idiots. Unless a mark
holder offers persuasive evidence to the contrary, courts must reject the
specter of the gullible, harried, ignorant, and stupid consumer as a
standard by which to measure likelihood of confusion. Instead, courts
should consistently embrace something along the lines of the
“reasonably careful purchaser,” with the approximate purchasing
sophistication of the judge deciding the issue—a creature far more
intelligent and discerning than the consumers currently manifest in
trademark jurisprudence. In sum, because it strengthens trademarks
without achieving any corresponding social benefit and is an improper
invocation of the judicial notice doctrine, the courts should be a little
less eager to find confusion likely simply because confusion somewhere,
somehow, on someone’s part is arguably possible.
Speech protected by the First Amendment that criticizes, parodies,
mocks, or otherwise references or invokes trademarked goods and
services should not be chilled or silenced by trademark law.
Subordinating speech rights to trademark interests not only contravenes
important constitutional principles, but also prevents consumers from
receiving certain types of information about these marks, placing these
decisions in conflict with stated goals of the Lanham Act.
Both free speech rights and efficient commerce would best be served
if courts entertained trademark infringement claims only where either
identical or exceedingly similar marks are used commercially in a
trademark sense, on directly competing or closely related goods and
services. Dilution claims should not silence speech that would otherwise
be free. Expansive property-like trademark monopolies should be allowed
only if they can be justified on the basis of sound public policy.
Protection of consumers from confusion as it is presently effectuated
does not provide such a justification. If judges are going to insist upon
constructing broad penumbras of intangible commercial property rights
around enforceable trademarks, these rights ought to attach consistently
and predictably to all trademarks within a particular mark class or
strength category. All consumers should be considered classless and
genderless, and all trademarks should be treated like Barbie, freely
available for unfettered expressive uses—even strange, sexist, sexually
charged, and impudent ones.
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